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Abstract
Studies abound investigating whether agency or stewardship theory is more applicable
within family firms. Both theories predict enhanced firm performance, but starkly contrast in
behavioral assumptions and structural prescriptions. Agency theory assumes an economic model
of man; agent behavior is based on self-interest and may conflict with the principal’s interest.
Governance structures that control and monitor agents are prescribed to thwart opportunistic
behavior and better align the goals of the principal and agent. Stewardship theory assumes a
humanistic model of man; steward behavior is based on serving others and therefore will align
with the principal’s interest. Governance structures that empower stewards are prescribed to
facilitate the continued alignment of interests. Investigations reveal that either theory can be
applicable in the unique context of family firms, thereby creating ambiguous and confounding
predictions about behavior and performance.
I address this theoretical and empirical debate by reviewing and synthesizing the family
firm literature grounded in these theories. I then conduct an empirical study to narrow the
distance between these opposing theoretical perspectives. My research investigates the
integration of agency and stewardship theories on family firm behavior and performance. My
research model intertwines components of agency and stewardship perspectives, making
predictions within, across, and in the integration of theories. Primary data collected from family
firm leaders, family employees, and nonfamily employees were analyzed in matched triads
representing 77 family firms. Results support the majority of predictions made. Contributions to
family firm literature, theory, and practice are discussed.
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CHAPTER 1: RESEARCH OVERVIEW
“Agency theory offers a rich and fruitful frame of reference by which the peculiar problems of family businesses
might be studied.”
- Chrisman, Chua, and Litz, 2004: 351
“Stewardship theory is ideal for explaining governance in the family business context.”
- Davis, Allen, and Hayes, 2010: 1093
“Agency and stewardship issues might operate side by side in some family firms. Further research is needed to
explore this possibility.”
- Chrisman, Chua, Kellermanns, and Chang, 2007: 1037

Introduction of Context and Theory
Family firms are the most prevalent type of organization around the globe (Debicki,
Matherne, Kellermanns, and Chrisman, 2009). In the US alone, family firms may account for as
much as 90% of all businesses (Anderson and Reeb, 2004) and account for 40 to 60% of the
gross national product (Schulze, Lubatkin, and Dino, 2003b). World-wide, more than two out of
every three businesses are family owned or controlled (Barnett and Kellermanns, 2006;
Westhead and Howorth, 2006). Family firms have also been characterized as the longest-lived
organizational type, with some dating back to as early as the sixth century (Astrachan, 2010).
Although family firms dominate the global landscape, research considering the family
firm as a unique organizational type has been practically non-existent until recently (Barnett and
Kellermanns, 2006; Goel, Mazzola, Phan, Pieper, and Zachary, 2012; Le Breton-Miller and
Miller, 2009). The prevalence and endurance of family firms has recently captured the attention
of organizational scholars, spawning a dramatic increase in research centering on this important
topic. Within the last decade, there has been a surge of family firm articles in both mainstream
and specialized journals and the emergence of academies, conferences, and new journals focused
on these types of organizations (Astrachan, 2010; Debicki et al., 2009). Main topics of scholarly
interest highlight the unique aspects of family firms, and include examinations of agency theory,
1

governance, altruism, familiness, and more recently, stewardship theory and the pursuit of
noneconomic goals (Chrisman, Kellermanns, Chan, and Liano, 2010).
Until such a time when these varied research efforts result in a dominant paradigm for the
field, scholars borrow traditional organizational theories, such as the opposing agency and
stewardship theories, to determine their generalizability to the family firm context. Agency
theory has been an influential and dominant perspective in the study of management for decades
(Cruz, Gómez-Mejía, and Becerra, 2010; Davis, Schoorman, and Donaldson, 1997; Nyberg,
Fulmer, Gerhart, and Carpenter, 2010). Broadly, agency theory is about the relationship between
two parties, the principal and the agent-manager (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
Specifically, it addresses this relationship from a behavioral and a structural perspective. Rooted
in economics, agency theory suggests that agents will choose opportunistic self-interested
behavior rather than behavior aimed at maximizing the principal’s interest (Davis et al., 1997;
Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). As such, principals will enact structural or
governance mechanisms to monitor the agent’s behavior, intending to thwart behavior not
aligned with the interest of the principal (Cruz et al., 2010; Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama and Jensen,
1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In turn, behavior will align and the performance of the firm
will increase (Fama, 1980).
In more recent years, stewardship theory has emerged as an alternate perspective in
organizational research (Braun and Sharma, 2007; Pieper, 2010). Stewardship theory is about the
relationship between two parties, the principal and the steward-manager (Davis et al., 1997).
Specifically, it also addresses this relationship from a behavioral and a structural perspective.
Because of its roots in sociology and psychology, stewardship theory describes a more
humanistic model of man (Argyris, 1973) than the economic view of agency theory (Corbetta
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and Salvato, 2004; Donaldson and Davis, 1991). It portrays individuals as stewards, intrinsically
motivated to put the interests of the principal ahead of self-serving interests (Corbetta and
Salvato, 2004; Zahra, Hayton, Neubaum, Dibrell, and Craig, 2008). Behavior is seen as
collectivistic and cooperative, and therefore pro-organizational (Davis et al., 1997; Eddleston,
Kellermanns, and Zellweger, 2012). To facilitate and encourage stewardship and thus increased
performance, principals create an organizational structure conducive to this behavior (Cruz et al.,
2010; Davis et al., 1997).
As described, both theories predict enhanced firm performance, but starkly contrast in
behavioral assumptions and structural prescriptions (Chrisman, Chua, Kellermanns, and Chang,
2007; Cruz et al., 2010; Wasserman, 2006; Tosi, Brownlee, Silva, and Katz, 2003). This has
created an on-going debate in family firm literature regarding the applicability of agency versus
stewardship theory in this unique context (Le Breton-Miller and Miller, 2009). Some scholars
suggest that “agency theory offers a rich and fruitful frame of reference by which the peculiar
problems of family businesses might be studied” (Chrisman, Chua, and Litz, 2004: 351), while
others describe stewardship theory as “ideal for explaining governance in the family business
context” (Davis, Allen, and Hayes, 2010: 1093). Solid arguments have been made and supported
in the family firm literature on both sides of the debate, thereby creating ambiguous and
confounding predictions about family firm behavior and performance.
Research Objective
Agency theory has received considerable research attention since its migration into the
family firm literature, and more recently, stewardship theory has followed suit (Le Breton-Miller
and Miller, 2009). Knowledge can be gained by this migration, such as new insights regarding
agency theory, stewardship theory, or importantly, the uniqueness, behavior, performance, and
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competitive advantage of family firms. Accordingly, the first objective of my dissertation
research is to review, synthesize, and expose limitations in the literature grounded to agency
theory and/or stewardship theory within family firms. Through this process, the aim is to gain
insights into the appropriateness and predictive ability of each theory on family firm behavior
and performance. The second objective of my dissertation research is to empirically investigate
predictions developed from insights gleaned from the review and synthesis.
Research Questions
My dissertation research investigates the agency versus stewardship theory debate within
a family firm context. Through both an exhaustive review and synthesis of the family firm
literature and an empirical test using primary data gathered from family firm leaders, family
employees, and nonfamily employees, I address the following research questions:
1. Are the tenets, prescriptions, and related performance outcomes of (a) agency theory
and (b) stewardship theory applicable within family firms?
2. Can the opposing prescriptions of agency theory and stewardship theory be integrated
within family firms to explain firm performance?
3. Does the family firm context (a) expand and/or (b) impose boundary conditions on
agency and stewardship theories?
Contributions
This dissertation research makes contributions to family firm literature, theory, and
practice. For family firm literature, it answers a call for examinations of agency and stewardship
theories side by side in the context of family firms (Chrisman et al., 2007). Specifically, this
research considers agency governance structures in tandem with stewardship governance
structures. In doing so, it begins to fill the gap in the family firm literature stream regarding the
value (or destructiveness) of these governance structures on performance. Although the focus is
on firm level performance, I suggest that individual behavior mediates the relationships between
4

governance structures and firm performance. Behavior is an important but neglected element of
both agency and stewardship theories, and is therefore captured in this research. Because of the
additional focus on individual behavior, this research can consider both family and nonfamily
employees of the family business, arguing that the relationships may vary by kinship status
(Davis et al., 2010). This implies that respondents are a key concern in family firm research;
results may be misleading if studies continue to mix survey responses from family and nonfamily
employees (Madison and Kellermanns, 2013). Additionally, this research makes an empirical
contribution to the family firm literature. To my knowledge, it is the first study to capture and
analyze data from matched triads comprised of the leader, a family employee, and a nonfamily
employee of the family firm.
For theory, this research provides a theoretical integration, suggests an important
boundary condition, and provides a foundation for a theoretical extension. This integrated study
is the first to capture the essence of both theories in tandem. Agency and stewardship theories
address the principal-manager relationship from a structural, behavioral, and performance
outcome perspective (Davis et al., 1997; Eisenhardt, 1989). Accordingly, I incorporate both
agency and stewardship structure and behavior in the same research model. I empirically capture
the choice of agency and stewardship structure and behavior by obtaining and analyzing survey
responses from both sides of the principal-manager relationship. Because of this integrated
approach, performance outcomes predicted within each theory and across theories can be
empirically investigated. Second, this research imposes a boundary condition around the
proposed behavioral and performance outcomes of theory when context is taken into
consideration. It empirically investigates whether outcomes of agency and stewardship
prescriptions hold equivocally between family and nonfamily employees of the family business.
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Third, this research offers an extension to agency and stewardship theories. The original theories
neglect to consider how the leader of the organization can influence the behavioral choice of
managers. This study empirically investigates whether the leader can choose and implement
governance structures that can influence the manager’s choice of agent or steward behavior. This
extension provides a new area of investigation for agency and stewardship research, particularly
as it relates to leaders influencing matched behavioral choices to obtain the desired performance
outcomes.
For practice, my research sheds light on the ambiguity surrounding the value of
governance structures for family firms. Ultimately, firm performance can be affected by both
agency and stewardship governance structures and by their varying behavioral effects on family
and nonfamily employees of the business. Accordingly, family firm leaders need to pay
particular attention when implementing these structures. Achieving optimal firm performance is
a balancing act between implementing the appropriate levels and types of governance structures
and receiving the desired behavioral outcomes from both family and nonfamily employees.
Organization of Dissertation
My dissertation contains five chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the theoretical focus (i.e.,
agency theory and stewardship theory) and the unique context (i.e., family firms). It contains a
statement of purpose, the questions that guide this research, and the intended contributions.
Chapter 2 is divided into three sections. The first section provides a broad overview of agency
theory and stewardship theory. The second section considers these theories in context by
examining the family firm literature grounded in agency and/or stewardship theories; it
highlights commonalities, reveals limitations, and provides recommendations for future research.
The third section presents a research model and the development of hypotheses for integrating
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agency and stewardship perspectives in family firms to predict firm performance. Chapter 3
outlines the methodology, including the survey instrument and approach, sample, measures, and
data analytics. Chapter 4 reports the results of the analysis. Chapter 5 concludes the dissertation
with a discussion of the results and an overall assessment regarding the appropriateness,
boundary conditions, and future research opportunities pertaining to the use of these theories
within the family firm research.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter provides a review of the literature in three major sections. The first section
provides a general overview of agency theory and stewardship theory and a more specific
comparison of the characteristics of each. The second section provides a review and synthesis of
the family firm literature grounded in agency and/or stewardship theories and calls attention to
gaps in the literature. Building from the review and seeking to address the gaps, the final section
presents a research model and development of hypotheses integrating agency and stewardship
theories in context to predict family firm performance.
Theory
Every theory should contain three necessary elements; namely the what, how, and why
(Whetten, 1989). The what seeks to describe the phenomenon and the associated factors in a
comprehensive but parsimonious way, the how describes the relationship between the factors,
and the why explains the rationale underlying the selected factors and their proposed
relationships (Reay and Whetten, 2011; Whetten, 1989). Theories should also be generalizable,
but instead often suffer from boundary conditions and limitations when context, like the where,
is taken into consideration (Lee and O’Neill, 2003; Smith and Hitt, 2005; Whetten, 1989).
Context refers to “situational opportunities and constraints that affect the occurrence and
meaning of organizational behavior as well as functional relationships between variables”
(Johns, 2006: 386).
My dissertation research considers both theory and context. The overview of agency
theory and stewardship theory1 is organized by the theoretical elements of what, how, and why.
Following the overview, I transition to the element of where by examining both agency and
1

The overview of agency theory and stewardship theory intends to summarize key theoretical elements rather than
to provide a review of the general literature applying these theories. The review of the literature is instead specific to
family firms and intends to integrate and extend these theoretical elements.
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stewardship theories specifically within family firm research to assess their strength and
generalizability with contextual considerations. I refer to the family firm context as the unique
opportunities, challenges, and resulting behavior and performance implications arising from
residing at the intersection of the family system and the business system.
Agency Theory
What. Agency theory is one of the most widely used theories in management (Arthurs
and Busenitz, 2003; Daily, Dalton and Rajagopalan, 2003; Wasserman, 2006). Broadly, agency
theory is about the relationship between two parties, the principal (owner) and the agent
(manager; Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Ross, 1973). More specifically, it
examines this relationship from a behavioral and a structural perspective. Theory suggests that
given the chance, agents will behave in a self-interested manner, behavior that may conflict with
the principal’s interest (Chrisman et al., 2004; Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen and Meckling, 1976;
Wiseman, Cuevas-Rodríguez, and Gómez-Mejía, 2012). As such, principals will enact structural
mechanisms that monitor the agent in order to curb the opportunistic behavior and better align
the parties’ interests (Cruz et al., 2010; Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama and Jensen, 1983).
How. Firm performance by way of cost minimization and greater efficiencies is the
desired outcome of the agency theory perspective (Corbetta and Salvato, 2004; Fama, 1980).
When the ownership and management of a firm are separated, theory suggests that agency
problems are created, and agency costs are incurred to alleviate these problems (Eisenhardt,
1989; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Karra, Tracey, and Phillips, 2006; Lee and O’Neill, 2003;
Wasserman, 2006). To elaborate, separation of ownership and management is a key component
of agency theory; the principal authorizes or delegates work to the agent, and the agent is
expected to act in the best interest of the principal (Ross, 1973; Wiseman et al., 2012). An
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agency problem is created when the interest of the principal and agent are misaligned and the
principal lacks the information to accurately assess the behavior of the agent (Eisenhardt, 1989;
Karra et al., 2006; Lee and O’Neill, 2003; Ross, 1973). Agency problems can take the form of
moral hazard or adverse selection (Chrisman et al., 2004; Eisenhardt, 1989; Karra et al., 2006).
Moral hazard refers to the situation where the agent lacks effort in the scope of the employment
relationship (Chrisman et al., 2004; Ross, 1973). It is considered a form of opportunistic
behavior that includes free-riding, shirking, and perk-consumption (Chrisman et al., 2004; Chua
et al., 2009; Karra et al., 2006). Adverse selection refers to the situation where the agent lacks the
ability and skills to competently behave in the scope of the employment relationship (Eisenhardt,
1989; Fama, 1980; Schulze et al., 2001).
Theory suggests the principal has two options for reducing agency problems (Eisenhardt,
1989), both of which can curb the agent’s opportunistic behavior. The first is to create a
governance structure that enables the monitoring and assessment of the actual behavior of the
agent (Anderson and Reeb, 2004; Chrisman et al., 2007). This structure includes for example,
reporting procedures, additional management, or a board of directors (Donaldson and Davis,
1991). The second is to create a governance structure where the contract is based on the actual
outcome of the agent’s behavior (Eisenhardt, 1989). An example of this type of structural
mechanism is compensation incentive pay (Chrisman et al., 2007), where pay is provided as an
incentive for high performance. Risk is thus shifted to the agent, creating the motivation for the
agent’s behavior to align with the principal’s interest (Davis et al., 1997; Eisenhardt, 1989). In
essence, the principal makes a choice between establishing governance structures based on the
agent’s actual behavior or the outcomes of that behavior (Eisenhardt, 1989). Either choice
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creates agency costs, the costs borne by the principal to monitor and assess agent behavior
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
Why. The underlying assumption of agency theory is based on the economic model of
man (Davis et al., 1997; Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This model assumes that
individuals will seek to optimize their own utility. In the principal-agent relationship, an agent is
hired to maximize the principal’s utility (Ross, 1973). However, agency theory assumes agents
will instead behave opportunistically because they too are self-serving. Therefore, the principal
enacts mechanisms to minimize losses to their own utility (Davis et al., 1997; Eisenhardt, 1989;
Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Ross, 1973).
Stewardship Theory
What. Stewardship theory is also about the employment relationship between two parties,
the principal (owner) and the steward (manager; Davis et al., 1997; Donaldson and Davis, 1991).
It too examines this relationship from a behavioral and a structural perspective. Theory suggests
that stewards will behave in a pro-social manner, behavior which is aimed at the interest of the
principal and thus the organization (Davis et al., 1997; Zahra et al., 2009). This behavior is
fostered by the quality of the relationship between the principal and steward and the environment
and ideals of the organization (Corbetta and Salvato, 2004; Davis et al., 1997).
How. Maximum firm performance, such as sales growth or profitability, is the desired
outcome of a stewardship perspective (Davis et al., 1997; Tosi et al., 2003). Theory suggests this
outcome is achieved when both the principal and the manager in the employment relationship
select to behave as stewards (Davis et al., 1997). At the heart of stewardship theory is the
assumption that the principal-steward relationship is based on a choice. When both parties
choose to behave as stewards and place the principal’s interest first, theory suggests a positive
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impact on performance because both parties are working toward the same goal (Davis et al.,
1997; Eddleston and Kellermanns, 2007).
The choice of stewardship behavior is impacted by both psychological and situational
factors (Corbetta and Salvato, 2004; Davis et al., 1997; Vallejo, 2009). Psychological factors
such as intrinsic motivation, high identification, and personal power can steer the behavioral
choice to stewardship (Davis et al., 1997; Zahra et al., 2008). Intrinsic motivation exists within
individuals and provides satisfaction in and of itself (Ryan and Deci, 2000); it is a psychological
attribute of stewardship theory because steward managers are motivated by intangible, higher
order rewards (Davis et al., 1997; Lee and O’Neill, 2003). Individuals who have high levels of
identification with their organization are more likely to choose stewardship because they feel a
strong sense of membership with their organization (Lee and O’Neill, 2003; Vallejo, 2009; Zahra
et al., 2008). Stewardship theory applies a personal power perspective, describing power based
on interpersonal relationships that develop over time (Davis et al., 1997) which in turn influence
and empower steward managers. These psychological factors facilitate the choice of stewardship,
which ultimately have a positive impact on firm performance.
Situational factors depict the organizational structure and include the management
philosophy and culture (Craig and Dibrell, 2006; Davis et al., 1997; Donaldson and Davis, 1991;
Zahra et al., 2008). Theory suggests that involvement-oriented, collectivist, low power distance
cultures help influence the choice of stewardship behavior (Davis et al., 1997). An involvementoriented management philosophy is portrayed by an environment where employees are trusted
with challenges, opportunities, and responsibility (Davis et al., 1997; Eddleston et al., 2012;
Vallejo, 2009). In organizations typified by collectivism, individuals put the goals of the
collective ahead of individual personal goals; the emphasis is on belonging, identifying, and
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displaying loyalty due to the tight-knit social framework present in the organization (Davis et al.,
1997; Nicholson, 2008). Low power distance describes an environment where equality is
perceived between different levels of the organizational hierarchy (Davis et al., 1997). An
organizational structure that accommodates and influences the choice of stewardship behavior
helps facilitate maximum performance for the firm.
Why. The underlying assumption of stewardship theory is based on the humanistic model
of man due to its foundation in sociology and psychology (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). This
model assumes that individuals are motivated by higher order needs fulfillment (Davis et al.,
1997). In the principal-steward relationship, a steward will put the interests of the principal ahead
of self-serving interests (Corbetta and Salvato, 2004; Davis et al., 1997; Davis et al., 2010; Zahra
et al., 2009). A principal will create an organizational structure where these stewardship
behaviors can flourish. As such, a stewardship structure is seen as collectivistic and cooperative,
resulting in positive benefits for the organization (Davis et al., 1997).
Summary
The essential theoretical elements of what, how, and why (Whetten, 1989) are both
addressed by agency and stewardship theories. As shown in Table 2.1, both theories seek to
address the same what: agency theory and stewardship theory are based on the principal-manager
employment relationship, and describe the behavior of the parties and the resulting structure of
the organization. Likewise, both theories seek to address the same outcome, firm performance
(Davis et al., 1997; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Tosi et al., 2003). However, the theories differ in the
how and why: agency theory suggests that increased performance is the result of the principal
implementing governance structures to curb the opportunistic behavior of the agent, based on the
assumed economic model of man; whereas, stewardship theory suggests increased performance
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is the result of the principal encouraging a governance structure that empowers and motivates
pro-organizational behavior of the steward, based on the assumed humanistic model of man.

Table 2.1: Summary of Agency and Stewardship Theoretical Elements
Agency Theory
Based on the principal-manager employment
relationship: describes the behavior of the parties
and the resulting structural mechanisms of the
organization

Stewardship Theory
Based on the principal-manager employment
relationship: describes the behavior of the parties
and the resulting structural mechanisms of the
organization

How

Performance: principal enacts governance
mechanisms to curb an agent’s opportunistic
behavior

Performance: principal creates an environment
conducive to facilitating a steward’s proorganizational behavior

Why

Economic model of man: individual/self-serving

Humanistic model of man: collective/other-serving

What

Agency Theory versus Stewardship Theory
A discussion of each theory in isolation was just provided; however, a discussion of both
agency theory and stewardship theory in comparison is warranted as well. As described, both
theories depict the same phenomena: the employment relationship between a principal and a
manager and its related organizational performance outcome (Tosi et al., 2003). The major
difference is the assumed model of man, economic versus humanistic (Corbetta and Salvato,
2004). Accordingly, agency theory and stewardship theory starkly contrast in their depiction of
behavior and governance structures (Wasserman, 2006).
The behavioral differences between agency and stewardship perspectives are pronounced
in the psychological factors of motivation and identification (Davis et al., 1997; Jaskiewicz and
Klein, 2007; Lee and O’Neill, 2003; Tosi et al., 2003). Motivation is the drive or impetus to act
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(Ryan and Deci, 2000). It is broadly categorized as either extrinsic or intrinsic. Extrinsic
motivation is typified as the drive for an external reward (i.e., a separable outcome). Due to the
assumed economic model of man, agency theory is characterized by extrinsic motivation, where
individuals are motivated by quantifiable economic gain. Intrinsic motivation exists within
individuals and provides satisfaction in and of itself (Ryan and Deci, 2000). Due to the assumed
humanistic model of man, stewardship theory is characterized by intrinsic motivation, where
individuals are motivated by intangible, higher order rewards (Davis et al., 1997).
Identification describes the connection an individual feels with the organization (Brown,
1969; Mael and Ashforth, 1992). High levels of identification create the desire to work toward
the organization’s success (Bass, 1960). Agency theory depicts managers as having a low level
of identification with the organization, thus allowing for self-serving interests to be chosen over
the principal’s interests (Davis et al., 1997). In contrast, stewardship theory depicts managers as
having a high level of identification with their organization that it is seen as an extension of the
self (Davis et al., 1997). High identification empowers stewards to work toward solving
problems and attaining organizational goals, thereby fulfilling intrinsic rewards and the interest
of the principal (Davis et al., 1997).
There are also structural differences in organizations depicted by either agency or
stewardship perspectives, as evidenced by the environment and culture. The organizational
environment can range from control-oriented to involvement-oriented. The organizational culture
can range from individualistic to collectivistic. Control-oriented and individualistic environments
are depicted through agency structures, such as the monitoring and controlling activities
principals place on agents to curb individualistic self-interest (Davis et al., 1997; Eisenhardt,
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1989). In contrast, involvement-oriented and collectivistic cultures highlight the stewardship
perspective (Davis et al., 1997).
Conclusion
The distinction between theories is found in the behavioral assumptions and the structural
prescriptions. From a behavioral perspective, agency theory describes behavior rooted in an
economic model of man; agent behavior will be based on self-interest and may conflict with the
principal’s interest. Stewardship theory describes behavior rooted in a more humanistic model of
man; steward behavior will be based on serving others and therefore will align with the
principal’s interest. From a structural perspective, agency theory prescribes governance
mechanisms that control and monitor agents in order to thwart opportunistic behavior and better
align the goals of the principal and agent. Stewardship theory instead prescribes an
organizational environment where stewards are trusted and empowered, and where control and
monitoring mechanisms are not needed because goals of the principal and steward are already
aligned. Both agency and stewardship theories suggest that performance is enhanced by the
prescriptions set forth.
To reiterate, Figure 2.1 offers an illustration of the prescriptions and outcomes related to
each theoretical perspective. As depicted, agency theory suggests that performance will increase
when governance and control mechanisms are in place to monitor and curb the agent’s
opportunistic behavior (i.e., high levels of governance mechanisms, high level of performance).
Without these controls, it is assumed that agents will act opportunistically creating costs and
lower levels of organizational performance (i.e., low levels of governance mechanisms, low level
of performance). The opposite is theorized by the tenets of stewardship theory. According to
stewardship theory, performance increases when the organizational structure is characterized by
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fewer monitoring and control mechanisms; this type of governance structure empowers and
motivates stewards to pro-organizational behavior (i.e., low levels of governance mechanisms,
high level of performance). With controls in place, it is assumed that stewards will feel betrayed
and motivation and pro-organizational behavior will decrease (i.e., high levels of governance
mechanisms, low level of performance).

Agency
Theory

High

Firm
Performance

Stewardship
Theory

Low

High

Low

Governance Mechanisms / Controls

Figure 2.1: Agency and Stewardship Prescriptions and Related Performance Outcomes

In summary, agency and stewardship theories both contain the essential elements of
theory. Each theory has predictive and explanatory power as shown in the descriptions of the
what, how, and why. However, the question remains as to whether the theories are adequate and
relevant when context is taken into consideration. In other words, are expansions necessary or
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boundary conditions or limitations apparent if the where is considered? In order to assess their
strength and generalizability, the next section of this chapter examines agency and stewardship
theories within family firms, an important organizational context.
Context
Although family firms are deemed the most prevalent and oldest organizational type,
scholarly investigations of these businesses are considerably less common and relatively recent
(Goel et al., 2012). With research on family firms still in the early stages, guidelines for
researchers are imperative. Importantly, research in this realm “should describe why family
businesses are distinct, how the uniqueness builds, and how and under what conditions this may
lead to a competitive advantage” (Klein, Astrachan, and Smyrnios, 2005: 333). Accordingly,
family firm governance and its related performance implications has been a topic of interest due
to the unique structures and dynamics brought about by residing at the intersection of the family
system and the business system (Goel et al., 2012). Since agency theory and stewardship theory
address governance and firm performance, it is therefore not surprising that they have served as
theoretical lenses within family firm research.
However, agency and stewardship theories offer opposing assumptions and predictions
for firm performance, and therefore have sparked an on-going debate in the family firm literature
regarding their applicability. Solid arguments have been made and supported on both sides of the
debate. Investigations reveal that either theory can be applicable in the unique context of family
firms, thereby creating ambiguous and confounding predictions about behavior and performance.
A review and synthesis of this literature is provided next.
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Characteristics of the Literature Reviewed
Forty articles grounded in agency theory and/or stewardship theory within the context of
family firms serve as the basis for this review. Articles were found through an electronic and
manual search of the family firm literature using combinations of keywords such as family firm,
family business, family enterprise plus agency theory, agency costs, or stewardship theory.
Family firm articles citing the seminal theoretical works (e.g., Davis et al., 1997; Donaldson and
Davis, 1991; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989) were also reviewed to determine
appropriateness for inclusion. To be considered for inclusion, the theoretical underpinning for the
conceptual or empirical model had to be agency or stewardship theory. Table 2.2 provides an
alphabetical list and the characteristics of these forty articles.
As shown in Table 2.2, the mix of twelve conceptual and twenty-eight empirical articles
were published in mainstream management journals, such as Academy of Management Journal,
Journal of Management Studies, and Journal of Management, in entrepreneurship journals,
including Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice and Journal of Business Venturing, and in
family firm specific outlets such as Family Business Review and Journal of Family Business
Strategy. In the broadest sense, the literature can be grouped by the theoretical perspective
adopted; namely, agency theory (22 articles), stewardship theory (11 articles), and the adoption
of both theoretical lenses (7 articles).
From an authorship perspective, seventeen of the top-25 most published family firm
scholars authored these articles (see Debicki et al., 2009): grouped by theoretical lens, the agency
scholars include Steier, Chua, Chrisman, Dino, Gómez-Mejía, Habbershon, Lubatkin, Sharma,
and Schulze; stewardship scholars include Eddleston and Zahra; authors simultaneously
supporting both theories include Astrachan, Howorth, Le Breton-Miller, Miller, and Westhead;
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the only top-25 ranked author who has work separately supporting agency theory and
stewardship theory is Kellermanns.
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Table 2.2: Agency and Stewardship Theory Research in a Family Firm Context
Authors

Journal

Article Type

Theoretical Perspective

Anderson & Reeb (2003)
Anderson & Reeb (2004)
Block (2012)
Blumentritt, Keyt, & Astrachan (2007)
Braun & Sharma (2007)
Chirico, Ireland, & Sirmon (2011)
Chrisman, Chua, Kellermanns, & Chang (2007)
Chrisman, Chua, & Litz (2004)
Chua, Chrisman, & Bergiel (2009)
Chua, Steier, & Chrisman (2006)
Corbetta & Salvato (2004)
Craig & Dibrell (2006)
Cruz, Gómez-Mejía, & Becerra (2010)
Davis, Allen, & Hayes (2010)
Dawson (2011)
Dibrell & Moeller (2011)
Eddleston (2008)
Eddleston & Kellermanns (2007)
Eddleston, Kellermanns, & Zellweger (2012)
Habbershon (2006)
Herrero (2011)
Jaskiewicz & Klein (2007)
Karra, Tracey, & Phillips (2006)
Le Breton-Miller & Miller (2009)
Lester & Cannella (2006)
Lubatkin, Durand, & Ling (2007)
Lubatkin, Ling, Schulze (2007)
Miller, Le Breton-Miller, & Scholnick (2008)
Nicholson (2008)
Pearson & Marler (2010)
Pieper, Klein, & Jaskiewicz (2008)
Prencipe, Markarian, & Pozza (2008)
Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino (2003a)
Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino (2003b)
Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, & Buchholtz (2001)
Sciascia, Mazzola, Astrachan, & Pieper (2012)
Tsai, Hung, Kuo, & Kuo (2006)
Vallejo (2009)
Westhead & Howorth (2006)
Zahra, Hayton, Neubaum, Dibrell, & Craig (2008)

Journal of Finance
ASQ
JBV
FBR
FBR
ETP
JBR
ETP
ETP
ETP
ETP
FBR
AMJ
ETP
JBV
JFBS
ETP
JBV
ETP
ETP
JoM
JBR
ETP
ETP
ETP
JBR
JMS
JMS
AMP
ETP
JSBM
FBR
JBV
AMJ
Org Science
Small Bus Econ
FBR
JBE
FBR
ETP

Empirical
Empirical
Empirical
Empirical
Empirical
Conceptual
Empirical
Empirical
Conceptual
Conceptual
Conceptual
Empirical
Empirical
Empirical
Empirical
Empirical
Conceptual
Empirical
Empirical
Conceptual
Empirical
Empirical
Empirical
Conceptual
Conceptual
Conceptual
Conceptual
Empirical
Conceptual
Conceptual
Empirical
Empirical
Empirical
Empirical
Empirical
Empirical
Empirical
Empirical
Empirical
Empirical

Agency Theory
Agency Theory
Agency Theory
Both
Agency Theory
Agency Theory
Agency Theory
Agency Theory
Agency Theory
Agency Theory
Stewardship Theory
Stewardship Theory
Agency Theory
Stewardship Theory
Agency Theory
Stewardship Theory
Stewardship Theory
Stewardship Theory
Stewardship Theory
Agency Theory
Agency Theory
Both
Agency Theory
Both
Agency Theory
Agency Theory
Agency Theory
Stewardship Theory
Agency Theory
Stewardship Theory
Both
Both
Agency Theory
Agency Theory
Agency Theory
Both
Agency Theory
Stewardship Theory
Both
Stewardship Theory
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The theoretical lens adopted coincides with the passage of time. The articles span more
than a decade from 2001 through 2012. Agency theory migrated into the family firm literature
stream first, starting with the work of Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, and Buchholtz (2001). A few
years later, the works of Corbetta and Salvato (2004) and Eddleston and Kellermanns (2007)
were the first to support stewardship theory from a conceptual and empirical approach,
respectively. Westhead and Howorth (2006) started a wave of research that adopts both agency
and stewardship perspectives. These chronological trends are evidenced by Figure 2.2.

12

10
Stewardship

8
Number
of Articles 6

Agency

4

Both

2

0
2001-2003

2004-2007

2008-2012

Publication Years

Figure 2.2: Trends in Agency and Stewardship Research in a Family Firm Context
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As shown, during the publication years 2001-2003, family firm articles applying an
agency theory perspective were the only agency/stewardship-related articles in the literature;
discussions and support for stewardship theory and both theories considered simultaneously soon
followed. Noticeable shifts began in the period 2004-2007: agency theory research in family
firms started its decline to a level below that of stewardship theory research; research supporting
a stewardship perspective in family firms drastically increased; and articles supporting both
agency and stewardship perspectives slightly increased. My review and synthesis of these
articles are organized accordingly.
Agency Theory Research
Agency theory has been a prominent lens in organizational research and more specifically
in family firm research (Chrisman et al., 2005; Goel et al., 2012; Le Breton-Miller and Miller,
2009). Twenty-two of the forty articles included in this review adopt an agency theory
perspective. Table 2.3 displays an alphabetical list, description, and key findings of these articles.
After reviewing these articles, it became apparent that the articles differed by research focus.
Each article had a research focus in one of two groups; namely, one group examines whether
family firms are susceptible to agency problems (17 articles) and one group supports agency
theory perspectives and prescriptions compared to that of stewardship (5 articles). Accordingly,
the agency focus (i.e., problems or prescriptions) is shown in a column in Table 2.3, and the
literature is reviewed by group.
The group addressing agency problems in the context of family firms includes eight
conceptual and nine empirical articles. The focus of the articles is on the unique characteristics
that create agency problems in family firms, and how they affect the relationship between
various governance mechanisms and performance, competitive advantage, or agency costs. The
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majority of empirical articles sample private family firms (i.e., 6 private using primary data; 3
public using secondary data) in the US (i.e., 6 US, 1 Spain, 1 Turkey, 1 Taiwan).
The group addressing agency prescriptions provides empirical support that agency theory
is more applicable in a family firm context when compared with a stewardship perspective. Two
articles use public firm samples and secondary data; two use private firm samples and primary
data; the majority uses US samples, and all use regression to explore variations in performance,
with the exception of one that considers CEO perceptions. The fifth article samples private
equity firms and their perceptions of family firms. A synthesis of the literature within each group
is provided next.

24

Table 2.3: Agency Theory Research in a Family Firm Context
Authors

Sample

Firm Type

Respondent

Data Analysis

IV

DV

Agency Focus

Key Findings

Anderson & Reeb
(2003)

141 family & 262
nonfamily firms
-US-

Public

n/a secondary
data

Regression

Firm type
(family/nonfamily)

Performance
(tobin’s Q &
ROA)

Agency Problem
-n/a

Family firms outperform
nonfamily firms; family
ownership reduces
opportunism

Anderson & Reeb
(2004)

141 family & 262
nonfamily firms
-US-

Public

n/a -secondary
data

Regression

Board independence
Family influence

Performance
(tobin’s Q)

Agency
Prescriptions

Agency prescriptions apply
in family firms; family
directors monitor business;
independent directors
monitor family

Block (2012)

154 family firms
-US-

Public

n/a -secondary
data

Regression

R&D spending
Family ownership

R&D productivity
(sales)

Agency Problem
-Family ownership

Family ownership creates
agency costs; face moral
hazard and information
asymmetry

Braun & Sharma
(2007)

84 family firms
-US-

Public

n/a -secondary
data

Regression

CEO duality
Family ownership

Performance
(market returns)

Agency
Prescriptions

CEO duality does not
affect family firm
performance; agency
prescriptions protect
minority shareholders

Chirico, Ireland, &
Sirmon (2011)

-theoretical
sampleFamily firms
pursuing growth

Relationships
Training/support
Mutual selection

Competitive
advantage

Agency Problem
-n/a

Concentrated ownership
and management are
beneficial for franchising;
assumes lack of agency
problems

Chrisman, Chua, &
Litz (2004)

901 family & 240
nonfamily firms
-US-

Private

Principal
(Firm)

Regression

Strategic planning
Board of Directors

Performance
(sales growth)

Agency Problem
-Non-economic
goals

Agency problems are
decreased with family
involvement

Chrisman, Chua,
Kellermanns, & Chang
(2007)

208 family firms
-US-

Private

Principal
(owner
managers)

Regression

Monitoring
Incentive
compensation

Performance

Agency
Prescriptions

Family managers are
agents; agency
prescriptions increase firm
performance

Chua, Chrisman, &
Bergiel (2009)

-theoretical
sampleProfessionalized
family firm

Compensation and
Performance
Evaluation Systems

Performance

Agency Problem
-Altruism
-Noneconomic
goals

Altruism can be costly to
family firms; lower
motivation and increased
opportunism of nonfamily
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Table 2.3. Continued.
Authors

Sample

Firm Type

Respondent

Chua, Steier, &
Chrisman (2006)

-conceptual-

Cruz, Gómez-Mejía, &
Becerra (2010)

122 family firms
-US-

Public

Principal
(CEO)

Dawson (2011)

35 private equity
firms
-Italy-

n/a

Karra, Tracey, &
Phillips (2006)

1 family firm
-Turkey-

Private

Habbershon (2006)

-conceptual-

Herrero (2011)

58 family & 33
nonfamily firms
-Spain-

Private

IV

DV

Agency Focus

Key Findings

Board interlocks

Performance

Agency Problem
-Intra-family
agency costs

The agency costs of family
firms can be offset by
social capital

Regression

Family relations
Family ownership
Pay

CEO perception of
TMT benevolence

Agency
Prescriptions

CEO perceptions and trust
impact agency contracts
and implementation of
agency prescriptions

Principal
(Investor)

HLM

Family involvement
and ownership

Investment
assessment

Agency
Prescriptions

Investors associate family
and business negatively;
prefer to invest in
professional family firms

Principal
(CEO)

Qualitative
case study

Employees
(family/nonfamily)

Agency costs

Agency Problem
-Altruism

Family influence decreases
and increases agency
problems depending on the
business stage

Governance
systems

Competitive
advantage

Agency Problem
-Life Cycle

Extends Karra et al (2006);
governance systems must
match life cycle

Relationship of
owner-manager
(family/nonfamily)

Efficiency

Agency Problem
-Family relations

Family firms outperform
nonfamily firms; have
reduced agency problems

Lester & Cannella
(2006)

-theoretical
sample-

Public

Firm type
(family/nonfamily)

Performance

Agency Problem
- Organizational
structure

Family firm agency costs
can be reduced with board
interlocks

Lubatkin, Durand, &
Ling (2007)

-conceptual-

Altruism

Agency costs

Agency Problem
-Altruism

Altruism explains
variances in governance
efficiencies more than
agency theory

Principal
(Owner)

Data Analysis

Stochastic
frontier
analysis
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Table 2.3. Continued.
Authors

Sample

Lubatkin, Ling,
Schulze (2007)

Firm Type
Private

Respondent

Data Analysis

IV

DV

Agency Focus

Key Findings

-theoretical
sample-

Altruism
Justice violations

Agency costs

Agency Problem
-Altruism

Considers justice
perceptions of agency
prescriptions of
family/nonfamily
employees.

Nicholson (2008)

-conceptual-

Leadership
Good governance

Survival

Agency Problem
-Family passions

Family firms suffer from
agency problems; they can
survive with good
governance and leadership

Schulze, Lubatkin, &
Dino (2003a)

883 family firms
-US-

Private

Principal
(CEO)

Regression

Pay incentives

Performance
(sales growth)

Agency Problem
-Altruism

Family firms have unique
agency problems; created
by altruism

Schulze, Lubatkin, &
Dino (2003b)

1464 family firms
-US-

Private

Principal
(CEO)

Regression

Shares/voting
power of board

Debt

Agency Problem
-Altruism

Proportion of family
ownership influences
board conduct

Schulze, Lubatkin,
Dino, & Buchholtz
(2001)

1376 family firms
-US-

Private

Principal
(CEO)

Regression

Pay incentives
Strategic planning
Board entrenchment

Performance
(sales growth)

Agency Problem
-Altruism

Altruism creates agency
problems; family firms
must incur agency costs

Tsai, Hung, Kuo, &
Kuo (2006)

63 family & 241
nonfamily firms
-Taiwan-

Public

n/a secondary
data

Survival
analysis

Performance (ROA)
CEO ownership
Board ownership

CEO tenure

Agency Problem
-n/a

Family firms need to refine
governance systems;
agency theory is not
suitable for family firms
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Agency Problems. At the heart of agency theory is the separation of ownership and
management and the problems that arise from this separation (Eisenhardt, 1989). This ownermanager conflict is referred to as a Type I agency problem (Villalonga and Amit, 2006).
However, it was assumed that family firms are not susceptible to Type I agency problems due to
a lack of separation among owners and managers (Chrisman et al., 2004; Goel et al., 2012;
Jensen and Meckling, 1976); and therefore, agency perspectives remained absent in this
organizational context. However, the work of Schulze and his colleagues challenged this logic
(Schulze et al., 2001; Schulze, Lubatkin, and Dino, 2003a, 2003b), and thus began an important
stream of literature. This stream seeks to conceptually and empirically demonstrate that family
firms are indeed susceptible to agency problems and costs due to their unique aspects. Research
supports nontraditional agency problems that are specific to the family firm context, created for
example by asymmetric altruism (Moores, 2009; Schulze et al., 2001, 2003) and entrenched
family ownership (Block, 2012; Moores, 2009; Nicholson, 2008).
Altruism is often regarded as selfless behavior that benefits others, but is presented in a
much different light by agency theorists (Eddleston, Kellermanns, and Sarathy, 2008). Agency
theory perspectives refer to altruism as asymmetric, which describes behavior that is exploitable,
not reciprocal, and can cause harm to family firms (Chua et al., 2009; Wright and Kellermanns,
2011). Asymmetric altruism can create both moral hazard and adverse selection agency problems
within the context of family firms (Schulze et al., 2001, 2003a). Family firms are embedded in
family relationships, such as the parent-child relationship (Schulze et al., 2003a). Scholars
suggest that parents can be overly generous to their children, and that their children may take
advantage of this generosity by shirking or free-riding (Dawson, 2011; Eddleston et al., 2008;
Schulze et al., 2001, 2003a). This moral hazard agency problem is compounded by the
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propensity in family firms for family leaders to refrain from monitoring other family members’
behavior (Chua, Chrisman, Kellermanns, and Wu, 2011; Eddleston, Chrisman, Steier, and Chua,
2010). Asymmetric altruism can also create adverse selection agency problems when family
firms hire family members instead of nonfamily regardless of whether they are the most qualified
or skilled for the position (Karra et al., 2006; Schulze et al., 2001, 2003a), and may even pay
them more generously (Chua et al., 2009). These asymmetric altruism-created agency problems
result in decreased family firm performance (Eddleston et al., 2010; Wright and Kellermanns,
2011), or create the necessity for family firms to incur agency costs by implementing governance
mechanisms to monitor and assess behavior (Chua et al., 2009; Lubatkin, Durand, and Ling,
2007).
Entrenched family ownership can also create agency problems specific to family firms.
Entrenchment is defined as “the relational contract between owners and managers that enable
both to occupy key positions in the firm for a significant duration” (Moores, 2009: 172). Family
ownership is often described as an effective organizational structure because it reduces Type I
agency problems associated with the separation of owners and managers (Anderson and Reeb,
2003; Chirico, Ireland, and Sirmon, 2011; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Tsai et al., 2006);
however, there is evidence that suggests otherwise (Block, 2012; Nicholson, 2008). Block (2012)
contends that family firm ownership is not a superior corporate governance structure because
family dynamics and conflicts are difficult to monitor. Ineffective monitoring allows for the
potential for increased moral hazard problems, and is empirically shown to be associated with
lower productivity (Block, 2012). Nicholson (2008) suggests family ownership can facilitate
agency problems such as the inability to make sound business decisions due to an excessive
emotional attachment to the firm or due to the lack of a qualified family successor for the
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business. Accordingly, governance mechanisms are necessary to alleviate these family firm
specific agency problems in order for the business to thrive (Block, 2012; Nicholson, 2008).
Additionally, family ownership can create a second type of agency problem specific to
family firms, referred to as a Type II agency problem (Ali, Chen, and Radhakrishnan, 2007; Goel
et al., 2012; Villalonga and Amit, 2006). Instead of the Type I owner-manager conflict, the Type
II represents the conflict between majority and minority shareholders (i.e., family and nonfamily
shareholders; Villalonga and Amit, 2006). An example of a Type II agency problem manifests
itself in the misalignment of shareholder goals; family firms often pursue noneconomic goals at
the expense of financial gain (Gómez-Mejía, Haynes, Nunez-Nickel, Jacobson, and MoyanoFuentes, 2007). Diverting resources to pursue the family’s noneconomic agendas may negatively
impact firm performance (Chrisman et al., 2004), thus creating conflict between family and
nonfamily shareholders.
In conclusion, this group of agency theory literature provides support that agency
problems are indeed prevalent in the family firm context. This agency problem research is
important for two reasons. First, this literature challenged original agency theory research that
argued agency problems did not exist in organizations typified by the convergence of ownership
and management (i.e., Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In
doing so, a host of nontraditional agency problems specific to family firms (i.e., asymmetric
altruism, family entrenchment, Type II agency problems) were brought to light, thus expanding
agency theory into the realm of the family firm. Second, this realization allows for continued
agency research within a family firm context, but with a different focus. It allows scholars to
research whether other tenets of agency theory are applicable in family firms. Accordingly, the
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next group of articles I reviewed shifts the focus away from agency problems, and instead
focuses on agency prescriptions2.
Agency Prescriptions. Five articles in my review support agency theory’s applicability
within family firms by examining outcomes of agency prescriptions. Three of these articles are
similar with their focus on firm performance (e.g., Anderson and Reeb, 2004; Braun and Sharma,
2007; Chrisman et al., 2007), the remaining two offer unique perceptual perspectives (e.g., Cruz,
Gómez-Mejía, and Becerra, 2010; Dawson, 2011). A summary of agency prescriptions
impacting firm performance and perception outcomes is provided next.
The three articles examining firm performance focus their attention on boards of directors
(Anderson and Reeb, 2004; Braun and Sharma, 2007), incentive compensation (Chrisman et al.,
2007), and monitoring activities (Chrisman et al., 2007) as agency prescriptions to mitigate
agency problems within family firms. Anderson and Reeb (2004) examine board independence
and family influence to support their contention that an agency lens is applicable to family firms.
They conclude that monitoring mechanisms such as a board of directors are necessary; outside
board members are put in place to monitor the family, and family members have a place on the
board to monitor the business (Anderson and Reeb, 2004). Likewise, Chrisman and his
colleagues (2007) explore the motivations and control of family firm managers to determine if
they are agents or stewards. They conclude that family managers are agents because family firms
using governance mechanisms prescribed by agency theory (i.e., monitoring, incentive
compensation) have higher levels of performance (Chrisman et al., 2007). Braun and Sharma

2

Some articles examine both agency problems and agency prescriptions. I interpreted the primary focus and
grouped each article accordingly. One factor that attributed to my grouping decision was the theoretical grounding:
all agency problem articles used agency theory only; all agency prescription articles pitted agency theory with
stewardship theory finding support for the agency perspective.
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(2007) explore CEO duality and demonstrate that the separation of positions is a beneficial
governance structure for family firm performance.
Instead of a focus on performance, the remaining two articles in this agency prescription
group are focused on perceptions. Cruz and her colleagues (2010) examine how agency contracts
are affected by the CEO’s perceptions of the top management team. In line with agency theory,
they suggest that monitoring and incentive mechanisms are implemented based on the CEO’s
trust perceptions of top managers. In the family firm context, they suggest that the presence of
top managers who are related to the CEO and the level of family ownership in the firm affect
these perceptions. Dawson (2011) examines the perceptions of private equity firms as they assess
the attractiveness of family firms. She finds that investors prefer professionalized family firms,
described as businesses that have agency prescriptions in place, such as human resources
practices and the presence of nonfamily managers (Dawson, 2011).
In conclusion, this group of family firm articles focuses on the remedies prescribed by
agency theory that are theorized to positively impact firm performance. Importantly, this
research provides support that agency prescriptions, such as the presence of a board of directors,
incentive compensation plans, and monitoring activities serve their intended and theorized
purpose within family firms. Similar to agency problem research, this research expands the
boundary conditions of agency theory by supporting its prescriptions and related outcomes
within a new organizational context, a context once thought to be irrelevant to agency theory.
Limitations and Future Research. Although agency theory problems and prescriptions are
prevalent in a family firm context, more research is still warranted. My review and synthesis
sheds light on three limitations that can guide future investigations. The first limitation in the
agency theory literature relates to the governance structure and related mechanisms employed
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within family firms. Governance mechanisms are the dominant agency theory prescription and
can be categorized as formal (i.e., monitoring activities, human resource policies) or social (i.e.,
informal meetings, get-togethers; Mustakallio, Aution, and Zahra, 2002). The family firm
literature is heavily focused on formal governance mechanisms like boards of directors (e.g.,
Anderson and Reeb, 2004; Braun and Sharma, 2007), incentive compensation plans (e.g.,
Chrisman et al., 2007; Schulze et al., 2001), strategic planning (e.g., Chrisman et al., 2004), or
human resources practices (Dawson, 2011). Importantly, agency research is “concerned with
describing the governance mechanisms that solve the agency problem” (Eisenhardt, 1989: 59);
however, research neglects to consider the impact of social governance mechanisms, and thus
should be a consideration for future research.
The second limitation in the agency theory literature ironically relates to the focus on
firm level performance. The theorized outcome of agency theory is firm performance, which is
often supported in the family firm literature (e.g., Anderson and Reeb, 2004; Chrisman et al.,
2007; Braun and Sharma, 2007). However, studies tend to ignore the reasons why there is a link
between the governance structure and firm performance. Agency theory prescribes governance
mechanisms to curb opportunistic behavior thus resulting in increased performance (Eisenhardt,
1989; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, just because governance mechanisms are in place
and performance levels are high, doesn’t necessarily mean opportunistic behavior was thwarted;
there could be other factors contributing to high levels of performance even in the presence of
opportunistic behavior. To account for this possibility, structure, behavior, and performance must
be considered. Extant studies neglect to consider behavior as the linking pin between structure
and performance; therefore, it should be examined in future studies. For example, research could
examine productive work behavior as the missing link; it is an appropriate proxy for capturing a
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lack of opportunistic behavior (i.e., shirking, free-riding), and has been conceptually and
empirically linked to increased firm performance (Gerhart and Milkovich, 1992; Huselid, 1995).
The third limitation revealed by my review and synthesis of the agency theory literature
in family firms is the assumption that managers are a homogeneous group. Agency theorists
subscribe to the idea that self-serving behavior is curbed by the use of governance mechanisms
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, it may be plausible that in a family
firm context where managers can be family or nonfamily members, differing behaviors may
result between the two groups (Chua et al., 2009; Davis et al., 2010). For example, altruism
creates agency problems and the need for agency prescriptions within family firms (Schulze et
al., 2001, 2003a), but this literature is focused solely on the relationship between family
members (i.e., parent-child). Research is necessary that addresses the relationship between
family and nonfamily members within family firms. Agency prescriptions may curb the assumed
opportunistic behavior of family members, but do they have the same effect on nonfamily
members? If not, what are the resulting performance implications for the family firm?
Accordingly, future research is needed that addresses agency prescriptions and outcomes with
considerations of employee type.
Conclusion. My review of this literature suggests that agency theory is indeed applicable
in a family firm context. The literature supports that agency problems are prevalent and uniquely
created in family firms. Accordingly, agency costs must be incurred to mitigate these problems.
Meaning, agency structural prescriptions, such as boards of directors, compensation incentive
plans, and monitoring activities, are deemed necessary in family firms to curb opportunistic selfinterested agent behavior and thus reap firm level performance benefits. However, other
governance structures could be considered in future research to determine their applicability in
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altering agent behavior. Assessing actual agent behavior is also warranted; in doing so, the
behavior of family and nonfamily employees could be assessed to determine if the prescriptions
of agency theory hold equivocally across employee types. In conclusion, agency theory is an
applicable theoretical perspective for family firm governance and performance research;
however, more research is necessary to fully comprehend the impact of agency prescriptions on
the behaviors within the family firm.
This concludes my review and synthesis of the family firm literature adopting an agency
theory perspective. At this time, I am able to address part (a) of my first research question. To
reiterate, the first research question asks, ‘are the tenets, prescriptions, and related performance
outcomes of (a) agency theory and (b) stewardship theory applicable within family firms?’ Based
on the review and synthesis, I am able to conclude that agency theory tenets, prescriptions, and
related performance outcomes are applicable within family firms. I now transition to my review
and synthesis of the family firm literature adopting a stewardship theory perspective to address
part (b) of the research question.
Stewardship Theory Research
Family firm research adopting a stewardship perspective has been on the rise in recent
years (Le Breton-Miller and Miller, 2009; Zahra et al., 2008). Since Corbetta and Salvato (2004)
suggested stewardship theory and its humanistic model of man as an appropriate alternative to
agency theory within the family firm context, a wave of articles adopting this theory has been
generated. There are eleven articles adopting a stewardship perspective within family firms.
These articles span six years, having been published in every year from 2006 through 2012.
Eight articles are empirical investigations, all of which are survey-based research on small
private firms, mostly in the US. Five of these eight survey family firms only, the remaining three
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articles incorporate survey data from nonfamily firms as well. Regression is the dominant
approach to data analysis, followed by structural equation modeling. Primarily, the dependent
variable is a measure of firm level performance. The independent variables depict a focus on
stewardship structure, behavior, or leadership; my review is provided according to this focus.
Table 2.4 displays an alphabetical list, description, and key findings of these articles.
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Table 2.4: Stewardship Theory Research in a Family Firm Context
Authors
Corbetta & Salvato
(2004)

Sample
-conceptual-

Firm Type

Respondent

Data Analysis

IV

DV

Stewardship Focus
Leadership

Key Findings
Stewardship may apply in
family firms; family owner
shapes the model of man

Craig & Dibrell (2006)

217 family & 179
nonfamily firms
-US-

Private

Principal
(CEO or top
manager)

Regression

Natural
environmental policy

Innovation &
Performance
(relative growth
& financial)

Structure

Stewardship characterizes
family firms; it drives
strategy and performance

Davis, Allen, & Hayes
(2010)

315 family firms
(366 employees)
-US-

Private

Manager
(family &
nonfamily
employees)

Regression

Value commitment
Trust
Perceptions of
agency

Stewardship &
leadership
perceptions

Behavior

Stewardship is ‘secret
sauce’ for family firms;
family perceive leaders as
stewards, nonfamily
perceive leaders as agents

Dibrell & Moeller
(2011)

206 family & 101
nonfamily firms
-US-

Private

Principal
(CEO,
owner, or top
manager)

Regression

Service-dominant
focus
Stewardship culture

Innovativeness

Structure

Family businesses exhibit
stewardship cultures that
help increase
innovativeness

Eddleston (2008)

-conceptual-

Transformational
leadership

Strategic
flexibility

Leadership

Transformational
leadership can lead to
stewardship cultures

Eddleston &
Kellermanns (2007)

60 family firms
-US-

Private

Principal
(CEO or top
manager)

SEM

Altruism
Control concentration

Performance
(relative growth
& financial)

Structure and
Behavior

Demonstrates the
effectiveness of
stewardship theory on
family firm performance

Eddleston,
Kellermanns, &
Zellweger (2012)

179 family firms
-Switzerland-

Private

Principal
(CEO or top
manager)

Regression

Strategic decisionmaking
Participative gov.
LTO
Human capital

Corporate
entrepreneurship

Structure

Stewardship culture
enhances corporate
entrepreneurship for family
firms

Miller, Le BretonMiller, & Scholnick
(2008)

676 family &
nonfamily firms
(equal split)
-Canada-

Private

Principal
(CEO)

Regression

Firm type
(family/nonfamily)

Stewardship
priorities

Structure

Family firms demonstrate
more stewardship priorities
(continuity, community,
connections) than
nonfamily firms
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Table 2.4. Continued.
Authors
Pearson & Marler
(2010)

Sample
-conceptual-

Firm Type

Respondent

Data Analysis

IV
Leader stewardship
behavior

DV
Reciprocal
stewardship

Stewardship Focus
Leadership

Key Findings
Family firm leaders can
create a culture of
reciprocal stewardship for
family and nonfamily

Vallejo (2009)

90 family firms
(295 surveys)
-US-

Private

Manager
(nonfamily
employees)

SEM

Identification
Involvement
Loyalty

Profitability &
Survival

Behavior

Stewardship factors of
nonfamily (identification,
involvement) influences
firm performance

Zahra, Hayton,
Neubaum, Dibrell, &
Craig (2008)

248 family firms
-US-

Private

Principal
(CEO)

Regression

Family culture of
commitment

Strategic
flexibility

Structure

Stewardship cultures
influence strategic
flexibility
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Structure. Structural or situational stewardship factors depict the work environment and
culture of the organization (Davis et al., 1997). Theory suggests these stewardship factors
encourage cooperation and empower and motivate employees, thereby enabling proorganizational behaviors and ultimately firm performance (Davis et al., 1997; Eddleston and
Kellermanns, 2007). Varying types of structural factors have been empirically tested within the
family firm studies. When compared to nonfamily firms, family firms are shown to have higher
levels of stewardship priorities, such as an organizational culture that is inclusive, flexible, and
where employees are nurtured, trained, and given broader responsibilities (Miller et al., 2008).
Stewardship culture, manifested in strategic decision making responsibilities and participative
governance structures, has been linked to higher levels of corporate entrepreneurship in family
firms (Eddleston et al., 2012). Family firms’ collectivistic stewardship culture has also been
associated with strategic flexibility (Zahra et al., 2008), innovativeness (Craig and Dibrell, 2006;
Dibrell and Moeller, 2011), and firm performance (Craig and Dibrell, 2006).
Behavior. Behavioral or psychological factors, such as intrinsic motivation and
identification, also facilitate stewardship (Davis et al., 1997). Family firm research adopting a
stewardship perspective includes empirical examinations of various behavioral factors. High
employee identification with the family business is positively associated with firm profitability
and survival (Vallejo, 2009). Davis, Allen, and Hayes (2010) demonstrate that family firms
foster trust and commitment among employees, making stewardship the “secret sauce” for
creating a competitive advantage in family firms. Altruistic tendencies that are other-serving, as
opposed to the self-serving asymmetric altruism found in agency research (Corbetta and Salvato,
2004), are shown to positively impact the growth and financial performance of family firms
(Eddleston and Kellermanns, 2007).
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Leadership. Stewardship theory is about the principal-manager relationship. Theory
suggests that both parties can choose to behave as stewards of the organization, and that the
structural factors can influence the behavioral choice (Davis et al., 1997). Family firm empirical
research adopting a stewardship perspective tends to focus on either the structure or the behavior
and their respective links to firm outcomes. Research neglects to consider how structure and
behavior are impacted by the actual relationship between the parties. However, two conceptual
articles within the family firm realm address this issue. Pearson and Marler (2010) argue that the
leader’s stewardship choice can motivate and facilitate reciprocal stewardship behavior from the
employee. Likewise, Eddleston (2008) suggests that transformational leadership can lead to a
stewardship culture. These ideas capture the essence of Corbetta and Salvato’s watershed article
that argues that “the owning family has a crucial impact in shaping the ‘model of man’ prevailing
within the organization as either the self-serving, economically rational man postulated by
agency theory, or the self-actualizing, collective serving man suggested by stewardship theory”
(Corbetta and Salvato, 2004: 357). Accordingly, leadership is an important factor in the creation
of a stewardship structure and in influencing stewardship behavior.
Limitations and Future Research. Stewardship research in the context of family firms is
relatively new and somewhat sparse; but encouragingly, the theoretical tenets and projected
outcomes do receive empirical support. However, my review reveals three gaps in this literature
stream that can be addressed in future research. First, scholars are focused on either structural or
behavioral factors of stewardship. Although both are important factors of stewardship theory,
research neglects examinations of both types of factors in tandem. Simultaneous consideration
would align better with the theoretical underpinnings. It also may be interesting to determine the
relative strength of each factor on performance.
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Second, studies fail to consider the choice of stewardship from both parties in the
principal-manager relationship. Theory stresses that increased performance is based on both the
principal and manager making a choice of stewardship (Davis et al., 1997). None of the reviewed
literature addresses the choice either conceptually or empirically. As such, research is warranted
that considers both sides of the relationship; conceptual models should address both the
principal’s choice and the manager’s choice of stewardship behavior. This concept should then
be carried through empirically by capturing data from both the principal and manager. As shown
in Table 3, extant studies only address the perspective of the principal (e.g., Zahra et al., 2008) or
the manager (e.g., Vallejo, 2009) as evidenced by the survey respondents. Furthermore,
empirical studies capture and mix responses from the CEO and the top manager to reflect the
principal’s view of stewardship (e.g., Eddleston and Kellermanns, 2007); when quite possibly,
these respondents may actually be the principal and the manager in the relationship.
Third, more research is needed to develop the ideas surrounding the leadership factors
that could extend stewardship theory. Research should consider the role and characteristics of the
leader in order to better understand how stewardship behaviors are encouraged and supported.
Structural and behavioral factors are important, but leadership seems equally important in
encouraging the choice of stewardship on the part of the manager and ultimately impacting firm
performance.
Conclusion. My review of this literature suggests that stewardship theory is indeed
applicable in a family firm context. The literature supports that stewardship structures and
behaviors are pronounced in a family firm environment. Furthermore, the research demonstrates
that these stewardship characteristics are predictive of family firm performance, as suggested by
stewardship theory. However, extant research neglects to simultaneously consider both sides of
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the principal-manager relationship. Meaning, the focus is on either the structure or the behavior
and therefore does not capture the essence of stewardship theory (i.e., the choice and its
influencing factors). Simultaneous investigations of both sides of the relationship would enable
considerations of stewardship choice, structure, behavior, and leadership influences. In doing so,
a more comprehensive assessment of the appropriateness of stewardship theory within a family
firm context could be made.
This concludes my review and synthesis of the family firm literature adopting a
stewardship perspective. At this time, I am able to address part (b) of my first research question.
To reiterate, the first research question asks, ‘are the tenets, prescriptions, and related
performance outcomes of (a) agency theory and (b) stewardship theory applicable within family
firms?’ Based on the review and synthesis, I am able to conclude that stewardship theory tenets,
prescriptions, and related performance outcomes are applicable within family firms. I now
transition to my review and synthesis of the family firm literature adopting both an agency and
stewardship theory perspective to address my second research question, ‘can the opposing
prescriptions of agency theory and stewardship theory be integrated within family firms to
explain firm performance?’
Both Agency Theory and Stewardship Theory Research
There is a group of family firm literature that concludes that both agency theory and
stewardship theory are an applicable perspective in this context, as opposed to one theory or the
other. According to my review, there are seven articles in this group, one conceptual and six
empirical studies. Like those adopting a stewardship approach, these articles were published
from 2006 through 2012. In chronological order, five empirical articles, both qualitative and
quantitative were published in 2006, 2007, or 2008; the one conceptual article was published in
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2009; then the remaining empirical article was published several years later in 2012. The
dominant sample in this group of articles is private family firms in Europe. Table 2.5 displays a
list, description, and key findings of these articles.
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Table 2.5: Both Agency Theory and Stewardship Theory Research in a Family Firm Context
Authors
Blumentritt, Keyt,
& Astrachan (2007)

Sample
27 family firms
-US-

Firm Type
Private

Respondent
Manager
(CEO)

Data Analysis
Qualitative
grounded
theory

IV
Competencies
Board support

DV
Nonfamily CEO
success

Focus
Leadership

Key Findings
Both theories can explain CEO success:
Agency = CEOs are competent
Stewardship = CEO cultural/family fit

Jaskiewicz & Klein
(2007)

351 family firms
-Germany-

Private

Principal
(Owner)

Regression

Owner-manager
goal alignment
(FPEC scale)

Board
characteristics

Prescriptions

Both theories can explain board composition:
Agency = low goal alignment (need larger
boards, more outside members)
Stewardship = high goal alignment

Le Breton-Miller &
Miller (2009)

-conceptual-

Family
involvement

Stewardship v.
agency

Leadership

Social embeddedness explains perspectives:
Agency = embedded in family (pursue family
interests at expense of shareholders)
Stewardship = embedded in business (pursue
business interests)

Pieper, Klein, &
Jaskiewicz (2008)

714 family firms
-Germany-

Private

Principal
(Owner)

Discriminant
analysis

Owner-manager
goal alignment
(FPEC scale)

Board Presence
% family in TMT

Prescriptions

Both theories can explain board presence:
Agency = low goal alignment, have board
Stewardship = high goal alignment, no board

Prencipe,
Markarian, & Pozza
(2008)

23 family & 21
nonfamily firms
-Italy-

Public

n/a secondary
data

Regression

R&D cost
capitalization

Performance
(change in profit)

Prescriptions

Both theories can explain why family firms
are less sensitive to short term performance
and stock fluctuations; agency and
stewardship prescriptions facilitate long-term
orientations

Sciascia, Mazzola,
Astrachan, & Pieper
(2012)

1035 family
firms
-US-

Private

Manager
(CEO or top
managers)

Regression

Family
ownership

International
entrepreneurship

Prescriptions

Stewardship is advantageous for
internationalization; agency prescriptions
should govern the business and the family

Westhead &
Howorth (2006)

240 family firms
-UK-

Private

Manager
(CEO)

Regression

Ownership and
management
structure

Performance

Leadership

Management rather than ownership structure
drives financial performance and pursuit of
nonfinancial goals
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The common theme of these seven articles is the conclusion that both agency and
stewardship theory apply in family firms. The articles comport to theoretical tenets by
highlighting the principal-manager relationship, such as structure of the relationship (e.g.,
Westhead and Howorth, 2006) or the goal alignment between the parties in the relationship (e.g.,
Jaskiewicz and Klein, 2007; Pieper, Klein, and Jaskiewicz, 2008), with considerations of the
family firm context, such as family involvement (e.g., Le Breton-Miller and Miller, 2009) or
family ownership (Sciascia, Mazzola, Astrachan, and Pieper, 2012). A secondary theme in this
literature is the focus on aspects of leadership or on theoretical prescriptions; my review is
grouped accordingly.
Leadership. There are three articles that adopt both agency and stewardship perspectives
with a focus on leadership aspects in family firms (e.g., Blumentritt, Keyt, and Astrachan, 2007;
Le Breton-Miller and Miller, 2009; Westhead and Howorth, 2006). Both theories are used to
explain leadership success (e.g., Blumentritt et al., 2007), leadership’s impact on firm
performance (e.g., Westhead and Howorth, 2006), and leadership embeddedness (e.g., Le
Breton-Miller and Miller 2009). Leadership success is investigated through both an agency and
stewardship lens by Blumentritt and colleagues (2007). They argue that both theories are equally
applicable in a family firm context in their examination of CEO competencies and board support
on the success of a nonfamily CEO. Success stems from an agency perspective in that principals
hire the most competent and skilled CEOs to run their business, and from a stewardship
perspective in that the CEO must build a relationship with the family, fit with the organizational
culture, and rely on the board for support rather than monitoring (Blumentritt et al., 2007).
The impact of leadership on family firm performance is examined in Westhead and
Howorth (2006). They suggest that agency and stewardship theories can both impact family firm
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performance. They argue that agency theory is applicable when owners focus on financial
objectives of the firm and thus implement agency prescriptions to monitor managers. They also
argue that stewardship theory is applicable when owners focus on nonfinancial objectives, or
“family agendas” (Westhead and Howorth, 2006: 303). Furthermore, they suggest that the CEO
has the greatest power in influencing the objectives and thus performance of family firms.
In a similar vein, leadership embeddedness is also examined from both an agency and
stewardship perspective. Embeddedness is defined as “the relationship between an actor’s
economic behavior and the social context in which it occurs” (Le Breton-Miller and Miller,
2009: 1171). The conceptual work of Le Breton-Miller and Miller (2009) concludes that agency
and stewardship environments within a family business are a manifestation of the level of family
embeddedness. They suggest that if the family is more embedded in the family than the business,
an agency environment will prevail because of the hierarchical nature of family and the family’s
self-serving interest. In contrast, if the family is more embedded in the business than the family,
a stewardship environment will prevail because the family is willing to put the interest of the
business first (Le Breton-Miller and Miller, 2009).
In conclusion, these three articles support both sides of the agency versus stewardship
debate by their focus on various aspects of leadership within family firms. In turn, firm
performance is impacted by leadership, whether it’s due to leadership success, goals, or social
embeddedness. Firm performance is also impacted by various prescriptions prescribed by both
agency theory and stewardship theory; articles focused on these theoretical prescriptions are
described next.
Prescriptions. There are four articles that adopt both agency and stewardship perspectives
with a focus on theoretical prescriptions (e.g., Jaskiewicz and Klein, 2007; Pieper et al., 2008;
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Prencipe et al., 2008; Sciascia, Mazzola, Astrachan, and Pieper, 2012). The dominant theoretical
prescription in this group of literature is a board of directors. Instead of a focus on the board of
directors’ impact on financial performance, articles focus on the impact of agency and
stewardship perspectives on the presence of a board of directors (e.g., Pieper et al., 2008) and
board characteristics (Jaskiewicz and Klein, 2007). This line of research suggests that when goal
alignment is high between the owners and managers, a stewardship environment will prevail and
the less likely the need for a board of directors (Pieper et al., 2008). In contrast, when goals
diverge, a board of directors is more likely (Pieper et al., 2008), and the board should be larger in
size and have a higher ratio of outside members, thus resulting in an agency environment
(Jaskiewicz and Klein, 2007).
Additional agency prescriptions are studied from a dual theoretical approach, with the
outcome being family firm internationalization (Sciascia et al., 2012). Research suggests that
family ownership can have either a positive or negative effect on internationalization decisions.
The positive effects are explained from a stewardship perspective in that family members want
the business to succeed because success ultimately benefits the family. The negative effects are
explained from a stagnation perspective, suggesting family firms lack resources, are
conservative, and have family conflicts (Sciascia, et al., 2012). Although this research considers
stagnation instead of agency as the comparative lens with the stewardship perspective, it is
included in this category of articles because agency theory prescriptions are argued. This
research suggests that monitoring mechanisms, creating a hierarchical form of governance, and
implementing a board of directors may be necessary to overcome stagnation and realize the
benefits of stewardship (Sciascia, et al., 2012).
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In summary, these articles support perspectives from both agency and stewardship
theory with a focus on theoretical prescriptions, such as a board of directors and other monitoring
mechanisms. Essentially, these articles suggest that boards are necessary in an agency
environment and not necessary in a stewardship environment; monitoring mechanisms are
necessary for the family and the business to succeed.
Limitations and Future Research. Although some scholars agree that both theories can be
applicable in a family firm context, this research suffers from two notable limitations. First, these
articles are not necessarily about both theories. Both refers to occurring together; although the
authors suggest that both theoretical lenses are adopted, none of the articles consider
simultaneous application of both theories. Instead, this research appears to take an either-or
theoretical perspective. Accordingly, no new insights beyond what was gleaned from the
literature supporting a single theoretical perspective could be gleaned from this group of
literature. Future research that adopts simultaneous theoretical considerations is thus warranted.
Second, research in this stream tends to reverse the order of causality as originally
theorized. Agency theory assumes that agents are self-serving; and therefore, principals will
enact governance mechanisms to curb the opportunistic behavior (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen and
Meckling, 1976). Stewardship theory assumes that stewards are other-serving; and therefore,
principals will create an environment that empowers and fosters this stewardship behavior (Davis
et al., 1997). However, this line of research instead considers the reverse. For example,
Jaskiewicz and Klein (2007) suggest that goal alignment triggers a stewardship environment and
goal misalignment triggers an agency environment. However, theory suggests that a stewardship
environment triggers the choice of stewardship among managers and therefore goals will align;
an agency environment triggers the need to implement mechanisms to create goal alignment
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between principals and agents. Therefore, future research should include both the contributing
factors and resulting outcomes of agency and stewardship theories, and it the order proffered.
Alternatively, research should address the rationale for applying theory in a way not originally
theorized.
Conclusion. This group of literature concludes that agency and stewardship theories can
be equally applicable in a family firm context. This literature supports that family firms can be
depicted by agency environments or stewardship environments and demonstrates that outcomes
can be explained by either theoretical lens. However, this research seems to adopt an either-or
perspective and neglects considerations of whether both agency and stewardship environments
can coexist. More research is needed to determine if agency theory and stewardship theory can
be integrated to more accurately capture the essence and causality of family firm structure,
behavior, and performance.
This concludes my review and synthesis of the family firm literature adopting both an
agency and stewardship perspective. My second research question asks, ‘can the opposing
prescriptions of agency theory and stewardship theory be integrated within family firms to
explain firm performance?’ Based on my review and synthesis of this group of literature, I
cannot sufficiently address this question. None of the literature integrates agency and
stewardship prescriptions nor seeks to explain performance through both lenses. Accordingly,
this question remains open as I transition to a concluding discussion regarding the family firm
literature reviewed.
Conclusion
I provided a broad overview of agency theory and stewardship theory and a specific
review and synthesis of the family firm literature adopting these theoretical perspectives. Both
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theories predict enhanced performance, but starkly contrast in behavioral assumptions and
structural prescriptions (Chrisman et al., 2007). Agency theory assumes an economic model of
man; agent behavior is based on self-interest and will conflict with the principal’s interest.
Governance structures that control and monitor agents are prescribed to thwart opportunistic
behavior and better align the goals of the principal and agent (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen and
Meckling, 1976). Stewardship theory assumes a humanistic model of man; steward behavior is
based on serving others and therefore will align with the principal’s interest. Governance
structures that empower and encourage stewards are prescribed to facilitate the continued
alignment of interests (Davis et al., 1997).
There is an on-going debate in the family firm literature on whether agency theory and
stewardship theory are applicable in this unique context (Le Breton Miller and Miller, 2009). The
first objective of my dissertation research was to investigate both sides of the debate by
examining the family firm literature grounded to each theoretical perspective. By doing so, I am
able to address my first research question, ‘are the tenets, prescriptions, and related performance
outcomes of (a) agency theory and (b) stewardship theory applicable within family firms?’ My
review shows that the tenets, prescriptions, and performance outcomes of (a) agency theory and
(b) stewardship theory can indeed apply to the family firm context.
However, support on both sides of the agency versus stewardship debate creates
ambiguous and confounding predictions about family firm behavior and performance. My review
and synthesis revealed limitations of the existing literature that when addressed can provide
additional insights into the appropriateness of these opposing theories within family firms.
Accordingly, the second objective of my dissertation research is to address these limitations
through an empirical investigation. In doing so, a more sufficient answer can be provided to
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addresses my second research question, ‘can the opposing prescriptions of agency theory and
stewardship theory be integrated within family firms to explain firm performance?’ Additionally,
the empirical investigation will allow me to address my third research question, ‘does the family
firm context (a) expand and/or (b) impose boundary conditions on agency and stewardship
theories?’ To guide my empirical investigation, my research model and hypotheses are presented
in the next section.
Research Model and Hypotheses Development
My research model seeks to address the gaps revealed in the literature review and
synthesis. Extant studies investigate whether agency or stewardship theory is more applicable
within family firms. Instead, my research investigates whether agency and stewardship theory
can be integrated to explain family firm performance. My research model intertwines structural
and behavioral components of agency and stewardship perspectives, making predictions within,
across, and integrating theories.
To reiterate, theory suggests that the organizational structure enacted by the principal
influences the manager’s choice of agency versus stewardship behavior, and that the fit between
the principal’s choice and manager’s choice impacts the performance outcome of the
relationship. My study incorporates these suggestions by modeling firm level performance as the
outcome of agency and stewardship structures, but mediated through agency and stewardship
behaviors. Thereby, the differing governance prescriptions and behavioral assumptions of both
theories are integrated in the same research model (see Figure 2.3).
A principal is one who delegates work to a manager, regardless of actual position within
the organizational hierarchy (Eisenhardt, 1989; Ross, 1973). Accordingly, this research defines
the principal as the family firm leader who is also part of the family. The family firm is viewed
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as an extension of the leader; therefore, the organizational structure reflects his or her values
(Carney, 2005; Kelly, Athanassiou, and Crittenden, 2000) and thus the principal’s choice. The
manager in the principal-manager relationship is defined as either a family or nonfamily
employee of the family business. Accordingly, the employees’ behavior is depicted as the
manager’s choice.
Within the agency theory framework (i.e., depicted above the dotted horizontal line in
Figure 2.3), agency structure serves as a proxy for the principal’s choice of agency. It represents
the principal’s adoption of agency prescriptions, such as the presence of a board of directors,
compensation incentive plans, and monitoring activities. This governance structure decreases the
manager’s agent behavior (i.e., free-riding, shirking), thus enabling increased firm performance.
Within the stewardship theory framework (i.e., depicted below the dotted horizontal line
in Figure 2.3), stewardship structure serves as a proxy for the principal’s choice of stewardship.
It represents the principal’s adoption of stewardship prescriptions, such as an involvementoriented and collectivist work environment. This stewardship governance structure increases the
manager’s steward behavior. In turn, firm performance is increased.
Across agency and stewardship theoretical frameworks, this research predicts behavioral
outcomes across theories by examining the impact of mismatched choices in the principalmanager relationship. Specifically, I investigate the consequences of the principal’s adoption of
an agency structure on the manager’s steward behavior and the principal’s adoption of a
stewardship structure on the manager’s agent behavior. Furthermore, I predict the impact of
mismatched choices in the principal-manager relationship is different when kinship status is
taken into consideration (i.e., family versus nonfamily employees of the family business).
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The development of nine hypotheses predicting the relationships in the proposed research
model is presented next; a list of these hypotheses is presented in Table 2.6. The research model
is a mediation model; however, I hypothesize direct effect relationships in this section and
address the mediation effects in the results and discussion section (e.g., Eddleston and
Kellermanns, 2007; Memili, Eddleston, Kellermanns, Zellweger, and Barnett, 2010). The first
four hypotheses are predictions within theory, the next four hypotheses are predictions across
theory, and the final hypothesis is a prediction integrating theory. More specifically, the within
theory hypotheses address the structure-behavior-performance link within the confines of agency
theory and stewardship theory, respectively. The across theory hypotheses address the
mismatched structure-behavior choices between the principal and manager; different
relationships are hypothesized for family managers and nonfamily managers. The integrating
theory hypothesis examines the impact of structural integration (i.e., agency and stewardship
structures in place simultaneously) on firm performance.
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Manager’s
Choice
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Choice
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Agency
Structure
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H1 (-)
H5a (-)
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Stewardship

Stewardship
Structure

H2 (-)

H5b

Firm
Performance

H6b

H4 (+)

H6a (+)

Steward
Behavior

H3 (+)

H7 (+)

Figure 2.3 Research Model of Structure, Behavior, and Performance in Family Firms

54

Table 2.6: Hypothesized Relationships
Within Agency Theory
H1

Agency structure is negatively associated with agent behavior.

H2

Agent behavior is negatively associated with firm performance.

Within Stewardship Theory
H3

Stewardship structure is positively associated with steward behavior.

H4

Steward behavior is positively associated with firm performance.

Across Theory
H5a

Agency structure is negatively associated with steward behavior.

H5b

Kinship status moderates the relationship between agency structure and steward behavior, such that
the negative relationship strengthens for family employees and weakens for nonfamily employees.

H6a

Stewardship structure is positively associated with agent behavior.

H6b

Kinship status moderates the relationship between stewardship structure and agent behavior, such that
the positive relationship strengthens for family employees and weakens for nonfamily employees.

Integrating Theory
H7

The interaction of agency and stewardship structures results in varying levels of firm performance.
Specifically, the Trust But Monitor Structure results in the highest level of firm performance,
followed by the Monitor Structure, then Trust Structure, with the Undetermined Structure resulting in
the lowest level of firm performance.
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Within Agency Theory
Agency theory rests on the following causal assumptions: (1) principals will enact an
organizational governance structure that curbs the manager’s assumed self-interested agent
behavior; (2) agent behavior is therefore curbed; (3) thus leading to increased firm performance
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Wasserman, 2006). My review of the family firm literature reveals
that studies empirically neglect the second causal assumption; meaning, studies examine the
direct relationship between governance structure and firm performance. Instead, my research
incorporates agent behavior as a mediator in this relationship. Accordingly, as theory predicts,
when both principals and managers choose agency (i.e., principal’s choice manifested in an
agency governance structure, and the manager’s choice depicted by actual behavior), firm
performance is increased.
Agency Structure and Agent Behavior. Agency structure serves as a proxy for the
principal’s choice of agency. It represents the principal’s adoption of agency prescriptions, such
as the presence of a board of directors (Anderson and Reeb, 2004; Braun and Sharma, 2007),
compensation incentive plans (Chrisman et al., 2007; Shulze et al., 2001, 2003), and monitoring
activities (Chrisman et al., 2007). Theory suggests this type of governance structure decreases
the manager’s agent behavior; it curbs opportunistic behavior such as free-riding and shirking
(Wasserman, 2006). Accordingly, agent behavior, operationalized as counterproductive
behavior, represents the manager’s choice of agency.
Agent behavior is considered a type of counterproductive work behavior, defined as those
deviant behaviors that threaten the organization’s well-being (Martinko, Gundlach, and Douglas,
2002). Deviant behaviors can include opportunistic behavior such as free-riding or shirking. In
contrast, productive work behavior is defined as employee behavior that allows the organization
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to function better, and includes behavior typified by effectiveness, efficiency, and effort
(Pritchard, 1995). It benefits the organization to have the work environment structured in such a
way to elicit productive behavior and curb counterproductive behavior (Pritchard, 1995).
Accordingly, agency theory prescribes an organizational governance structure for this intended
purpose (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
Agency structure is depicted by the presence of control and monitoring mechanisms such
as a board of directors, monitoring activities, and compensation incentive plans (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976). According to Daily, Dalton, and Cannella (2003: 372), “in nearly all modern
governance research governance mechanisms are conceptualized as deterrents to managerial selfinterest.” The primary role of a board of directors is to monitor the managers of the organization
to ensure the goals of the principal are being met and the free-rider problem is minimized
(Anderson and Reeb, 2004; Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Fama, 1980). Likewise, additional
monitoring activities are often implemented for the purpose of ensuring that managers act in the
interest of the principal (Chrisman et al., 2007; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). Monitoring activities
can take many forms, can be used on various types of employees (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003),
and have been shown to be successful in family firms (Chrisman et al., 2007). Monitoring serves
the intended purpose of controlling agent behavior because when managers know they are being
monitored, they will behave in a productive manner; without monitoring, agent managers will
behave in a self-interested manner (Wright and Kroll, 2002).
The adoption of compensation incentive plans, in which pay is provided as an incentive
for high performance outcomes, is another agency prescription used to align the managers’
interest with the principal (Fama, 1980). Compensation incentives motivate managers to curb
their opportunistic behavior because doing so is in their best interest and in turn, the best interest
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of the principal (Becker and Huselid, 1992). Numerous studies provide support that
compensation incentives increase productivity (i.e., decrease agent behavior; Huselid, 1995;
Gerhart and Milkovich, 1992; Rynes, Gerhart, and Parks, 2005). For example, studies
demonstrate that compensation incentives have increased employee productivity by as much as
30% (Locke, Feren, McCaleb, Shaw, and Denny, 1980) and even 44% (Lazear, 1986). In a
recent meta-analysis, results indicate that compensation incentives increased employee task
performance by 23%. Using an agency theory lens, Sesil and colleagues demonstrate that
incentive compensation increases employee productivity (Sesil, Kroumova, Blasi, and Kruse,
2002). As stated by Barringer and Milkovich (1998: 310), “outcome-based contracts provide
powerful incentives for agents to be as productive as possible.” Taken together, I predict that
agency structure, consisting of monitoring and control mechanisms (i.e., board of directors,
monitoring activities, compensation incentive plans), will decrease counterproductive agent
behavior. Stated formally:
H1: Agency structure is negatively associated with agent behavior.
Agent Behavior and Firm Performance. Decreasing agent behavior is beneficial for an
organization (Pritchard, 1995) from a theoretical and empirical perspective. Theoretically,
according to agency theory, increased firm performance is predicted when both the principal and
the manager in the principal-manager relationship choose agency (Davis et al., 1997). Managers
react to the use of agency governance structures by decreasing their agent behavior, thus
resulting in increased firm performance (Eisenhardt, 1989). This decrease in agent behavior can
be thought of as an increase in productive behavior. Empirically, productive behavior has been
shown to be positively associated with corporate financial performance (Gerhart and Milkovich,
1992; Huselid, 1995) and small business growth (Voulgaris, Asteriou, and Agiomirgianakis,
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2003). Additionally, Lee (2006) suggests that employee productivity is positively associated with
the performance levels specifically within family firms. My research focuses on the relationship
between counterproductive behavior and firm performance, therefore the association becomes
negative. Formally stated, I hypothesize:
H2: Agent behavior is negatively associated with firm performance.
Within Stewardship Theory
Stewardship theory rests on the following causal assumptions: (1) principals will enact an
organizational governance structure that empowers and motivates the manager’s assumed otherinterested steward behavior; (2) steward behavior is therefore increased; (3) thus leading to
increased firm performance (Davis et al., 1997). My review of the family firm literature reveals
that studies empirically neglect both causal assumptions; meaning, studies examine the direct
relationship between stewardship structure and firm performance or the relationship between
steward behavior and firm performance. Instead, my research considers the entire causal chain
by incorporating steward behavior as a mediator in the relationship between stewardship
structure and firm performance. Accordingly, as theory predicts, when both principals and
managers choose stewardship (i.e., principal’s choice manifested in stewardship structure, and
the manager’s choice depicted by actual behavior), firm performance is increased.
Stewardship Structure and Steward Behavior. Stewardship structure represents the
principal’s choice of stewardship. It depicts the adoption of stewardship prescriptions, such as
the presence of an involvement-oriented (Eddleston and Kellermanns, 2007; Eddleston et al.,
2012) and collectivist culture (Dibrell and Moeller, 2011; Le Breton-Miller and Miller; Zahra et
al., 2008). Research suggests that stewardship structures increase steward behavior (Davis et al.,
1997; Davis et al., 2009).
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Steward behavior represents the managers’ choice of stewardship, and is operationalized
as organizational value commitment in this research. Organizational value commitment is
defined as “identification and alignment with the business, specifically with the beliefs and
values that it represents” (Angle and Perry, 1981; Davis et al., 2010: 1096), and has been used as
a proxy for steward behavior in extant theoretical (e.g., Davis et al., 1997) and empirical (e.g.,
Davis et al., 2010; Vallejo 2009) studies. Research suggests that value commitment is a relevant
steward behavior because when organizational members share the same values as the
organization, they see the organization as an extension of themselves (Davis et al., 2010) and
work toward its best interest (i.e., pro-organizational behavior).
It benefits the organization to have the work environment structured in such a way to
facilitate steward behavior. Accordingly, stewardship theory prescribes an organizational
governance structure for this intended purpose (Davis et al., 1997). Stewardship structures are
depicted by the presence of an involvement-oriented and collectivistic culture (Davis et al., 1997;
Zahra et al., 2008). An involvement-oriented culture, such as one depicted by high levels of
information exchange and social interaction, empowers steward behavior. Empowerment refers
to “an employee’s feelings of competence, meaningfulness, choice, and impact in their job or
work role” (Wall, Cordery, and Clegg, 2002: 147). When an employee finds meaning in their
job, levels of pro-organizational behavior are found to increase (Madison and Kellermanns,
2013). Collectivistic cultures encourage and empower employees to behave as stewards with a
focus on the social system rather than on self-interested goals (Davis et al., 1997; Lee and
O’Neill, 2003). Accordingly, I hypothesize:
H3: Stewardship structure is positively associated with steward behavior.
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Steward Behavior and Firm Performance. Increasing steward behavior is beneficial for
an organization from a theoretical and empirical perspective. Theoretically, according to
stewardship theory, increased firm performance is predicted when both the principal and the
manager in the principal-manager relationship choose stewardship (Davis et al., 1997). Managers
react to the use of stewardship governance structures by increasing their steward behavior, thus
resulting in increased firm performance.
Managers who have high levels of organizational value commitment accept the
organization’s goals and work toward accomplishing them (Mayer and Schoorman, 1992; Pieper,
Klein, and Jaskiewicz, 2008). Accordingly, research supports the positive relationship between
organizational commitment and firm performance (Kunze, Boehm, and Bruch, 2011; Ostroff,
1992). The relationship between steward behavior and firm performance has also been supported
in the context of family firms. Vallejo (2009) finds that high identification with the family
business is positively linked to firm profitability and survival. Davis and colleagues (2010) state
that steward behavior is what gives family firms a competitive advantage. Eddleston and
Kellermanns (2007) demonstrate that steward behavior positively impacts the growth and
financial performance of family firms. Accordingly, I hypothesize:
H4: Steward behavior is positively associated with firm performance.
Across Theory
With both agency and stewardship predictions incorporated in the same model, additional
theoretical assumptions can be empirically tested. When the parties in the principal-manager
relationship make different choices in agency or stewardship, negative consequences can arise
(Davis et al., 1997). If a principal chooses agency and implements an agency governance
structure, steward managers may feel betrayed by this and decrease their level of performance
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(Pieper et al., 2008); if a principal chooses stewardship by implementing a stewardship
governance structure, agent managers are afforded the opportunity to behave in a self-interested
manner (Davis et al., 1997). The next set of hypotheses examines these across theory
consequences, with different predictions made for family and nonfamily employees of the family
firm.
Agency Structure and Steward Behavior. Agency structures may curb the opportunistic
behavior of agents, but might have different effects on stewards (Wasserman, 2006). Said
differently, “what works well to control or motivate an opportunistic manager may not work well
to control or motivate a steward” (Lee and O’Neill, 2003: 212; Pieper et al., 2008). Stewards are
motivated to behave in the best interest of the organization (Davis et al., 1997; Donaldson and
Davis, 1991; Lee and O’Neill, 2003). However, behavior is affected by the governance structure
present; theory suggests a steward performs best in a governance structure typified by
empowerment, autonomy, and trust (Davis et al., 1997). This type of governance structure
motivates stewards to continue to strive for the realization of organizational goals above selfinterested goals (Davis et al., 1997).
In contrast, agency structures are implemented as a way of controlling self-interested
behavior, rather than empowering other-interested behavior. Accordingly, for stewards under
agency structures, motivation is decreased and pro-organizational behavior is undermined
(Argryis, 1964; Chrisman et al., 2007; Corbetta and Salvato, 2004; Davis et al., 1997).
Additionally, the use of control mechanisms can offend and betray stewards (Patel, Eddleston,
and Kellermanns, 2011). These monitoring and control mechanisms, such as compensation
incentives, can also “result in a narrowing focus on individual goals to the exclusion of valueenhancing cooperation with coworkers” (Becker and Huselid, 1992: 337). Taken together,
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imposing an agency structure on a steward manager lowers pro-organizational behavior.
Accordingly, I hypothesize:
H5a: Agency structure is negatively associated with steward behavior.
Although I hypothesize a negative relationship between agency structure and steward
behavior, I argue this relationship is moderated by kinship status. I suggest steward behavior is
affected by fairness perceptions based on equity theory; tension is created by unfair conditions,
and people will resolve their tension by lowering their level of pro-organizational behavior until
equity is perceived (Moorman, 1991). Or simply and positively put, if employees perceive fair
treatment, they will reciprocate by increasing their pro-organizational behavior (Ehrhart, 2004;
Fassina, Jones, and Uggerslev, 2008).
For family employees of the family business, I suggest the negative relationship between
agency structure and steward behavior is strengthened due to perceptions of unfairness. Altruistic
tendencies within the family firm are suggested to result in family employees receiving higher
levels of compensation or higher ranking positions within the organization, regardless of their
qualifications (Chua et al., 2009; Karra et al., 2006; Schulze et al., 2001, 2003a). Additionally,
family employees of the family business are viewed as agents (Chrisman et al., 2007) and have
an inclination to free-ride or shirk by taking advantage of the altruistic behavior afforded to them
(Dawson, 2011; Eddleston et al., 2008; Schulze et al., 2001, 2003a). As such, family member
employees of the family business often feel a sense of entitlement (Karra et al., 2006; Chua et al.,
2009). Agency structures, where family member behavior and outcomes are monitored and
controlled, create an environment where family employees are treated the same as nonfamily
employees and do not receive special treatment or perquisites (Schulze et al., 2003a).
Accordingly, I suggest family members will perceive unfairness in losing advantages thought to
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be entitled to them by being a member of the family and will thus lower their pro-organizational
behavior.
For nonfamily employees of the family business, I suggest the negative relationship
between agency structure and steward behavior is weakened. I argue this is due to nonfamily
employees’ perceptions of fairness in family firms with agency structures in place. Family firms
are often associated with perceptions of favoritism and bias (Barnett and Kellermanns, 2006;
Lee, 2006; Lubatkin, Schulze, Ling, and Dino, 2005). The presence of an agency structure,
where monitoring mechanisms are implemented and applied consistently throughout the firm can
facilitate a sense of fairness for nonfamily employees (Barnett and Kellermanns, 2006). For
example, incentive compensation and performance appraisal systems can promote fairness by
demonstrating that pay is based on objective measures, rather than subjective and biased
measures (Evans and Davis, 2005). Accordingly, an agency structure instills to nonfamily
employees that they are working in an organization that promotes fairness. Moving from
perceptions of inequity to equity will enhance the pro-organizational behavior of nonfamily
employees. Taken together, I hypothesize:
H5b: Kinship status moderates the relationship between agency structure and steward
behavior, such that the negative relationship strengthens for family employees and
weakens for nonfamily employees.
Stewardship Structure and Agent Behavior. Stewardship structures may empower proorganizational behavior of stewards, but might have different behavioral effects on agents.
Stewardship governance structures are environments where managers are trusted and empowered
to behave in the best interest of the organization (Davis et al., 1997; Donaldson and Davis,
1991). These types of structures are considered to be “dysfunctional under the agency theory
model of man” (Davis et al., 1997: 26). Stewardship structures can be harmful to an organization
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with agent managers because they may allow for opportunistic agent behavior rather than
productive work behavior to prevail. Without controls in place to monitor behavior, agency
theory assumes the agent manager will act in a self-interested manner (Eisenhardt, 1989;
Wiseman et al., 2012).
Agent behavior, or counterproductive behavior, is likely to surface under a stewardship
structure for several reasons. A stewardship structure depicts a socially interactive and
collectivistic work environment (Davis et al., 1997; Dibrell and Moeller, 2011; Eddleston and
Kellermanns, 2007; Eddleston et al., 2012; Zahra et al., 2008). Considerable time and effort
invested in social interactions may increase counterproductive behavior and may not be cost
effective (Molina-Morales and Martínez-Fernández, 2009). Specifically in family firms, social
interactions may involve more time spent discussing family affairs rather than business affairs
(Zhang, Cone, Everett, and Elkin, 2011). Collectivistic work environments can also increase
counterproductive behavior due to social loafing, defined as “the reduction in motivation and
effort when individuals work collectively compared with when they work individually” (Karau
and Williams, 1993: 681). It is suggested that social loafing enhances free-rider problems;
individuals are compelled to reduce effort and productivity when working collectively because
they assume individual contributions are less identifiable (George, 1992; Karau and Williams,
1993). Additionally, research suggests that having a culture of camaraderie and cooperation
among employees can have negative consequences such as employee complacency, sentimentbased rather than rationally-based decision making, and an increased tolerance for social loafing
(Griskevicius, Ackerman, Van den Bergh, and Li, 2011). This line of research, coupled with
theoretical assumption that a mismatch in the principal and manager’s choice will lead to
negative consequences, provides support for the following hypothesis:
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H6a: Stewardship structure is positively associated with agent behavior.
However, I argue that kinship status moderates the relationship between stewardship
structure and agent behavior. For family employees, I suggest the positive relationship is
strengthened, meaning the negative consequences of stewardship structure on agent behavior are
stronger. One of the characteristics unique to family firms is particularism, which can be
described as a “tendency of the owner-managers to view the firm as ‘our business’” (Carney,
2005: 255). Family members are usually in top management roles, can influence the strategic
direction of the firm (Kelly, Athanassiou, and Crittenden, 2000), and often possess an emotional
attachment to the firm (Bernhard and O’Driscoll, 2011; Mustakallio et al., 2002). Family
members are often territorial and protective of their family business, and when feelings of
infringement surface, counterproductive behavior may result (Rantanen and Jussila, 2011). A
stewardship structure that promotes social interaction, information exchange, and a collectivistic
work environment between family and nonfamily employees may trigger these feelings of
infringement. Meaning, family employees may feel that nonfamily employees are infringing on
their domain by an environment of inclusion, and therefore counterproductive behavior may
result in the presence of a stewardship structure.
In contrast, I argue that stewardship structure will have beneficial consequence on agent
behavior of nonfamily employees of the family business. Nonfamily managers are part of the
firm but not part of the family, and therefore may resent family members. In summarizing
Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, and Buchholtz (2001), Anderson and Reeb (2004: 212), state,
“favoritism towards heirs and siblings can lead to family perquisites…leading to resentment by
nonfamily managers.” Stewardship structures that encourage interaction between family and
nonfamily employees may facilitate the feeling of interconnectedness for nonfamily employees,
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therefore lessening the feelings of resentment. This structure provides social interaction between
family and nonfamily employees, and as such commitment to a shared vision can be formed
(Mustakallio et al., 2002). It facilitates an environment where employees can exhibit productive
behavior such as helping each other and encouraging the flow of information (Evans and Davis,
2005). As such, I argue that nonfamily employees will react more favorably and decrease their
level of agent behavior in the presence of a stewardship structure. Taken together, I hypothesize:
H6b: Kinship status moderates the relationship between stewardship structure and agent
behavior, such that the positive relationship strengthens for family employees and
weakens for nonfamily employees.
Integrating Theory
This section presents my hypothesis integrating agency and stewardship theories to
predict the performance of family firms. Theory assumes that the principal’s choice is either
agency or stewardship. As Wasserman (2006: 961) states, “stewardship theory is more relevant
in contexts in which agency theory is less relevant, and vice versa.” However, this fails to
consider the simultaneous choice of agency and stewardship and neglects the organizational
reality that work environments can include both agency and stewardship governance structures.
As stated by Mahoney (2005: 151), “Barnard (1938) argues that formal and informal
organization always and everywhere co-exist.” The presence of both structures would suggest
the adoption of both agency and stewardship prescriptions for influencing manager behavior and
ultimately firm performance.
I argue that the integration of agency and stewardship structures results in increased firm
performance over the use of just one structure alone. Furthermore, I suggest that organizations
can have varying levels and combinations of both these structures, each with a different impact
on firm performance. As illustrated in Table 2.7, firms can have: (1) a high level of agency
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structure and a low level of stewardship structure, labeled Monitor Structure; (2) high levels of
both agency and stewardship structures, labeled Trust But Monitor Structure; (3) low levels of
both agency and stewardship structures, labeled Undetermined Structure; and (4) a low level of
agency structure and a high level of stewardship structure, labeled Trust Structure.

Agency Structure

Table 2.7: Governance Structure Integration

High

Monitor
Structure

Trust But
Monitor
Structure

Low

Undetermined
Structure

Trust
Structure

Low

High

Stewardship Structure

Separately, agency structures (e.g., Anderson and Reeb, 2004; Braun and Sharma, 2007;
Chrisman et al., 2007) and stewardship structures (e.g., Craig and Dibrell, 2006) have been
shown to increase firm performance in family firms. However, I suggest that firm performance
will be enhanced when both structures are used in combination. When both are present, agency
structures will curb undesired agent behavior, but not at the expense of endangering steward
behavior; steward behavior is still influenced by the simultaneous stewardship structure.
Likewise, stewardship structures will empower steward behavior, but not at the expense of
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allowing agent behavior to surface; self-interested behavior is still being curbed by the
simultaneous agency structure. Accordingly, an organizational environment that includes agency
and stewardship governance structures will result in positive behavior and thus increased firm
performance, regardless of whether managers are stewards or agents. This argument diverges
from theory in that it negates the negative consequences of mismatched choices because of its
integration of both agency and stewardship theory prescriptions.
Based on these arguments, I predict the highest level of firm performance will be found
in organizations with high levels of both agency and stewardship structures. Trust But Monitor
Structures would simultaneously curb agent behavior and increase steward behavior, thus
resulting in higher levels of firm performance. Support for this argument is also found in the
control literature; in a qualitative case study, Cardinal and colleagues found that integrated and
balanced levels of both formal (e.g., agency) and informal (e.g., stewardship) controls led to
higher firm performance than having imbalanced controls in place (Cardinal, Sitkin, and Long,
2004). As such, I suggest that organizations with Trust But Monitor Structures would have the
highest levels of firm performance.
The structural combination I predict would lead to the second highest firm performance
level is the Monitor Structure, or those with a high level of agency structure and a low level of
stewardship structure. I then predict the Trust Structure, depicted as having a high level of
stewardship structure and a low level of agency structure, to have the third highest firm
performance level. These predictions are based on my review and interpretation of the family
firm literature. Agency theory has long been associated with economic performance outcomes,
and therefore, the relationship between agency prescriptions and firm performance is more
frequently examined and supported in the family firm literature (e.g., Anderson and Reeb, 2003,
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2004; Chrisman et al., 2011; Chrisman et al., 2007; Chua et al., 2006; Lester and Cannella, 2006;
Schulze et al., 2003; Schulze et al., 2011). Conversely, although stewardship theory predicts
increased performance, much of the extant family firm stewardship literature focuses on
noneconomic outcome variables (e.g., Davis et al., 2010; Miller et al, 2008; Pearson and Marler,
2010; Zahra et al., 2008). Taken together, there is stronger and more support for agency theory
over stewardship theory prescriptions having a positive impact on the performance of the family
firm. As such, I predict that firms with Monitor Structures would have higher performance levels
than firms with Trust Structures.
Lastly, I predict that firms with low levels of both agency and stewardship structures, or
an Undetermined Structure, would have the lowest level of firm performance when compared to
the other structural combinations. The lack of both agency and stewardship structures would
create an organizational environment where agent behavior might prevail and steward behavior
might be reduced, thereby impacting the performance of the firm. Summarizing these arguments,
I formally hypothesize:
H7: The interaction of agency and stewardship structures results in varying levels of firm
performance. Specifically, the Trust But Monitor Structure results in the highest level of
firm performance, followed by the Monitor Structure, then Trust Structure, with the
Undetermined Structure resulting in the lowest level of firm performance.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the theoretical tenets of agency and stewardship theories encompass
structure, behavior, and performance. The organizational structure enacted by the principal
influences the manager’s choice of agent versus steward behavior, and the fit between the
principal’s choice and manager’s choice impacts the performance outcome of the relationship.
My study incorporates these suggestions by modeling firm level performance as the outcome of
agency and stewardship structures, but mediated through agent and steward behaviors. Thereby,
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the differing governance prescriptions and behavioral assumptions of both theories are integrated
in the same model.
As theorized by agency theory, I predict that agency structures will decrease agent
behavior; therefore both the principal and manager have chosen agency, and firm performance
will increase. As theorized by stewardship theory, I predict that stewardship structures will
increase steward behavior; therefore both the principal and manager have chosen stewardship,
and firm performance will increase. Additionally, I consider across theory implications. Theory
suggests negative consequences result from the principal and manager making different choices
in agency or stewardship; my predictions comport with these theoretical assumptions, but only
for the behavior of family employees of the business. These predictions imply that for family
employees, an agent always behaves as an agent and a steward always behaves as a steward.
Mismatched choices will result in negative consequences; family agents will act
opportunistically in a stewardship environment and family stewards will feel betrayed in an
agency environment.
However, I predict positive across theory behavior for nonfamily employees; therefore,
diverging from theoretical assumptions for nonfamily employees of the business. These
predictions imply that for nonfamily employees, the work environment implemented by the
principal can influence or alter the manager’s behavior. A principal enacting an agency
environment on a nonfamily steward or enacting a stewardship environment on a nonfamily
agent can still have a positive impact on the behavior and ultimately the performance of the firm.
I also make predictions based on integrating agency and stewardship perspectives. I
suggest that family firms can have agency and stewardship structures operating side by side
(Chrisman et al., 2007). I hypothesize that varying combinations and levels of these structures
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have a differing impact on the performance of family firms. This integration narrows the distance
between oposing theoretical views and provides a foundation on which future research can build.
This concludes Chapter 2. In this chapter, I provided an overview of agency theory and
stewardship theory, then transitioned to examining these theories within the context of family
firms. I answered my first research question by concluding that both agency theory and
stewardship theory are applicable within family firms, but suggested the theories needed to be
integrated to offer additional explanations for family firm behavior and performance.
Accordingly, I presented an integrated research model and the development of hypotheses
within, across, and integrating theories with considerations of kinship status; the next chapter
presents the methodology used to test the research model and predicted relationships.
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY
A detailed account of the methodology used to test the research model and hypotheses is
provided in this chapter. A general overview is provided first, followed by a specific description
of the survey instrument and approach, sample, and measures. The chapter concludes with a
description of the data analysis process, including the diagnostic and bias tests conducted prior to
testing the hypotheses in the research model.
Overview
I collected data via surveys mailed to family firms, a common method among family firm
researchers (Eddleston et al., 2008). The uniqueness of my approach stems from utilizing
multiple respondent types; I collected survey data from the leader, a family employee, and a
nonfamily employee of the family firm. A mailing list of 2165 family firms was obtained from a
combination of sources, but primarily from undergraduate business students at a major US
university. The survey instrument contained previously validated and accepted scales or adapted
scales to accommodate the family firm context: firm performance was collected from the leader,
perceptions of governance structures were collected from both employee types, and perceptions
of employee behavior were captured from the leader. Data is analyzed with OLS regression, with
tests for mediation and moderation via a subgroup analysis. A more detailed explanation of the
survey instrument, survey approach, sample, measures, and data analysis is provided next.
Survey Instrument
Mail surveys are frequently used in empirical studies within the social sciences (Dillman,
1991), and more specifically within small and medium enterprises (Newby, Watson, and
Woodliff, 2003) and family firms (Eddleston et al., 2008). As such, it is an appropriate approach
to data collection in this research. However, low response rates are often a concern for survey
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researchers; therefore, certain survey design and administration methods have been suggested to
increase the number of responses (Dillman, 1991; Newby et al., 2003). From a design
perspective, it has been suggested that surveys indicating university sponsorship (Greer and
Lohtia, 1994; Kanso, 2000), assuring anonymity of respondents (Kanso, 2000), using colored
paper and booklet formatting (Dillman, 1991; Kanso, 2000; Newby et al., 2003), including
postage paid return envelopes (Kanso, 2000) and personalization (Dillman, 1991) can increase
response rates. From an administrative perspective, mailing follow-up reminders and
replacement questionnaires is also found to increase response rates (Creswell, 2009; Dillman,
1991; Salant and Dillman, 1994).
Accordingly, my survey instrument contained: (1) a statement of university affiliation
and sponsorship including contact information for the university’s research compliance officer;
(2) a statement assuring the anonymity of the respondent; (3) colored paper (e.g., ivory for the
firm leader, orange for the family employee, and blue for the nonfamily employee); (4) booklet
formatting; and (5) postage paid return envelopes stapled to each survey. Follow-up packets were
mailed to nonresponding firms and included a personalized cover letter of reminder, replacement
questionnaires, and postage paid return envelopes.
Survey Approach
Although survey methodology is commonplace in family firm research (Eddleston and
Kellermanns, 2007), my research approach is unique because of the utilization of multiple
respondent types. I collected survey data from the leader, a family member employee, and a
nonfamily employee of the family firm. As such, three surveys were developed, one for each
respondent type. The leader survey contained questions about firm level characteristics, such as
age, size, and industry. It also included previously validated scales to capture firm performance,
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and perceptions of employee agency and stewardship behavior. The family and nonfamily
employee surveys contained identical items, with the exception of asking the family member for
his/her relationship to the founder. Scales contained in these surveys were previously validated
and sought to ascertain perceptions of agency and stewardship governance structures. Additional
details regarding the variables and scale items is found in the measures section.
To accommodate my survey approach, I assembled packets for each family firm. The
packet included a cover letter on university letterhead and a survey for completion by the leader,
family member, and nonfamily member. The packets were mailed to a named contact of family
firm; in most cases, this named contact was the leader of the business. The cover letter provided
instructions for survey distribution (e.g., the ivory survey is for the leader, the orange survey is
for a family member, the blue survey is for a nonfamily member; the surveys were also titled
accordingly). Each survey had a postage paid return envelope stapled to it to ensure anonymity
(e.g., Eddleston and Kellermanns, 2007; Eddleston et al., 2008) and to increase response rates
(Kanso, 2000). The surveys were numbered alike for each business in order to match multiple
responses to the same family firm (e.g., Eddleston and Kellermanns, 2007; Eddleston et al.,
2008).
Sampling Frame
A list of family businesses was obtained from a combination of soliciting contact
information of known family firms from undergraduate business students at a large public
university in the southeastern US, searching newspapers and websites for articles about family
businesses, and attending local forums specifically for family business owners. This approach
yielded a sampling frame of 2165 family firms, which was then reduced to 2024 firms following
the removal of 141 contact businesses due to insufficient/undeliverable addresses (114),
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responses of ‘not a family business’ (16), or expressed disinterest (11). After initial and followup mailings to these 2024 firms, I received 408 completed surveys representing 192 distinct
family firms for a total organizational response rate of 9.5% (see Table 3.1). However, data will
be analyzed in matched triads, meaning a survey must have been received from the leader, a
family employee, and a nonfamily employee of the same family firm. This constrains my sample
size; my final sample includes 77 matched organizational triads, for an overall response rate of
3.8%.

Table 3.1: Summary of Surveys Mailed and Returned
Source

a

Packets
Mailed

Packets
Returnedb

Leader

Family

Nonfamily

Students

1379

71

128

95

95

318

148

11.3%

Community

697

66

30

15

17

62

33

5.2%

Media

82

4

9

8

11

28

11

14.1%

Personal

7

0

0

0

0

0

0

0.0%

2165

141

167

118

123

408

192

9.5%

Total

Survey Responses

Organizational Responses
Total

# of Organizations

a Students: undergraduate students in business courses at The University of Tennessee Knoxville

b
c

Community: Knoxville Chamber of Commerce, Family Firm community meetings
Media: Web searches, newspapers, advertisements
Personal: Family businesses known to me
Includes undeliverable packets (114), responded “not a family business” (16), responded “not-interested in participating” (11)
Number of organizational responses / (packets mailed – packets returned)

Matched Responses
Source

Triads

Dyads (L-F)

Dyads (L-NF)

Dyads (F-NF)

65

81

81

70

Community

8

14

11

8

Media

4

5

6

5

Personal

0

0

0

0

TOTAL

77

100

98

83

Students

76

c

Response Rate

Of interest to note, the highest organizational response rate of 14.1% came from the
family firms obtained through the use of media outlets. This is not surprising given they are
proudly advertising themselves as family businesses and would most likely be interested in
assisting with a family firm research project. The lowest organizational response rate of 0.0%
was from family businesses personally known to me. I assume these businesses did not respond
because potentially they didn’t want me knowing sensitive information about their businesses or
the responses from their employees.
Measures
The operationalization of each variable in the research model is discussed in this section.
The dependent variable is described first, followed by a discussion of the independent, mediator,
moderator, and control variables. A summary of the variables, measures, and data sources is
provided in Table 3.2.
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Table 3.2: Summary of Variables, Measures, and Data Sources
Variable

Measure

Data Source

4-item subjective measure; growth relative to
competition (Eddleston and Kellermanns, 2007)

Principal (Firm Leader)

Dependent Variable
Firm Performance
Independent Variables
Agency Governance Structure
Structure

Board of Directors (Chrisman et al., 2004)
Compensation Incentives (Schulze et al., 2001)

Principal (Firm Leader)

Monitoring

5-item scale (Chrisman et al., 2007)

Manager (family and
nonfamily employees)

Stewardship Governance Structure
Information Interaction

2-item information exchange frequency scale
(adapted from Ling and Kellermanns, 2010)

Manager (family and
nonfamily employees)

Social Interaction

3-item social interaction scale
(adapted from Mustakallio et al., 2002)

Manager (family and
nonfamily employees)

3-item productivity scale (Nyhan, 2000); reverse
coded

Principal (Firm Leader)

4-item organizational commitment scale (Nyhan,
2000)

Principal (Firm Leader)

Family / Nonfamily

Manager (family and
nonfamily employees)

Industry (retail, services, other)
Firm Age (number of years in existence)
Size (number of employees)

Principal (Firm Leader)

Mediators
Agent Behavior
Steward Behavior

Moderator
Kinship Status

Controls
Firm-Level
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Dependent Variable: Family Firm Performance
From a theoretical perspective, both agency and stewardship theories seek to explain firm
performance. Within the strategy literature, the ultimate dependent variable is firm performance,
and researchers try to explain as much of the predictive power as possible (Richard, Devinney,
Yip, and Johnson, 2009). In the broadest terms, performance measures can be categorized as
financial or nonfinancial (Rauch, Wiklund, Lumpkin, and Frese, 2009). More specifically, many
types of performance are studied, such as operational performance (i.e., value-chain activities),
organizational performance (i.e., sales growth, market share, accounting, and financial returns),
or organizational effectiveness (i.e., survival; Combs, Crook, and Shook, 2005; Richard et al.,
2009).
Accordingly, I captured an overall measure of firm performance from the family firm
leader by asking four questions relating to the financial and nonfinancial growth of the firm
(Eddleston and Kellermanns, 2007). Growth is an important dependent variable in family firms
because of the desire for transgenerational sustainability and to accommodate the growing
family. Specifically, leaders were asked to indicate if the family firm’s growth was much worse,
about the same, or better compared to the competitors on a seven-point scale. The average of the
four items was used as the score for firm performance. The scale items are presented in Table 3.3
(α = 0.83).
Additionally, use of this performance measure has its benefits. First, subjective
performance measures have been found to be reasonable indicators of performance; objective
measures are often unavailable and tend to lower the survey response rate (Kellermanns et al.,
2008; Runyan, Droge, and Swinney, 2008). Second, objective performance measures have been
found to correlate highly with subjective data (Ling and Kellermanns, 2010; Venkatraman and
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Ramanujam, 1986), warranting the use of subjective performance measures in survey research.

Table 3.3: Scale Items for Family Firm Performance
How would you rate your firm’s performance as compared to your competitors?
1

Growth in sales

2

Growth in market share

3

Growth in the number of employees

4

Growth in profitability

Independent Variables: Agency and Stewardship Structures
Both agency and stewardship theories offer governance prescriptions for increased
performance. Accordingly, agency and stewardship governance structures serve as the
independent variables in this research and are described next.
Agency Structure. From an agency perspective, governance mechanisms are implemented
to curb the assumed self-interested behavior on the part of the agent. These agency governance
prescriptions have been examined within family firms and include the presence of a board of
directors (Anderson and Reeb, 2004; Chrisman et al., 2004), compensation incentive plans
(Chrisman et al., 2007; Schulze et al., 2001), and monitoring activities (Chrisman et al., 2007).
Accordingly, my survey instrument included measures for each of these variables.
The family firm leader was asked if the family firm was governed by a board of directors,
indicated with a response of yes (coded ‘1’) or no (coded ‘0’). The family firm leader was asked
if there was a compensation incentive plan for family employees and nonfamily employees,
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indicated with a response of yes (coded ‘1’) or no (coded ‘0’). Monitoring activities were
captured from family and nonfamily employees. The employees were asked five questions
regarding how often the leader of the firm uses monitoring methods to obtain information on
their activities and performance on a scale of 1 to 7 (1 = never; 7 = very often). The responses on
the five items were averaged to obtain the score for the level of monitoring. This scale utilized
for monitoring methods came from Chrisman and his colleagues (2007) and is shown in Table
3.4 (α = 0.84).
An overall index of agency structure was created to ascertain the level of agency
prescriptions present in the family firm; a high score indicating a high level of agency structure.
This approach was necessary because firms may choose to implement a variety of agency
prescriptions; and an absence of one prescription does not necessarily mean an absence of an
agency structure (Chrisman et al., 2007). This index was calculated by summing four z-scores:
(1) the presence of a board of directors, (2) a compensation incentive plan for family employees,
(3) a compensation incentive plan for nonfamily employees, and (4) the level of monitoring
activities.
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Table 3.4: Scale Items for Agency Structure
Structure
1a

Does this family firm have a compensation incentive plan for family members?

1b

Does this family firm have a compensation incentive plan for nonfamily members?

2

Does this family firm have a governance board?

Monitoring Activities: How often are the following methods used to obtain information on activities and
performance?
1

Personal direct observation

2

Regular assessment of short-term output

3

Progress toward long-term goals

4

Input from other managers

5

Input from subordinates

Stewardship Structure. A stewardship structure is typified by an involvement-oriented
structure that encourages interaction and cooperation (Davis et al., 1997; Eddleston et al., 2012).
This study uses the level of interaction between family and nonfamily employees in the family
firm as a proxy for a stewardship governance structure, captured with five items on a scale of 1
to 7 (1 = never, 7 = very often). Respondents are the employees, both family and nonfamily, of
the family firm. Two questions capture interaction from an information exchange frequency
perspective, defined as “the amount of interaction among team members, whether face-to-face or
through telephone, written communication, and emails” (Ling and Kellermanns, 2010: 327). I
argue that high levels of information exchange depict a culture that is involvement-oriented and
supports interaction between employees. Accordingly, I used the scale from Ling and
Kellermanns (2010), but adapted it to a family firm employee context. The scale originally was
three items and sought to address the level of interaction between top management team
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members, but it was used in this research to seek the level of interaction between family and
nonfamily members of the family business. Additionally, I dropped one of the items, the level of
written communication, due to its nonsignificant loading in a confirmatory factor analysis.
Further justification for dropping this item is warranted because conceptually, ‘written’
communication does not necessarily capture interaction between employees.
I also assessed the level of social interaction by use of a three-item scale from
Mustakallio and colleagues (2002). They measured social interaction among family members of
the business by assessing whether family members maintain close social relations, know each
other personally, and visit each other regularly. Based on the lower than desired factor loading of
the last item in the analysis of Mustakallio et al (2002), I dropped this item and added a similar
item more aligned with the spirit of a stewardship governance structure by asking the frequency
of social interactions occurring at company functions. Furthermore, I ascertained social
interaction between family and nonfamily employees rather than between family members.
Responses from the five items were averaged to obtain the score for a stewardship
governance structure. This measure exhibited acceptable fit in a confirmatory factor analysis
(χ²=3.39, df=3, p=0.335, RMSEA=0.041, CFI=0.997, GFI=0.982, NFI=0.979). Scale items are
found in Table 3.5 (α = 0.81).
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Table 3.5: Scale Items for Stewardship Structure
How often do family members and nonfamily members of the firm
1

Have face-to-face meetings

2*

Have written communication (e.g. reports, email, personal notes, etc.)

3

Have telephone conversations

4

Maintain close social relations

5

Know each other on a personal level

6

Attend company functions (e.g. picnics, parties, get-togethers, etc)

*dropped during CFA

Mediators: Agent and Steward Behaviors
Agent Behavior. Agent behavior is a form of opportunistic behavior that includes freeriding or shirking (Chrisman et al., 2004; Chua et al., 2009; Eisenhardt, 1989; Karra et al., 2006),
and refers to the situation where the agent lacks effort or is unproductive in the scope of the
employment relationship (Chrisman et al., 2004; Ross, 1973). Accordingly, agent behavior was
captured by reverse coding Nyhan’s (2000) three-item scale assessing employee productivity. A
panel of practitioners and academics tested the scale for validity (Nyhan, 2000), and it has
exhibited high reliability in empirical studies (α = .75 in Nyhan, 2000; α = .83 in Fry, Vitucci,
and Cedillo, 2005). Responses were obtained from the leaders of the family firms on a sevenpoint scale indicating the level of agreement with the statements (1 = strongly disagree; 7 =
strongly agree). The scale items appear in Table 3.6 (α = 0.78).
Steward Behavior. In line with Davis et al (2010), the employees’ level of value
commitment to the organization was used in my research as a proxy for steward behavior.
Research suggests that value commitment is an employee stewardship behavior depicted by the
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level of commitment to and identification with the organization (Davis et al., 1997; 2010).
Accordingly, a previously validated four-item scale measuring this level of organizational value
commitment (Nyhan, 2000) was used in this research. Responses to the level of steward behavior
exhibited by employees were obtained from the leaders of the family firms on a seven-point
scale indicating the level of agreement with the statements (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly
agree). The scale items appear in Table 3.6 (α = 0.87).

Table 3.6: Scale Items for Agent and Steward Behaviors
Agent Behavior: Productivity (reverse coded)
1

Everyone is busy in the organization; there is little idle time.

2

Work quality is a high priority for all employees.

3

Everyone in the organization gives his/her best efforts.

Steward Behavior: Organizational Value Commitment
1

Leadership makes everyone feel like “part of the family” in this organization.

2

Employees would be very happy to spend the rest of their career with this organization.

3

Employees talk up this organization to their friends as a great place to work.

4

Employees really feel as if the organization’s problems are their own.

Moderator: Kinship Status
Kinship status, family versus nonfamily employee, is the moderator in this study. Kinship
status was assessed primarily through the survey approach; I asked the firm leader to distribute
the orange family survey to a family employee working in the business and the blue nonfamily
survey to a nonfamily employee working in the business. Additionally, there were instructions
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on the top of both the orange and blue surveys that indicated whether it was for family or
nonfamily employee completion. As an additional check, the family survey asked respondents to
identify their relationship to the family firm leader and asked if they are a descendant of the
family firm founder.
Controls: Industry, Firm Age, Firm Size
Control variables that have been associated with family firm performance are necessary
in order to isolate the effect of interest. Consistent with extant family firm empirical studies, such
as the work of Chrisman et al (2004) and Schulze et al (2001, 2003), the firm’s industry, age, and
size serve as control variables in this study. Industry conditions may affect firm performance
(Craig and Dibrell, 2006), and therefore, the firm’s industry was captured via the leader’s survey
as either retail, services, or other (i.e., manufacturing, transportation). Age of the organization
may also affect firm performance; research suggests that younger firms may have higher growth
potential (Chrisman, et al., 2009; Memili, et al., 2010) or that older firms are in existence
because they have had successful performance (Schulze et al., 2001). Therefore, I controlled for
firm age, measured by years of existence and captured from the family firm leader.
Organizational size is not only suggested to impact firm performance, but it potentially impacts
agency and stewardship variables in the research model. Agency-related, Pieper et al (2008)
suggest that larger organizations are more complex than smaller organizations, thereby making
boards of directors necessary. Stewardship-related, Davis et al (2010) suggest that organizational
size impacts the amount of social interation within a firm; the larger the firm, the less likely the
interaction. Accordingly, I controlled for firm size by asking the family firm leader for the
number of employees in the firm.
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Data Analyses
Overview
The data analysis section describes the statistical analyses used to test the hypothesized
relationships in my research model. It contains a description of preliminary analysis, diagnostics
tests, and necessary tests of biases. All tests were performed using IBM SPSS Statistics Version
21.
Agency theory and stewardship theory are both based on the principal-manager
relationship. In order to match the empirical investigation with the theoretical underpinnings and
my research model within the family firm context, data was analyzed using matched triads. Each
triad was made up of the family firm leader, a family employee, and a nonfamily employee
within the same family business (n=77 triads). In doing so, both sides of the principal-manager
relationship are taken into consideration. A principal-manager relationship is depicted by the
principal delegating work to the manager. Accordingly, the family firm leader represents the
principal, and both family and nonfamily employees represent the manager.
I analyzed matched triad data using OLS hierarchical regression, with tests for mediation
and moderation. In order to use regression analysis, I aggregated the employee responses to the
organizational level so that all variables would be at the same level of analysis. Before
aggregation, I calculated rwg, or the level of within-group interrater agreement (James, Demaree,
and Wolf, 1984), between employees within the same family firm. This calculation compares the
variability of a variable within the firm to an expected variance. Aggregation from the individual
level to the firm level is justified when the variability within the firm is smaller than the
variability expected by chance, represented by an rwg of greater than 0.70 (Klein and Kozlowski,
2000). The rwg statistic, restricted to a range of 0 to 1, for each of the variables in my model
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obtained from the employee responses was above this threshold (i.e., monitoring = 0.87;
information exchange = 0.83; social interaction = .87). Thereby, aggregation was justified, and
triad data at the organizational level was used during the entire data analysis phase, with the
exception of the moderation hypotheses.
To test the moderation hypotheses, data was analyzed using subgroups at the dyad level.
The dyads consisted of family firm leaders matched with family employees of the same family
firm and family firm leaders matched with nonfamily employees of the same family firm. The
leader-family dyad was compared to the leader-nonfamily dyad. Accordingly, employee data
from the family and nonfamily was not used in aggregate for the moderation tests.
Before presenting the results of the data analysis of the hypothesized relationships in my
research model, it is first necessary to explain the preliminary analysis, diagnostic tests, and bias
tests conducted. A description, along with the results, of each of these tests is provided next.
Preliminary Analysis
Prior to data analysis, I checked for missing data because although the sample is random,
a lack of a response may not be random (i.e., respondents refuse to answer a question). There
were minimal missing data in my sample and no observable patterns of missing values. As such,
and to preserve sample size in correlation and regression analysis, I followed the approach set
forth in Allison (2001), and imputed missing data since less than 15% missing threshold was
achieved across all variables. The percentage of missing values in the items of my variables
ranged from 0% missing (i.e., the presence of a board of directors, the level of social interaction,
agent behavior, industry, firm age, and firm size) to 11.04% missing (i.e., firm performance).
Table 3.7 shows the missing data statistics and method of imputation used in my research.

88

Table 3.7: Missing Data Statistics
Possible
Responses

Actual
Responses

Percent
Missing

Method of Imputation

308

274

11.04%

mean replacement

Board of Directors

77

77

0.00%

n/a

Compensation Incentives-Family

77

76

1.30%

family survey response

Compensation Incentives-Nonfamily

77

75

2.60%

nonfamily survey response

770

741

3.77%

mean replacement

Information Exchange Frequencyb

308

306

0.65%

mean replacement

Social Interactionc

462

462

0.00%

n/a

Mediators
Agent Behavior

231

231

0.00%

n/a

Dependent Variable
Firm Performance
Independent Variables
Agency Structure

a

Monitoring

Stewardship Structure

Steward Behavior

308

302

1.95%

mean replacement

Controls
Industry

77

77

0.00%

n/a

Firm Age

77

77

0.00%

n/a

Size

77

77

0.00%

n/a

a Monitoring: Family responses: 374/385 = 2.86% missing; Nonfamily responses: 367/385 = 4.68% missing
b Information Exchange Frequency: Family responses: 153/154 = 0.65% missing; Nonfamily responses: 153/154 = 0.65% missing
c Social Interaction: Family responses: 231/231 = 0.00% missing; Nonfamily responses: 231/231 = 0.00% missing

By way of example, there were 77 possible responses to the question asked of firm
leaders as to whether there are compensations incentives for family employees (i.e., single item
asked of all 77 firm leaders in the sample). A total of 76 responses were obtained; the missing
value was imputed by using the survey response from the family employee of the same firm to
the same question. As another example, there were 308 possible responses to the social
interaction variable (2 items x 77 family employee responses + 2 items x 77 nonfamily employee
responses). There were 306 actual responses and 2 missing values. The missing values were
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imputed with the mean score of the item across all respondents. The variable with the highest
percentage of missing values was firm performance. This was not surprising because missing
data issues are quite common in empirical studies of family firms, especially when using primary
data sources and when sensitive data, such as firm performance, is sought (Zellweger,
Kellermanns, Chrisman, and Chua, 2012).
Diagnostic Tests
Before testing the research model and hypotheses, diagnostic tests were performed to
ensure the data assumptions of random distribution, independence, normality, linearity, and
homoscedasticity hold (Cohen, Cohen, West, and Aiken, 2003).
Random distribution and independence. Random distribution refers to the assumption
that the data were randomly sampled and there is variation in the responses. Independence refers
to the assumption that the data are independent of one another, meaning that each observation is
not influenced by any other observations. Both of these assumptions are met based on my survey
approach.
Normality. Scores for variables should be normally distributed, as depicted by a
symmetrical, bell-shaped curve. Normality can be assessed with skewness (i.e., symmetry of the
distribution) and kurtosis (peakedness of the distribution) statistics, a visual inspection of a
histogram and a normal probability plot, and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic. The further
away from zero the skewness and kurtosis statistic is, the less normal the distribution. Some
research suggests that a skewness statistic of greater than twice the standard error and a kurtosis
statistic greater than ± 3indicates a significant deviation from a normal distribution. Furthermore,
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test assesses the normality of the distribution with a non-significant
value indicating normality; a significant value indicating a violation of the normality assumption.
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The histogram displays the distribution of the data and includes a bell-shaped curve to indicate
normality. The normal probability plot displays the observed value plotted against the expected
value from a normal distribution, with a reasonably straight line indicating normality. Table 3.8
presents the skewness, kurtosis, and Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics, and Figure 3.1 displays the
histogram and normal probability plots for the variables in my research model.
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Table 3.8: Normality Statistics

Dependent Variable
Firm Performance

Skewness

Std Error

Kurtosis

-0.22

0.27

0.28

Performance Variable 1

-0.34

-0.06

Performance Variable 2

0.00

-0.41

Performance Variable 3

1.00

0.88

Performance Variable 4

-0.64

0.30

Kolmogorov-Smirnov
significance value
.02

Independent Variables
Agency Structure

0.04

0.27

-0.75

Board of Directors

0.83

-1.35

Compensation Incentives-Family

0.76

-1.46

Compensation Incentives-Nonfamily

0.13

-2.04

Monitoring Variable 1

-1.10

1.19

Monitoring Variable 2

-0.70

0.44

Monitoring Variable 3

-0.60

-0.12

Monitoring Variable 4

-1.80

4.85

Monitoring Variable 5

-0.81
-0.64

1.10
-0.10

Stewardship Structure

0.27

Information Interaction Variable 1

-0.82

Information Interaction Variable 3

-0.89

0.03

Social Interaction Variable 1

-0.50

-0.29

Social Interaction Variable 2

-1.41

2.98

Social Interaction Variable 3

-0.93

0.33

.07

.04

-0.10

Mediating Variables
Agent Behavior

0.75

0.27

0.61

Productivity (reversed) Variable 1

0.64

Productivity (reversed) Variable 2

0.91

0.37

Productivity (reversed) Variable 3

0.55
-1.03

-0.45
1.37

Steward Behavior

-0.29

0.27

Organizational Commitment Variable 1

-0.88

-0.14

Organizational Commitment Variable 2

-1.07

1.08

Organizational Commitment Variable 3

-0.96

0.52

Organizational Commitment Variable 4

-0.72

0.16
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.00

.01

Figure 3.1: Normality Plots
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Dependent Variable: Firm Performance

Independent Variables: Agency Structure and Stewardship Structure

Figure 3.1 continued

94

Mediating Variables: Agent Behavior and Steward Behavior

Figure 3.1 continued
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With considerations for each statistic and a visual inspection of the distribution, I
concluded that stewardship structure, agent behavior, and steward behavior violate the
assumption of normality, and therefore transformation is necessary. Based on the appearance and
skewness of the distribution, the appropriate transformation to normality for stewardship
structure is a reflection and logarithm, for agent behavior is a square root, and for steward
behavior is a reflection and logarithm (Cohen et al., 2003). Accordingly, Figure 3.2 presents the
statistics, histogram, and normal probability plots for the transformed variables. These
transformed variables conform to normality assumptions and therefore are used for the remaining
analysis.
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Stewardship Structure
Agent Behavior
Steward Behavior

Skewness

Std Error

Kurtosis

Kolmogorov-Smirnov
significance value

-0.08

0.27

-0.70

0.20

0.23

0.27

-0.29

0.04

-0.06

0.27

-0.55

0.20

Stewardship Structure

Agent Behavior

Steward Behavior

Figure 3.2: Normality Statistics and Plots for Transformed Variables
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Linearity and Homoscedasticity. The relationship between two continuous variables
should be linear to be appropriate for correlation analysis. Linearity can be assessed by a
scatterplot, where variables appear to be clustered in a straight line as opposed to curvilinear.
Homoscedasticity assumes that the variability in scores for one variable should be similar at all
values of the second variable. Homoscedasticity can also be assessed by a scatterplot, where
variables appear to follow a cigar-shaped pattern. Figure 3.3 presents the scatterplots for the
variables in my research model. Based on these scatterplots, I conclude that the data do not
violate the assumption of linearity or homoscedasticity.
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Figure 3.3: Linearity and Homoscedasticity Plots
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Bias Tests
Due to the lower than desired response rate, I performed three checks for potential
nonresponse bias and also assessed sample representativeness. Due to the use of primary survey
data, I also tested for common methods bias. A description of these bias tests is provided next.
Nonresponse Bias. Research shows that late respondents are more similar to
nonrespondents than they are to early respondents (Kanuk and Berenson, 1975). As such, I
divided respondents into groups categorized as early or late respondents, based on the average
number of days to respond. As a second check, I split the data by grouping those who responded
to the first mailing versus those who responded to the second mailing. And, as an additional
check, I compared my sample data with the data I collected that could not be used in the analysis
(i.e., if the respondent was part of a triad versus not a part of a triad). This third test was to
ensure the final sample for data analysis was similar to the complete sample of respondents. If no
significant differences in the means of the research variables are found on these splits, the
assumption is supported that nonresponse bias is not a major problem in this study. Table 3.9,
3.10, and 3.11 present the results of the bias tests for the leader surveys, family surveys, and
nonfamily surveys, respectively.
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Table 3.9: Leader Survey Nonresponse Bias Statistics
Early vs. Late
Early

Late

t

Firm Performance

4.82

4.79

0.10

Agent Behavior

2.54

2.50

Steward Behavior

5.61

Board of Directors

1st vs. 2nd Mailing
df

p

1st

2nd

t

75

0.92

4.96

4.53

1.86

0.30

75

0.77

2.53

2.52

5.78

-0.67

75

0.51

5.54

0.25

0.46

-1.78

75

0.06

Compensation
Incentives-Family

0.32

0.33

-0.11

75

Compensation
Incentives-Nonfamily

0.42

0.58

-1.37

Industry

4.76

4.75

Firm Age

32.60

Firm Size

p

Triad

Non

t

df

75

0.07

4.81

4.79

-0.17

165

0.87

0.02

75

0.98

2.53

2.58

0.64

165

0.52

5.90

-1.44

75

0.15

5.67

5.70

0.22

165

0.82

0.40

0.15

2.33

75

0.01*

0.31

0.21

-1.48

165

0.14

0.91

0.28

0.41

-1.13

75

0.26

0.32

0.34

0.27

165

0.79

75

0.18

0.48

0.48

-0.18

75

0.86

0.47

0.48

0.13

165

0.90

0.10

75

0.99

4.92

4.44

1.07

75

0.29

4.75

4.81

0.21

165

0.84

43.96

-1.71

75

0.09

35.06

38.15

-0.47

75

0.64

36.14

30.68

-1.20

165

0.23

1.23

1.53

-1.83

75

0.08

1.41

1.17

1.70

75

0.09

1.32

1.13

-1.81

165

0.07

Leader Education

3.94

3.63

1.14

75

0.26

3.96

3.63

1.22

75

0.23

3.84

3.88

0.19

165

0.85

Leader Gender

0.75

0.88

-1.32

75

0.19

0.80

0.78

0.23

75

0.82

0.79

0.76

-0.56

165

0.58

Leader Age

54.90

55.18

-0.11

75

0.91

56.42

52.33

1.71

75

0.09

54.99

55.60

0.36

165

0.72

Leader Tenure

21.64

25.25

-1.11

75

0.27

23.40

21.59

0.57

75

0.57

22.77

20.19

-1.28

165

0.20
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df

Triad vs. Non-Triad
p

For the 77 leader surveys in my sample, the average days to respond was 23.17, with 53
early responders and 24 late responders. There were no significant differences in the variable
means using this grouping. Split differently, there were 50 respondents who returned the first
survey mailed; the remaining 27 respondents required a second survey before responding. There
was only one variable, the presence of a board of directors, that was significantly different
between these groups. Forty percent of responders to the first survey indicated their firms had a
board of directors, whereas only fifteen percent of responders to the second survey indicated
their firms had a board of directors. However, based on the early versus late statistic on this
variable, coupled with this variable being a relatively small part of the agency governance
structure index, there was little cause for concern. The third bias check includes comparing
means on the surveys I used in this research versus the surveys I did not. I received a total of 167
leader surveys, including 77 that are part of a survey triad, and 90 that are not part of a triad (i.e.,
not used in this research). There were no significant differences in mean scores between these
groups.
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Table 3.10: Family Employee Survey Nonresponse Bias Statistics
Early vs. Late
Early

Late

Monitoring

5.91

5.65

Stewardship Structure

0.31

Gender
Age
Education
Tenure

t

1st vs. 2nd Mailing
df

p

1st

2nd

t

1.04

75

0.03

5.86

5.77

0.26

0.95

75

0.35

0.30

0.56

0.48

0.65

75

0.52

41.87

39.21

0.76

75

3.63

3.64

-0.03

11.97

12.15

-0.07

Triad vs. Non-Triad

df

p

Triad

Non

t

df

0.37

75

0.28

0.53

0.57

0.48

0.45

41.48

75

0.98

75

0.94

0.71

5.82

5.47

1.68

113

0.10

75

0.60

0.29

0.31

-0.41

113

0.68

0.70

75

0.48

0.53

0.44

0.86

113

0.39

40.23

0.37

75

0.71

40.97

46.74

-1.90

113

0.06

3.51

3.81

-1.19

75

0.24

3.63

3.29

1.66

113

0.10

12.95

10.68

0.94

75

0.35

12.03

16.03

-1.73

113

0.09
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p

For the 77 family employees in my sample, the average days to respond was 24.45, with
51 early responders and 26 late responders. Split differently, there were 46 respondents who
returned the first survey mailed; the remaining 31 respondents required a second survey before
responding. I received a total of 115 family employee surveys, of which 77 were used in this
sample of matched triads and 38 were not used. As shown, there were no significant differences
in the variable means within any of these splits.
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Table 3.11: Nonfamily Employee Survey Nonresponse Bias Statistics
Early vs. Late
Early

Late

Monitoring

5.36

5.24

Stewardship Structure

0.35

Gender
Age
Education
Tenure

t

1st vs. 2nd Mailing
df

p

1st

2nd

t

Triad

Non

0.34

75

0.74

5.23

5.46

-0.709

75

0.48

5.32

5.09

0.84

112

0.40

0.38

-0.60

75

0.55

0.37

0.35

0.510

75

0.61

0.36

0.41

-1.09

112

0.28

0.36

0.48

-0.92

75

0.36

0.37

0.43

-0.624

75

0.54

0.40

0.38

0.18

112

0.86

46.20

39.95

2.09

75

0.04*

45.09

13.47

0.509

75

0.61

44.41

46.59

-0.80

112

0.43

3.13

3.00

0.50

75

0.62

3.29

2.81

2.101

75

0.04*

3.08

3.09

0.05

112

0.96

10.15

9.20

0.39

75

0.70

11.11

8.16

1.349

75

0.18

14.35

9.88

-1.93

112

0.06
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df

Triad vs. Non-Triad
p

t

df

p

For the 77 nonfamily employees in my sample, the average days to respond was 21.70,
with 55 early responders and 22 late responders. For this grouping, there was a significant
difference in the average age of early versus late responders. The early responders were older,
46.20 years on average versus 39.95 years for the late responders. Split differently, there were 45
respondents who returned the first survey mailed; the remaining 32 respondents required a
second survey before responding. There was a significant difference in the education level of
those requiring a follow-up survey: the group responding to the first survey request had, on
average, received some college education, whereas the group responding to the second survey
were high school educated, on average. Neither of the significant differences on age and
education were seen across the other splits, are approaching non-significance (i.e., p=0.04), and
are not an integral part of this investigation. I received a total of 114 nonfamily employee
surveys, of which 77 were used in this sample of matched triads and 37 were not used. There
were no significant differences found across the variables with this split. Taken together, I
conclude that nonresponse bias is not a major issue in this research.
Representativeness. Due to the small sample size, I conducted a check to ensure my
research sample is representative of the population. In line with the literature (e.g., Eddleston,
Otondo, and Kellermanns, 2008), I compared characteristics from my sample to those of four
other samples: (1) sample of 673 US family firms from the 1997 National Family Business
Survey (Winter, Danes, Koh, Fredericks, and Paul, 2004); (2) sample of 1464 US family firms
from Schulze, Lubatkin, and Dino (2003); (3) sample of 315 US family firms from Davis, Allen,
and Hayes (2010); and (4) sample of 1035 US family firms from Sciascia, Mazzola, Astrachan,
and Pieper (2012). Respectively, these studies represent a national database, the largest sample
reported in my review of the family firm literature grounded to agency theory, the largest sample
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reported in my review of the family firm literature grounded to stewardship theory, and the
largest sample reported in my review of the family firm literature utilizing both agency and
stewardship theory perspectives. Similar to my approach, each of these empirical studies
sampled family firms in the US. Additionally, none of the authors of these empirical studies
overlap, thereby assuming their samples do not overlap. Each of these aforementioned studies
captured different variables, so complete comparisons could not be made. Table 3.12 presents a
comparison table of key leader and firm characteristics across the family firm samples.

Table 3.12: Representativeness across Samples
1997 Database
Winter et al
(2004)

Agency
Schulze et al
(2003)

45.80

54.00

Leader Characteristics
Age

Stewardship
Davis et al
(2010)

a

Education
Gender

Both
Sciascia et al
(2012)

Current Study

54.99
3.45

b

2.75

0.71

0.79

Tenurec

3.62

Firm Characteristics
Age
# of Employees

48.98

d

4.35

26.72

36.14

4.02

# of Family Employees

3.12

3.43

4.41

e

Industry

Retail

0.21

0.15

0.27

Services

0.41

0.19

0.26

Other

0.38

0.66

0.17

e

Generations

1st generation

0.32

0.30

2nd generation

0.41

0.53

3rd generation

0.14

0.17

a Education Code: 1=high school; 2=some college; 3=college graduate; 4=postgraduate
b Gender = percent male
c Tenure Code: 1 = 1-2 years; 2 = 3-6 years; 3 = 7-10 years; 4 = 11-15 years; 5 = >15 years
d # of Employees Code: 1 = 1-5 employees; 2 = 6-10 employees; 3 = 11-25 employees; 4 = 26-50 employees; 5 = >50 employees
e Industry/Generations: statistic represents the percent in each category

107

As shown, the leader characteristics in my sample are similar to those from other
samples: the average age and tenure of the firm leaders in my sample is slightly greater,
education levels are slightly lower, and are comprised of a greater percentage of males. The firm
level characteristics are also similar: the average age of the firms in my sample is between the
two samples of comparison, there are slightly fewer total employees but more family employees,
and the industry and generational characteristics follow similar patterns and percentages. As
such, I conclude that my sample is representative of US family firms in general.
Common Method Bias. The variance attributable to the method rather than the measures,
referred to as common method bias, is often a concern in survey research (Fiske, 1982;
Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, and Podsakoff, 2003). There are techniques for controlling common
method bias, both from a procedural perspective (i.e., survey design) and from a statistical
perspective. To alleviate potential concerns, I took the following procedural prescriptions: (1) I
collected the predictor and criterion variables from different sources (e.g., leader, family
employee, nonfamily employee); (2) I protected respondent anonymity and confidentiality; (3) I
stated in bold lettering on top of each survey that there are no right or wrong answers thus hoping
to prevent dishonest but socially desirable answers; and (4) I used previously accepted and
validated scales with carefully constructed questions that were not ambiguous, vague, or doublebarreled (Podsakoff et al., 2003).
Because the predictor and criterion variables were obtained from different sources,
coupled with the aforementioned survey design prescriptions, according to Podsakoff et al.,
2003: 897), “additional statistical remedies could be used but in our view are probably
unnecessary in these instances.” However, as a precaution, I performed a Harman’s single-factor
statistical test suggested by Podsakoff and Organ (1986) which is also frequently used in family
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firm survey research studies (e.g., Eddleston and Kellermanns, 2007; Kellermanns, Eddleston,
Barnett, and Pearson, 2008; Memili et al., 2010). This test entails entering all the items of the
model’s variables in a factor analysis to determine the number of factors that emerge and the
amount of variance explained. If no dominant factor emerges from this statistical test, coupled
with the procedural prescriptions taken, I can conclude that common method bias does not
appear to be a problem. I entered all the items of my model’s variables in a factor analysis. Eight
factors emerged (i.e., represented by 3 control variables, 2 independent variables, 2 mediators,
and 1 dependent variable) accounting for 72.57% of the variance, with the first factor explaining
20.29%. Accordingly, I conclude that common method bias does not present an issue in my
research.
Conclusion
An account of the methodology used to test the research model and hypotheses was
provided in this chapter. A general overview was provided first, followed by a specific
description of the survey instrument and approach, sample, and measures. The data analysis
section followed, with a description of the statistical analyses used to test the research model,
preliminary analysis, diagnostics tests, and necessary tests of biases. The next chapter presents
the results of the hypotheses tests.
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS
Chapter 3 presented the methodology employed in this study and the results from
preliminary data analysis. This chapter presents the results from testing the hypothesized
relationships in my research model and from additional post hoc tests. It first provides
descriptive statistics and correlations, followed by the results of the hypotheses tests, and then
concludes with post hoc results within agency and stewardship theory, across theories, and from
the integration of theories. An integrated discussion of these results is found in Chapter 5.
Correlation Results
Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations between the variables in my study are
provided in Table 4.1. On average, my sample of 77 family firms have been in business for 36.14
years and employ 63.73 employees (natural logarithm used to correct for skewness, mean =
1.32). Firms in the retail industry represent 27% of the sample, 26% are in the services industry,
and the remaining firms are in other industries (i.e., manufacturing, construction, transportation).
Agency structure is an index that captures the level of monitoring and control mechanisms
present in the family firm. From low levels of agency structures to high levels of agency
structures, the index values range from -5.03 to 4.94 with the average being 0.09. Stewardship
structure captures the level of interaction from a communication and social perspective. The
transformed values of stewardship structure range from 0.00, representing low levels of
stewardship structures, to 0.69, representing high levels of stewardship structures, with an
average value of 0.35. The average value for agent behavior is 1.46, measured by reverse coding
productivity and transformed for skewness, with higher values representing greater levels of
agent behavior. The average value for steward behavior is 0.33, measured by the level of
perceived organizational value commitment, also transformed for skewness. The higher the

110

score, the higher the level of steward behavior. The average level of firm performance, measured
on a seven point scale, is 4.81, with higher scores representing higher levels of performance.
As shown in the correlation matrix, of the control variables (i.e., firm age, size, industry),
the family firm’s age is significantly correlated with the most variables: size, agent behavior, and
firm performance. As expected, agency structure is negatively and significantly correlated with
agent behavior, and stewardship structure is positively and significantly correlated with steward
behavior. Both agency and stewardship structures are also significantly correlated with firm
performance in the direction expected. However, neither agent behavior nor steward behavior is
significantly correlated with firm performance. The strongest correlation is between agent
behavior and steward behavior, indicated by a significant and positive relationship.
As described, some of the variables in my study are correlated; however, the highest
variance inflation factor statistic estimated in conjunction with each hierarchical regression
model was 2.34. The most extreme condition index statistic was 23.12. Both are below the
threshold indicating multicollinearity, therefore alleviating that concern in my study (Hair,
Anderson, Tatham, and Black, 1998).
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Correlations
Mean

Std Dev

1
1.00

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1

Age

36.14

27.33

2

Size

1.32

0.59

0.31**

1.00

3

Retail

0.27

0.45

0.14

0.09

1.00

4

Services

0.26

0.44

-0.17

-0.08

-0.36***

1.00

5

Agency Structure

0.09

2.37

-0.03

0.29**

-0.07

0.02

1.00

6

Stewardship Structure

0.35

0.16

-0.05

0.05

0.15

0.03

-0.13

1.00

7

Agent Behavior

1.46

0.30

0.24*

0.22†

-0.16

-0.05

-0.24*

0.17

1.00

8

Steward Behavior

0.33

0.19

0.05

0.13

-0.24*

0.18

-0.19

0.22*

0.69***

1.00

9

Firm Performance

4.81

0.97

-0.25*

0.19†

-0.06

0.21†

0.23*

0.25*

-0.18

-0.09

n = 77 matched triads
*** correlation is significant at the 0.001 level
** correlation is significant at the 0.01 level
* correlation is significant at the 0.05 level
† correlation is significant at the 0.10 level
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9

1.00

Regression Results
Within and Across Theory
My hypotheses were tested via hierarchical regression analysis with six models, and
results are provided in Table 4.2. In Model 1, firm performance was regressed on the control
variables, with two significant relationships. The age of the firm was significantly and negatively
related to performance, indicating that the older the firm, the lower the performance (B = -0.01,
p≤.01). The size of the firm, measured by the natural logarithm of the number of employees, was
significantly and positively related to performance (B = 0.50, p≤.01), indicating that the greater
the number of employees, the greater the performance. The industry variables (i.e., retail,
services, and other industries as the omitted referent) were not significant with firm performance.
Model 2 through Model 6 follow the steps in the Baron and Kenny (1986) test for
mediation. Each step is necessary to provide support for a mediational model. In the first step,
shown as Model 2, I regressed the dependent variable on the independent variables: I built from
Model 1 by adding agency structure and stewardship structure to the equation. Firm age and size
remained significant, industry remained not significant. Agency structure was approaching
significance with firm performance (B = 0.08, p≤.10), and stewardship structure was significant
with firm performance (B = 1.50, p≤.05). This model accounts for 18.4% of the variance in firm
performance as indicated by the adjusted R² value, which is the statistic typically reported for
smaller sample sizes. This explains 6.0% more of the variance in firm performance beyond just
the control variables.
The next step, shown in Models 3 and 4, involved regressing the mediators on the
independent variables. In Model 3, agent behavior was regressed on agency structure and
stewardship structure. Firm age was not significant with agent behavior, but firm size (B = 0.13
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p≤.05) and retail industry (B = -0.20 p≤.01) were significant. Agency structure was negatively
and highly significant with agent behavior (B = -0.04, p≤.01), thus supporting Hypothesis 1.
Stewardship structure was positively and moderately significant with agency behavior (B = 0.33,
p≤.10), thus marginally supporting Hypothesis 6a. The variables in Model 3 explain 19.4% of the
variance in agent behavior. In Model 4, steward behavior was regressed on agency structure and
stewardship structure. The same control variables, firm size and retail industry, were significant
with steward behavior as they were on agent behavior (B = 0.07, p≤.10 and B = -0.12, p≤.05,
respectively). Stewardship structure exhibited a positive and significant relationship with steward
behavior (B = 0.27, p≤.05), thus supporting Hypothesis 3. Agency structure exhibited a negative
and significant relationship with steward behavior (B = -0.02, p≤.05), thus supporting Hypothesis
5a. The variables in Model 4 explain 13.6% of the variance in steward behavior.
The third step involved regressing the dependent variable on the mediators, as shown in
Model 5. As was the case in Model 1 and Model 2, the firm’s age and size remained significant
with firm performance (B = -0.01, p≤.05 and B = .55, p≤.01, respectively). Agent behavior was
negatively but not significantly associated with firm performance. Although the direction of the
relationship was as hypothesized, Hypothesis 2 is not supported. Steward behavior was also
negatively but not significantly associated with firm performance indicating no support for
Hypothesis 4. This model explains 13.4% of the variance in firm performance, which represents
an increase of only 1.0% over the model with just the control variables.
Model 6 depicts the final step, where I simultaneously regressed the dependent variable
on both the independent variables and mediators. With all variables entered, firm age and size
remained significant with firm performance (B = -0.01, p≤.05 and B = 0.46, p≤.05, respectively).
Stewardship structure was also significant with firm performance (B = 1.80, p≤.01), but agency
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structure was not significant with firm performance. Neither agent behavior nor steward behavior
were significant with firm performance. This model explains 20.5% of the variance in family
firm performance. Although not formally hypothesized, the results of these steps indicate that
mediating relationships are not supported within my model, rendering Sobel tests unnecessary.
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Table 4.2: Regression Results – Within and Across Theory
Performance

Performance

Agent
Behavior

Steward
Behavior

Performance

Performance

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

4.43***
(0.29)

4.05***
(0.35)

1.17***
(0.11)

0.16*
(0.07)

5.10***
(0.63)

4.63***
(0.62)

Age

-0.01**
(0.00)

-0.01*
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)

-0.01*
(0.00)

-0.01*
(0.00)

Size

0.50**
(0.19)

0.37†
(0.19)

0.13*
(0.06)

0.07†
(0.04)

0.55**
(0.19)

0.46*
(0.20)

Retail

0.05
(0.25)

-0.02
(0.25)

-0.20**
(0.08)

-0.12*
(0.05)

-0.05
(0.26)

-0.18
(0.26)

Services

0.41
(0.26)

0.36
(0.25)

-0.07
(0.08)

0.05
(0.05)

0.41
(0.27)

0.36
(0.25)

Agency Structure

0.08†
(0.05)

-0.04**
(0.01)

-0.00*
(0.01)

0.05
(0.05)

Stewardship Structure

1.50*
(0.65)

0.33†
(0.20)

0.27*
(0.13)

1.80**
(0.66)

Constant
Controls

Independent Variables

Mediating Variables
Agent Behavior

-0.44
(0.51)

-0.41
(0.50)

Steward Behavior

-0.34
(0.79)

-0.62
(0.76)

Adj. R²

0.124

0.184

0.194

0.136

0.134

0.205

F statistic

3.70**

3.86**

4.04**

2.99**

2.96**

3.45**

Unstandardized regression coefficients shown (standard errors in parentheses)
n = 77 matched triads
*** significant at the 0.001 level
** significant at the 0.01 level
* significant at the 0.05 level
† significant at the 0.10 level
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Kinship Status
To test the moderation hypotheses of the effect of kinship status across theories, data
were analyzed by splitting apart the triads into dyad relationships: 77 dyads comprised of the
family firm leader matched with the family employee within the same firm, and 77 dyads
comprised of the family firm leader matched with the nonfamily employee within the same firm.
Accordingly, the aggregated responses of family and nonfamily employees were not used as they
were for the triad analysis; rather, the responses from the family employees were separate from
the nonfamily employee responses. Correlation results for these dyad subsets are found in Table
4.3; regression results for this analysis are found in Table 4.4.
The relationships of interest in this dyad analysis are those with agency structure and
stewardship structure, as those are the variables measured with employee responses. As indicated
in the correlation matrix, family responses are depicted below the diagonal and nonfamily
responses are above the diagonal. For family and nonfamily employees, agency structure is
significantly and positively correlated with firm size and firm performance. Additionally, agency
structure and stewardship structure are significantly and negatively correlated for family; agency
structure and agent behavior are significantly and negatively correlated for nonfamily. For family
employees, stewardship structure is significantly and positively correlated with steward behavior.
For nonfamily employees, stewardship structure is significantly and positively correlated with
industry and firm performance.
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Table 4.3: Bivariate Correlations for Dyad Subsets
1

2
0.31**

3

4

5

6

7

0.14

-0.17

0.05

-0.08

0.24*

0.05

*0.25*

0.09

-0.08

0.30**

0.13

0.22†

0.13

0.19†

-0.36**

-0.06

0.22†

-0.16

-0.24*

-0.06

-0.02

0.05

-0.05

0.18

0.21†

-0.10

-0.20†

-0.14

0.21†

0.15

0.11

0.32**

0.69***

-0.18

1

Age

2

Size

0.31**

3

Retail

0.14

0.09

4

Services

-0.17

-0.08

-0.36***

5

Agency Structure

-0.05

0.31**

-0.07

0.05

6

Stewardship Structure

0.01

-0.05

-0.00

-0.01

-0.24*

7

Agent Behavior

0.24*

0.22†

-0.16

-0.05

-0.18

0.11

8

Steward Behavior

0.05

0.13

-0.24*

0.18

-0.18

0.22*

0.69***

9

Firm Performance

-0.25*

0.19†

-0.06

0.21†

0.24*

0.04

-0.18

n = 77 leader-family dyads below the diagonal; 77 leader-nonfamily dyads above the diagonal
*** correlation is significant at the 0.001 level
** correlation is significant at the 0.01 level
* correlation is significant at the 0.05 level
† correlation is significant at the 0.10 level
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8

9

-0.09
-0.09

Table 4.4: Regression Results – Kinship Status Effects Across Theories
Steward Behavior

Agent Behavior

Family

Nonfamily

Family

Nonfamily

0.23***
(0.06)

0.24***
(0.06)

1.26***
(0.11)

1.24***
(0.10)

Age

0.00
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)

0.00†
(0.00)

0.00*
(0.00)

Size

0.08†
(0.04)

0.07
(0.04)

0.09
(0.06)

0.07
(0.06)

Retail

-0.10†
(0.05)

-0.10†
(0.05)

-0.16*
(0.08)

-0.20*
(0.08)

Services

0.06
(0.05)

0.05
(0.05)

-0.06
(0.08)

-0.08
(0.08)

-0.02*
(0.01)

-0.02†
(0.01)
0.19
(0.18)

0.29†
(0.15)

Constant
Controls

Independent Variables
Agency Structure

Stewardship Structure

Adj. R²

0.098

0.073

0.084

0.114

F statistic

2.65*

2.20†

2.39*

2.95*

Unstandardized regression coefficients shown (standard errors in parentheses)
n = 77 matched dyads of leader-family; 77 matched dyads of leader-nonfamily
*** significant at the 0.001 level
** significant at the 0.01 level
* significant at the 0.05 level
† significant at the 0.10 level
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Using the same control variables as in the matched triad regression models, steward
behavior of family and nonfamily employees was regressed on agency structure. As shown,
agency structure is negatively and significantly related to the steward behavior of both family
employees (B = -0.02, p≤.05) and nonfamily employees (B = -0.02, p≤.10). The slope of the line
is slightly steeper for family than nonfamily (i.e., -.022 versus -.017 when rounded to three
decimals), and significance of the relationship is stronger for family employees than for
nonfamily employees. At high levels of agency structure, family employees exhibit less steward
behavior. This finding supports Hypothesis 5b.
I plotted the effects of kinship status on the relationship of agency structure and steward
behavior. These lines were plotted using the regression equations and predicted values at one
standard deviation above and one standard deviation below the mean. For example, using the
results from Table 4.4, family steward behavior = 0.23 – 0.02 agency structure. The mean of
agency structure is 0.09, and the standard deviation is 2.37. The predicted value for steward
behavior at one standard deviation above the mean (2.46) is 0.18, and at one standard deviation
below the mean (-2.28) is 0.28. A line was then drawn between these two points. Likewise, the
regression line was also plotted for nonfamily employees’ predicted steward behavior. Figure 4.1
presents the plot of the effects of kinship status on the relationship between agency structure and
steward behavior.
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0.30

Steward Behavior

0.27

0.24
Family
Nonfamily

0.21

0.18

0.15
Low
-1SD

High
+1SD
Agency Structure

Figure 4.1: Kinship Status Effects of Agency Structure on Steward Behavior

Agent behavior of family and nonfamily employees was then regressed on stewardship
structure. As indicated, stewardship structure is not a significant predictor of agent behavior for
family employees (B = 0.19, n.s.), but is positively and moderately significant with agent
behavior of nonfamily employees (B = 0.29, p≤.10). Although this supports kinship status as a
moderator in the stewardship structure–agent behavior relationship, it runs counter to the
hypothesized relationships. Thus, Hypothesis 6b is partially supported. Using the same method
described above, I plotted the effects of kinship status on the relationship between stewardship
structure and agent behavior. Figure 4.2 presents the plot.
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1.38
1.36
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1.34

Nonfamily
1.32
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Figure 4.2: Kinship Status Effects of Stewardship Structure on Agent Behavior

Integrating Theory
I hypothesize that is it possible, and even beneficial, for organizations to have both
agency and stewardship structures in place simultaneously. To test the integration of theories, I
conducted a one-way between-groups analysis of variance to explore the impact of structural
combinations on firm performance levels3. Family firms were divided into four groups based on
their level of agency and stewardship structures. I coded each family firm as having either a high
or low level of agency structure using the sample mean score of 0.09 as the dividing point. I also

3

I also conducted OLS regression to analyze the integration of theories. I created an interaction term by multiplying
agency structure and stewardship structure. I then regressed the control variables, agency structure, stewardship
structure, and the interaction term on firm performance. The interaction term was significant (B = .71, p≤.01),
indicating that the integration of structures is positively associated with firm performance. However, the impact of
varying structural combinations cannot be interpreted with this analysis. Accordingly, a between-groups ANOVA
was conducted; the results of this analysis are reported in this section.
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coded each family firm as having either a high or low level of stewardship structure using the
sample mean of 0.35 as the dividing point. I then coded each organization into one of four
groups: (1) Monitor Structure: high agency structure and low stewardship structure; (2) Trust But
Monitor Structure: high agency structure and high stewardship structure; (3) Undetermined
Structure: low agency structure and low stewardship structure; and (4) Trust Structure: low
agency structure and high stewardship structure.
Results from the between-groups ANOVA indicate a statistically significant difference in
firm performance for the four groups: F(3, 73) = 3.88, p=.01. The effect size, calculated using eta
squared, was 0.14 and is therefore considered large (Cohen, 1988). Table 4.5 presents the mean
firm performance levels of each group. As indicated by the highlighted cell in Table 4.5, the
highest performance level occurs when family firms have Trust But Monitor Structures (i.e., high
levels of both agency and stewardship structures), followed by Trust Structures, Undetermined
Structures, and with Monitor Structures resulting in the lowest firm performance level. The
Tukey HSD test indicates that the mean performance level for family firms with the Trust But
Monitor Structure (M=5.43, SD=0.85) is significantly different and higher than the performance
of firms with the Monitor Structure (M=4.50, SD=1.10) and the Undetermined Structure
(M=4.57, SD=1.00), but is not significantly different from firm performance of firms with the
Trust Structure (M=4.79, SD=0.68). These results partially support Hypothesis 7; as predicted,
the combinations of structures impact firm performance differently, however the order is not as
hypothesized.
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Agency Structure

Table 4.5: Firm Performance Levels by Governance Structure Integration
Monitor
Structure
4.50
n=18

Trust But
Monitor
Structure
5.43
n=18

Undetermined
Structure

Trust
Structure

4.57
n=22

4.79
n=19

Low

High

High

Low

Stewardship Structure

I also performed a similar analysis using OLS hierarchical regression so that I could
control for additional factors that may be influencing firm performance levels. As with my
previous analysis, I controlled for firm age, firm size, and industry. I created dummy variables
for each combination of structures and used the Trust But Monitor Structure as the referent
category. Regression results are shown in Table 4.6 and can be interpreted as follows. Generally,
the performance level of firms with Trust But Monitor Structures is 4.96. For those with Trust
Structures, firm performance is 0.50 less; Undetermined Structures, 0.54 less; Monitor
Structures, 0.82 less. Each variable is significant at the .10 level. The global F test shows the
model is significant at the .01 level. Using the adjusted R² statistic, the model explains 17.9% of
the variance in firm performance. The addition of the control variables did not change the results
from the between-groups ANOVA.
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Table 4.6: Regression Results – Integrating Theory
Performance

Performance

Model 1

Model 2

4.43***
(0.29)

4.96***
(0.38)

Age

-0.01**
(0.00)

-0.01*
(0.00)

Size

0.50**
(0.19)

0.43*
(0.20)

Retail

0.05
(0.25)

0.03
(0.25)

Services

0.41
(0.26)

0.35
(0.25)

Constant
Controls

Independent Variables
Monitor Structure (High Agency and Low Stewardship)

-0.82**
(0.30)

Trust Structure (Low Agency and High Stewardship)

-0.50†
(0.30)

Undetermined Structure (Low Agency and Low Stewardship)

-0.54†
(0.31)

Adj. R²

0.124

0.179

F statistic

3.70**

3.36**

Unstandardized regression coefficients shown (standard errors in parentheses)
n = 77 matched triads
*** significant at the 0.001 level
** significant at the 0.01 level
* significant at the 0.05 level
† significant at the 0.10 level
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Conclusion
To summarize the analyses, my hypothesized relationships and results are presented in
Table 4.7. Of the nine hypotheses in my research, five were fully supported, two were partially
supported, and two were not supported. I conducted a deeper investigation into the relationships
through multiple post hoc examinations. The remainder of this chapter provides a description of
the post hoc tests and results. Chapter 5 provides an integrated discussion of these research
results.
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Table 4.7: Hypothesized Relationships and Results
Within Agency Theory
H1

Agency structure is negatively associated with agent behavior.

Supported

H2

Agent behavior is negatively associated with firm performance.

Not supported

Within Stewardship Theory
H3

Stewardship structure is positively associated with steward behavior.

Supported

H4

Steward behavior is positively associated with firm performance.

Not supported

Across Theory
H5a

Agency structure is negatively associated with steward behavior.

Supported

H5b

Kinship status moderates the relationship between agency structure and
steward behavior, such that the negative relationship strengthens for family
employees and weakens for nonfamily employees.

Supported

H6a

Stewardship structure is positively associated with agent behavior.

Supported

H6b

Kinship status moderates the relationship between stewardship structure and
agent behavior, such that the positive relationship strengthens for family
employees and weakens for nonfamily employees.

Partially Supported
(moderation supported, but
opposite of hypothesis)

Integrating Theory
H7

The interaction of agency and stewardship structures results in varying levels
of firm performance. Specifically, the Trust But Monitor Structure results in
the highest level of firm performance, followed by the Monitor Structure,
then Trust Structure, with the Undetermined Structure resulting in the lowest
level of firm performance.
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Partially Supported
(interaction supported, but
performance levels in a
different order than
hypothesized)

Post Hoc Tests and Results
Within and Across Theory – Post Hoc
Both agency and stewardship theory predict enhanced firm performance when structures
are in place to curb agent behavior or empower steward behavior. My research model
incorporated predictions within and across agency and stewardship theories by examining the
relationship between structure and behavior and the relationship between behavior and
performance. As reported, my results supported the hypothesized relationships between structure
and behavior within and across agency and stewardship theories. However, my empirical
examination did not find significant main effects between agent behavior and firm performance
or steward behavior and firm performance. Accordingly, I conducted post hoc tests of potential
moderators that may be influencing these relationships to provide possible explanations for the
nonfindings. I focused on two individual level characteristics, human capital and position within
the family firm, for these post hoc moderation tests.
I selected human capital, operationalized as the level of formal education completed4, and
position within the organization5 as potential moderators in the relationship between behavior
and performance. I suspect human capital may moderate the relationship because employee
behavior may only translate to increased firm performance if the employee is highly capable. I
suspect that position may moderate the relationship because employee behavior may only
translate to increased firm performance if the employee is in a position to lead and make changes
within the organization.

4

Educational level was self-reported by family and nonfamily employees. Respondents who indicated their
education level was less than a high school diploma, a high-school diploma, or some college/associates degree were
coded 0; those who indicated a bachelor’s degree, master’s degree, or terminal degree were coded 1.
5
Position in the family firm was self-reported by family and nonfamily employees. Managers and below (i.e., office
managers, secretaries, dental hygienists) were coded 0; Directors and above (i.e., Director of Human Resources,
Vice President, CFO) were coded 1.
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For the moderation post hoc tests, rather than capturing the leader’s perception of agent
and steward behavior within the firm, I captured agent behavior and steward behavior from both
family and nonfamily employees. This provides two benefits; it alleviates common methods bias
because the independent and dependent variables are captured from different sources, and I can
analyze results by family versus nonfamily employees.
The moderation tests were conducted via OLS hierarchical regression. Results of human
capital as a potential moderator in the relationship between behavior and performance are
presented in Table 4.8. The moderating effects were tested in 3 models for leader-family dyads
and leader-nonfamily dyads. In Model 1, I regressed the same control variables used in previous
analysis (i.e., firm age, firm size, and industry) on firm performance, finding age and size to be
significant. Model 2 incorporates the independent variables, agent behavior, steward behavior,
and human capital; none have a significant relationship with firm performance for family or
nonfamily. Model 3 includes the interaction terms of human capital and agent behavior and
human capital and steward behavior. Neither of the interaction terms are significant for family
employees; however, the interaction of human capital and steward behavior was significant for
nonfamily employees (B = 2.67; p≤.05). The results indicate that human capital is indeed a
moderator in the relationship between a nonfamily employee’s steward behavior and firm
performance. The interaction plot is presented in Figure 4.3. As depicted, the steward behavior of
college educated nonfamily employees positively impacts firm performance.
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Table 4.8: Post Hoc Results – Human Capital Moderation

Model 1
Family

Performance
Model 2
Model 3
Family
Family

Model 1
Nonfamily

Performance
Model 2
Model 3
Nonfamily
Nonfamily

4.69***
(0.15)

4.82***
(0.19)

4.83***
(0.20)

4.69***
(0.15)

4.72***
(0.18)

4.69***
(0.18)

Age

-0.01**
(0.00)

-0.01*
(0.00)

-0.01*
(0.00)

-0.01**
(0.00)

-0.01**
(0.00)

-0.01**
(0.00)

Size

0.50**
(0.19)

0.53**
(0.19)

0.51**
(0.19)

0.50**
(0.19)

0.46*
(0.21)

0.48*
(0.21)

Retail

0.05
(0.25)

0.02
(0.22)

0.03
(0.26)

0.05
(0.25)

0.05
(0.26)

0.05
(0.26)

Services

0.41
(0.26)

0.38
(0.27)

0.40
(0.28)

0.41
(0.26)

0.45
(0.26)

0.48†
(0.26)

Human Capital

-0.18
(0.23)

-0.19
(0.23)

-0.10
(0.23)

-0.15
(0.23)

Agent Behavior

-0.68
(0.53)

-0.88
(0.79)

0.15
(0.40)

0.54
(0.46)

Steward Behavior

0.18
(0.89)

-0.22
(1.44)

0.37
(0.61)

-0.53
(0.74)

Constant
Controls

Independent Variables

Interactions
Human Capital x
Agent Behavior

0.39
(1.11)

-1.31
(0.84)

Human Capital x
Steward Behavior

0.63
(1.96)

2.67*
(1.25)

Adj. R²

0.124

0.134

0.123

0.124

0.104

0.137

F statistic

3.70**

2.68*

2.19*

3.70**

2.26*

2.35*

Unstandardized regression coefficients shown (standard errors in parentheses)
n = 77 matched dyads of leader-family; 77 matched dyads of leader-nonfamily
*** significant at the 0.001 level
** significant at the 0.01 level
* significant at the 0.05 level
† significant at the 0.10 level
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Figure 4.3: Human Capital Effects of Nonfamily Steward Behavior on Firm Performance

Results of organizational position as a potential moderator in the relationship between
behavior and performance are presented in Table 4.9. Similar to the human capital analysis, the
moderating effects were tested in 3 models for leader-family dyads and leader-nonfamily dyads.
In Model 1, I regressed the control variables on firm performance, finding family firm age and
size to be significant. Model 2 incorporates the independent variables, agent behavior, steward
behavior, and position; none have a significant relationship with firm performance for family or
nonfamily. Model 3 includes the interaction terms of position and agent behavior and position
and steward behavior. Neither of the interaction terms are significant for nonfamily employees;
however, the interaction of position and steward behavior was significant for family employees
(B = 3.86, p≤.10). The results indicate that the position in the organization is a moderator in the
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relationship between a family employee’s steward behavior and firm performance. The
interaction plot is presented in Figure 4.4. As depicted, the steward behavior of family members
who are directors and executives positively impacts firm performance.
Taken together, results of these post hoc tests reveal that there are moderators in the
relationship between individual behavior and firm performance. For nonfamily employees, the
level of human capital influences the relationship between steward behavior and firm
performance. For family employees, the position within the organization influences the
relationship between steward behavior and firm performance. Neither human capital nor
organizational position was found to be a moderator in the relationship between agent behavior
and firm performance.
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Table 4.9: Post Hoc Results – Position Moderation

Model 1
Family

Performance
Model 2
Model 3
Family
Family

Model 1
Nonfamily

Performance
Model 2
Model 3
Nonfamily
Nonfamily

4.69***
(0.15)

4.74***
(0.17)

4.80***
(0.17)

4.69***
(0.15)

4.67***
(0.16)

4.64***
(0.16)

Age

-0.01**
(0.00)

-0.01*
(0.00)

-0.01**
(0.00)

-0.01**
(0.00)

-0.01*
(0.00)

-0.01**
(0.00)

Size

0.50**
(0.19)

0.52**
(0.19)

0.49**
(0.19)

0.50**
(0.19)

0.41†
(0.21)

0.47*
(0.22)

Retail

0.05
(0.25)

0.00
(0.25)

0.01
(0.25)

0.05
(0.25)

0.04
(0.26)

0.11
(0.26)

Services

0.41
(0.26)

0.33
(0.27)

0.15
(0.27)

0.41
(0.26)

0.44
(0.26)

0.52†
(0.27)

Position

-0.05
(0.23)

0.05
(0.22)

0.11
(0.31)

-0.19
(0.36)

Agent Behavior

-0.70
(0.53)

-0.58
(0.60)

0.19
(0.40)

0.34
(0.42)

Steward Behavior

0.22
(0.90)

-0.85
(1.03)

0.30
(0.61)

0.06
(0.63)

Constant
Controls

Independent Variables

Interactions
Position x
Agent Behavior

-0.53
(1.15)

-2.25
(1.48)

Position x
Steward Behavior

3.86†
(2.03)

4.02
(2.62)

Adj. R²

0.124

0.126

0.177

0.124

0.103

0.111

F statistic

3.70**

2.57*

2.82**

3.70**

2.25*

2.04*

Unstandardized regression coefficients shown (standard errors in parentheses)
n = 77 matched dyads of leader-family; 77 matched dyads of leader-nonfamily
*** significant at the 0.001 level
** significant at the 0.01 level
* significant at the 0.05 level
† significant at the 0.10 level
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Figure 4.4: Position Effects of Family Steward Behavior on Firm Performance

Kinship Status – Post Hoc
My research model examined, and results supported, kinship status as a moderator in the
relationship between structure and behavior across theories. Although not formally hypothesized,
I tested the effects of kinship status on within theory predictions as a post hoc test. Regression
results for this analysis are found in Table 4.10. As shown, agency structure is negatively and
significantly associated with agent behavior for both family (B = -0.03, p≤.05) and nonfamily (B
= -0.04, p≤.01) employees. Stewardship structure is positively and significantly associated with
the steward behavior of family employees (B = 0.23, p≤.05), but has no significant effect on the
steward behavior of nonfamily employees (B = 0.13, n.s.). The plots are presented in Figure 4.5.
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Table 4.10: Post Hoc Results – Kinship Status Effects Within Theories
Steward Behavior

Agent Behavior

Family

Nonfamily

Family

Nonfamily

0.19**
(0.07)

0.23***
(0.07)

1.28***
(0.09)

1.27***
(0.10)

Age

0.00
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)

0.00*
(0.00)

Size

0.05
(0.04)

0.04
(0.04)

0.14*
(0.06)

0.14*
(0.06)

Retail

-0.09†
(0.05)

-0.11*
(0.05)

-0.17*
(0.08)

-0.18*
(0.08)

Services

0.06
(0.05)

0.05
(0.05)

-0.06
(0.08)

-0.07
(0.08)

-0.03*
(0.02)

-0.04**
(0.01)

Constant
Controls

Independent Variables
Agency Structure

Stewardship Structure

0.23*
(0.11)

0.13
(0.10)

Adj. R²

0.084

0.051

0.132

0.162

F statistic

2.40*

1.81

3.32**

3.93**

Unstandardized regression coefficients shown (standard errors in parentheses)
n = 77 matched dyads of leader-family; 77 matched dyads of leader-nonfamily
*** significant at the 0.001 level
** significant at the 0.01 level
* significant at the 0.05 level
† significant at the 0.10 level
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Figure 4.5: Kinship Status and Within Theory Relationships
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Integrating Theory – Post Hoc
My research examined the performance levels of family firms exhibiting varying levels
of both agency and stewardship structures. Each of the 77 family firms in my sample were
grouped into one of four categories based on their levels of agency and stewardship structures:
Monitor Structure (high agency and low stewardship), Trust But Monitor Structure (high agency
and high stewardship), Undetermined Structure (low agency and low stewardship), and Trust
Structure (low agency and high stewardship). Results supported my assertion that these groups
have significantly different performance levels. As a post hoc examination, I explored leader and
firm level characteristics within these groups to see if any patterns, other than their governance
structures, emerged in their configurations. Table 4.11 presents the means of these characteristics
among the four groups.
The leader characteristics examined were gender (displayed as the percentage male), age,
(displayed in years), education (1=less than high school, 2=high school, 3=some college,
4=bachelor’s degree, 5=master’s degree, 6=terminal degree), tenure (displayed in years working
in the family firm), and founder (displayed as the percentage of leaders who are also the firm’s
founder). The firm characteristics examined were the number of family and nonfamily
employees, generations of ownership concentration (1=one generation, 2=two generations, 3=
three or more generations), generation currently working in the firm (1=one generation, 2=two
generations, 3= three or more generations), whether the family firm employs top management
who are not family members, has a business plan, and has a succession plan (displayed as the
percentage responding yes).
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Table 4.11: Post Hoc Results – Structural Integration Patterns
Monitor
Structure

Trust But Monitor
Structure

Undetermined
Structure

Trust
Structure

Significance
between Groups

0.78

0.78

0.73

0.89

n.s.

58.74

54.63

54.38

52.47

n.s.

3.72

4.22

3.73

3.74

n.s.

Tenure

27.78

23.17

22.45

18.00

n.s.

Founder

0.44

0.67

0.59

0.53

n.s.

3.29

5.72

2.55

6.38

n.s.

108.96

94.89

18.50

25.87

n.s.

Generations Owning

1.61

1.56

1.41

1.37

n.s.

Generations Working

2.00

1.89

1.55

2.11

p≤.05

Nonfamily TMT

0.72

0.72

0.32

0.42

p≤.05

Business Plan

0.89

0.89

0.50

0.74

p≤.01

Succession Plan

0.67

0.72

0.36

0.37

p≤.05

Firm Performance

4.50

5.43

4.57

4.79

p≤.01

Leader Characteristics
Gender
Age
Education

Firm Characteristics
Family Employees
Nonfamily Employees

Based on a means comparison, there are no significant differences in leader
characteristics among the four groups. Although, it is of interest to note that firms with Trust But
Monitor Structures have a higher percentage of leaders who are also the founders of the family
firm. The means comparison is more revealing when examining firm level characteristics. The
Monitor Structures and Trust But Monitor Structures are the most similar in firm level
characteristics. Based on my sample, 72% of firms with these structures have top management
who are nonfamily, 89% have business plans, and more than two-thirds have succession plans in
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place. These firms both have high agency structures but differ in their level of stewardship
structure and in their level of firm performance; the Trust But Monitor Structure has a higher
level of stewardship structure and a significantly higher level of firm performance. This finding
implies that the high level of stewardship structure could be driving the firm’s performance since
all other characteristics are equal. This implication is further supported in that firms with
Monitor Structures and Undetermined Structures have the lowest performance levels and also
low levels of stewardship structures. The Undetermined Structures have the lowest levels of
generations working, the lowest percentage of nonfamily top management team members, and
the lowest levels of having a business plan and succession plan in place. These family firms do
not appear to be structured in any discernable way. The firms with Trust Structures have the
highest level of generations currently working in the family business. This finding implies that
the more generations of family involved, the more prevalent a culture of high stewardship and
low agency structure. Also of notable interest, the structures with high levels of agency structure,
regardless of the level of stewardship structure, have the greatest number of nonfamily members;
this implies that as the firm grows with nonfamily, monitoring mechanisms prescribed by agency
theory are deemed necessary. Conversely, the structures with high levels of stewardship
structure, regardless of the level of agency structure, have the greatest number of family
members; this implies that the presence of family members within the firm creates an
environment where stewardship prescriptions can prevail.
Conclusion
This chapter presented the results of my data analyses for testing the relationships in my
research model and for my post hoc tests. These empirical tests support the majority of my
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predictions within, across, and in the integration of agency and stewardship theories. Chapter 5
presents an in depth and integrated discussion of these research results.
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This chapter provides a discussion of my research findings in six major sections. The first
section provides an overview of this study and reiterates the research questions guiding my
dissertation. The second section offers a discussion of the findings from the tests of the
hypothesized relationships in my research model. The third section describes the contributions
this study makes to the literature, theory, and practice. The fourth and fifth sections address
limitations and offer suggestions for future research. The last section concludes the dissertation
by providing answers to the aforementioned research questions.
Overview
Family firms are the most prevalent and enduring organizational type, but organizational
research centering on family firms pales in comparison (Barnett and Kellermanns, 2006; Goel et
al., 2012; Le Breton-Miller and Miller, 2009). However, there has been a recent influx of
research in this context, with most scholarly investigations focused on the predictors of
performance of these firms. Accordingly, family firm governance has been a dominant topic of
interest (Goel et al., 2012). Agency theory and stewardship theory both address governance and
firm performance, and therefore have served as theoretical lenses within these investigations.
However, both agency and stewardship theories offer opposing assumptions and
predictions for firm performance (Chrisman et al., 2007; Cruz et al., 2010; Wasserman, 2006;
Tosi et al., 2003), and therefore have sparked an on-going debate in the family firm literature
regarding their applicability (Le Breton-Miller and Miller, 2009). Agency theory assumes an
economic model of man; agent behavior is based on self-interest and may conflict with the
principal’s interest. Governance structures that control and monitor agents are prescribed to
thwart opportunistic behavior and better align the goals of the principal and agent (Jensen and
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Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989). Stewardship theory assumes a humanistic model of man;
steward behavior is based on serving others and therefore will align with the principal’s interest.
Governance structures that empower and encourage stewards are prescribed to facilitate the
continued alignment of interests (Davis et al., 1997; Donaldson and Davis, 1991). Investigations
reveal that either theory can be applicable in the unique context of family firms, thereby creating
ambiguous and confounding predictions about behavior and performance.
As such, the purpose of my dissertation was to gain insights into the appropriateness and
predictive ability of each theory on family firm behavior and performance. To do so, the first
objective was to review, synthesize, and expose limitations in the literature grounded to agency
theory and/or stewardship theory within family firms. The second objective was to empirically
investigate predictions developed from insights gleaned from the review and synthesis. The
following research questions guided this project:
1. Are the tenets, prescriptions, and related performance outcomes of (a) agency theory
and (b) stewardship theory applicable within family firms?
2. Can the opposing prescriptions of agency theory and stewardship theory be integrated
within family firms to explain firm performance?
3. Does the family firm context (a) expand and/or (b) impose boundary conditions on
agency and stewardship theories?
Research Findings
Extant studies investigate whether agency or stewardship theory is more applicable
within family firms. Instead, my research investigates whether agency and stewardship theory
can be integrated to explain family firm performance. My research model intertwined structural
and behavioral components of agency and stewardship perspectives, making predictions within
theory, across theory, and integrating theory. The results of my study are discussed accordingly.
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Within Theory
The first four hypotheses in my research model examined within theory relationships.
Hypothesis 1 and 2 investigated within agency theory predictions. According to agency theory,
principals implement governance structures to curb the assumed opportunistic behavior of
managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989). These agency structures include
mechanisms that control and monitor behavior, such as the presence of a board of directors,
incentive compensation plans, and formal monitoring activities (Chrisman et al., 2007;
Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Eisenhardt, 1989). Theory suggests these structures align the goals
of the manager with the principal, and in turn firm performance in enhanced. Hypothesis 1
predicted that agency structures reduce opportunistic agent behavior; my results supported this
prediction. Hypothesis 2 linked reduced agent behavior to increased firm performance; my
results did not support this prediction.
Hypothesis 3 and 4 investigated within stewardship theory predictions. According to
stewardship theory, principals implement governance structures to empower and encourage the
assumed steward behavior of managers (Davis et al., 1997). These stewardship structures are
depicted by work environments that are participatory and collectivistic (Donaldson and Davis,
1991). Theory suggests these structures empower a steward’s other-interested and proorganizational behavior, thus leading to increased firm performance (Davis et al., 1997).
Hypothesis 3 predicted that stewardship structures enhance steward behavior; my results
supported this prediction. Hypothesis 4 linked increased steward behavior to increased firm
performance; my results did not support this prediction.
Relationship between structure and behavior. As described, the relationships between
structure and behavior were supported for within agency and within stewardship theory
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predictions. As a deeper investigation into the relationship between structure and behavior, I
examined results by kinship status. Results show that agency structures curb the agent behavior
of both family and nonfamily employees alike. However, results also show that stewardship
structures increase the steward behavior of only family employees; it has no impact on the
steward behavior of nonfamily employees. Taken together, these findings suggest that both
agency and stewardship governance structures serve their intended purpose on the behavior of
employees within family firms, but more so for family than nonfamily employees.
Relationship between behavior and performance. As described, the relationships between
behavior and firm performance were not supported for either of the within theory predictions.
This finding implies that the agent and steward behaviors of employees within the family firm do
not have a significant impact on the performance of the family firm. Within stewardship theory,
my post hoc analysis revealed a reason for these nonfindings may be due to a contingency in the
relationship between steward behavior and performance. Human capital and position with the
organization both moderated the relationship between steward behavior and firm performance.
Results indicate that the steward behavior of nonfamily employees with higher levels of
human capital is beneficial to the performance of the firm. This finding could mean that the level
of human capital impacts the nonfamily employee’s level of understanding about the goals of the
principal. Steward behavior theoretically leads to increased performance because the steward
manager is other-serving and therefore works toward the principal’s best interest (Davis et al.,
1997). A highly educated nonfamily manager would work toward the principal’s interest thereby
enhancing firm performance; however, a less educated nonfamily manager may not comprehend
the goals of the principal, thereby not behaving in a way that would lead to increased
performance. For family employees, human capital is not a moderator in the relationship
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between steward behavior and firm performance. This finding implies that family members
already have an understanding of the family firm’s goals because of the familial status,
regardless of the level of human capital.
Results also indicate that the steward behavior of family members in higher ranking
positions has a beneficial impact on firm performance. This perhaps indicates that as more
family members serve in prominent roles within the family business, the more a stewardship
culture can emerge. This reduces the cost and stress associated with potentially unnecessary
monitoring mechanisms and would allow for family members to be empowered to behave in the
best interest of the firm. In turn, increased firm performance could lead to increased benefits for
the family such as the ability to pass a successful firm to future generations. This supports the
contention of Le Breton-Miller and Miller (2009) that a stewardship perspective prevails when
the family is embedded in the business. It is also aligns with the stewardship research of
Eddleston and Kellermanns (2007) that demonstrates that family involvement can have a positive
influence on family firm outcomes and help it succeed through the generations.
Within agency theory, my post hoc analysis did not find support for moderators in the
relationship between agent behavior and performance. The lack of findings in the main effect
and in the moderation analysis could potentially be due to impression management, defined as
“those behaviors individuals employ to protect their self-images, influence the way they are
perceived by significant others, or both” (Wayne and Liden, 1995: 232). I measured agent
behavior, operationalized as unproductive behavior, in aggregate from the perception of the firm
leader. It is possible that employees may be behaving in an unproductive manner but are able to
conceal this behavior from the leader, thereby influencing the leader’s perception and survey
responses. I also measured self-reported agent behavior from both the family and nonfamily
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employee. This measure also produced nonsignificant findings, indicating the possibility that
employees rated their behavior as more productive than actual behavior in order to enhance my
perception of them.
Relationship between structure and performance. Results also indicate a positive and
significant relationship between structure and firm performance, for both agency and stewardship
structures. These findings, coupled with the lack of findings between behavior and performance,
reveal that agency and stewardship governance structures have a beneficial and direct effect on
both employee behavior and firm performance, rather than having an indirect effect on firm
performance through behavior. Additionally, these within theory results indicate that stewardship
structures and steward behavior have a greater impact on firm performance than do agency
structures and reduced agent behavior; this is especially the case when nonfamily members have
high levels of human capital and when family members are in high ranking positions within the
organization.
Across Theory
The next four hypotheses in my research model examined across theory relationships:
Hypothesis 5a and 6a examined direct effects across theories; Hypothesis 5b and 6b examined
kinship status as a moderator in these across theory relationships. Theory suggests that when the
parties in the principal-manager relationship make different choices in agency or stewardship,
negative consequences can arise (Davis et al., 1997). If a principal imposes an agency structure
on a steward manager, the manager may feel betrayed and offended by the use of these control
and monitoring mechanisms and may decrease the level of steward behavior (Pieper et al., 2008).
If a principal imposes a stewardship structure on an agent manager, the manager is afforded the
opportunity to act in a self-interested manner because behavior is not being controlled or
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monitored in this type of environment (Davis et al., 1997). Both of the across theory predictions
were supported in my research: Hypothesis 5a predicted reduced steward behavior in the
presence of agency structures; Hypothesis 6a predicted increased agent behavior in the presence
of stewardship structures. These findings demonstrate the negative behavioral consequences of
mismatched choices in the principal-manager relationship (Davis et al., 1997).
This research also examined kinship status as a moderator in the across theory
relationships, suggesting that the relationships are different for family and nonfamily employees
of the family firm. In broad terms, I suggested the negative across-theory consequences between
structure and behavior are worse for family employees than for nonfamily employees. More
specifically, in the agent structure-steward behavior relationship, my arguments were based on
fairness perceptions (Barnett and Kellermanns, 2006; Evans and Davis, 2005). If agency
structures are implemented and applied consistently across the organization, I predicted that
family employees would have lower levels of steward behavior than nonfamily employees. To
elaborate, research suggests that family employees often have a sense of entitlement. When they
are treated the same as nonfamily employees, they perceive unfairness by losing advantages (i.e.,
perks, higher compensation, no monitoring) thought to be entitled to them. Conversely,
nonfamily employees perceive fairness when the governance structure is not biased in favor of
family employees. These fairness perceptions impact the level of pro-organizational steward
behavior. Hypothesis 5b formally stated this kinship status prediction, and my results supported
this hypothesis. Agency structure is negatively and significantly related to the steward behavior
for both family and nonfamily employees. However, at high levels of agency structure, family
employees exhibit lower levels of steward behavior than nonfamily employees.
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I also predicted stronger negative consequences for family employees than for nonfamily
employees in the steward structure-agent behavior relationship. The literature suggests that
family employees are often territorial and protective of their family’s firm. When family
members feel that nonfamily members are infringing on their territory, by way of social
interaction, information exchange, and collectivistic cultures typified by stewardship structures,
their level of counterproductive behavior may increase (Rantanen and Jussila, 2011). For
nonfamily employees, who are part of the business system but not the family system,
stewardship structures can facilitate feelings of interconnectedness and membership (Mustakallio
et al., 2002). In turn, increased productive behavior (i.e., decreased agent behavior) may result
because nonfamily members feel as if they are part of the family system and want to work
toward the best interest of the family business. Hypothesis 6b formally stated this kinship status
prediction in the relationship between stewardship structure and agent behavior. Results show
support for kinship status as a moderator, but results run counter to the hypothesized predictions.
The relationship between stewardship structure and agent behavior for family employees is not
statistically significant, but it is for nonfamily employees. At low levels of stewardship structure,
both family and nonfamily employees exhibit the same level of agent behavior. However, at high
levels of stewardship structure, nonfamily employees exhibit higher levels of agent behavior than
family employees.
These results indicate that agency structure has negative consequences on the steward
behavior of both family and nonfamily employees, but more so for family employees.
Stewardship structure increases the agent behavior for nonfamily, but has no significant effect on
the agent behavior of family employees. These results support the across theory predictions and
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demonstrate that family firm governance structures have differing behavioral effects on family
and nonfamily employees of the business.
Integrating Theory
Relationship between structural integration and performance. The final hypothesis of my
research model examined the integration of agency and stewardship structures on the
performance of family firms. I suggested that family firms can have characteristics of both
agency and stewardship governance structures; firms can have high levels of both, low levels of
both, or combinations of high and low agency/stewardship structures. In Hypothesis 7, I
predicted that when firms exhibit high levels of both agency and stewardship structures, the
negative behavioral consequences across theory would be negated, thereby increasing firm
performance. Indeed, this finding is supported in my sample of family firms. The firm
performance level for the group of family firms categorized as having Trust But Monitor
Structures is significantly higher than any other combinations of structures. This finding implies
that family firms will have beneficial performance differentials when they have structures in
place both control and monitor agent behavior while simultaneously empowering steward
behavior.
A deeper investigation of the firms with Trust But Monitor structures reveals patterns in
firm level characteristics. On average, these family firms not only have high levels of both
agency and stewardship structures, but they have high levels of nonfamily on their top
management teams, and have business plans and succession plans in place. This pattern suggests
these family firms are more professionalized than the other groups in this analysis. Conversely,
firms with Undetermined Structures have the lowest levels of these characteristics among the
groups. Results also indicate that stewardship structures may have a greater benefit to firm
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performance than agency structures; high levels of stewardship structures are found in the Trust
But Monitor Structure and the Trust Structure, both of which have the higher levels of firm
performance than the Monitor or Undetermined Structure.
Relationship between structural integration and behavior. My research shows a positive
impact on family firm performance when governance structures are integrated. However, a closer
examination of the impact on behavior with consideration of kinship status was made. I
examined the effects of kinship status on within theory predictions and on across theory
predictions. Findings support behavioral differences among family and nonfamily employees
that can be attributed to family firm governance structures. When integrating agency and
stewardship structures, my research offers additional implications with regard to behavior.
Agency structure curbs agent behavior for both family and nonfamily employees, but it also
decreases steward behavior for both family and nonfamily employees. Stewardship structure
increases steward behavior for family employees but has no effect on the steward behavior of
nonfamily employees. Stewardship structure also increases agent behavior of nonfamily
employees, but has no effect on the agent behavior of family members.
This implies that agency structures are beneficial for family firms because they curb
opportunistic agent behavior; however, these structures have negative consequences on steward
behavior. Stewardship structures are beneficial for family firms because they increase steward
behavior of family employees; however, these structures are harmful because they increase the
agent behavior of nonfamily employees. This implies that agency structures are necessary, but
that stewardship structures may only be beneficial when the family firm employs a large number
of family employees.
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This can also shed light on the relationship between the principal and managers within
family firms. When the principal chooses agency, family and nonfamily employees behave
similarly: they might be agents because their agent behavior is curbed; they might be stewards
because they reduce their steward behavior because they are offended by the use of controlling
and monitoring mechanisms. When the principal chooses stewardship, family and nonfamily
employees behave differently: family employees are likely stewards because their steward
behavior increases without their level of agent behavior increasing; nonfamily employees are
likely agents because their agent behavior increases without their level of steward behavior
increasing. Taken together, this implies that family employees are stewards and nonfamily
employees are agents in the principal-manager relationship within family firms.
Contributions
This research makes contributions to the family firm literature, theory, and practice. For
family firm literature, this research answered a call for examinations of agency and stewardship
theories side by side in the context of family firms (Chrisman et al., 2007). The extant literature
adopts an either-or perspective and neglects considerations of whether both agency and
stewardship environments can coexist. My research integrated agency theory and stewardship
theory to capture the essence of family firm structure, behavior, and performance. In doing so, it
demonstrated that agency and stewardship structures individually can increase firm performance,
but that the combination of structures is more beneficial for family firm performance.
Furthermore, the combination of structures can negate the negative behavioral
consequences within the family firm. Behavior is an important but neglected element of both
agency and stewardship theories, and is therefore captured in this research. Because of the
additional focus on behavior, I was able to investigate the impact of governance structures with
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considerations of kinship status. My research demonstrated that the structure of the family firm
impacts the behavior for family and nonfamily employees differently. This implies that
respondents are a key concern in family firm research; results may be misleading if studies
continue to mix survey responses from family and nonfamily employees. Additionally, this
research makes an empirical contribution to the family firm literature. To my knowledge, it is the
first study to capture and analyze data from matched triads comprised of the leader, a family
employee, and a nonfamily employee of the family firm.
For theory, this research provides a theoretical integration, suggests an important
boundary condition, and offers a theoretical extension. This integrated study is the first to capture
the essence of both theories in tandem. Agency and stewardship theories address the principalmanager relationship from a structural, behavioral, and performance outcome perspective (Davis
et al., 1997; Eisenhardt, 1989). Accordingly, I incorporate both agency and stewardship structure
and behavior in the same research model. I empirically capture the choice of agency and
stewardship structure and behavior by obtaining and analyzing survey responses from both sides
of the principal-manager relationship. Because of this integrated approach, performance
outcomes predicted within each theory and across theories can be empirically investigated.
Second, this research imposes a boundary condition around the proposed behavioral and
performance outcomes of theory when context is taken into consideration. It empirically
investigates whether outcomes of agency and stewardship prescriptions hold equivocally
between family and nonfamily employees of the family business. Third, this research offers an
extension to agency and stewardship theories. The original theories neglect to consider how the
leader of the organization can influence the behavioral choice of managers. This study
empirically investigates whether the leader can choose and implement governance structures that
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can influence the manager’s choice of agent or steward behavior. This extension provides a new
area of investigation for agency and stewardship research, particularly as it relates to leaders
influencing matched behavioral choices to obtain the desired performance outcomes.
For practice, this research sheds light on the ambiguity surrounding the value of
governance structures for family firms. Agency and stewardship structures have a direct impact
on family firm performance, but also can have varying behavioral effects on family and
nonfamily employees of the business. Accordingly, family firm leaders need to pay particular
attention when implementing these structures. Achieving desirable firm performance levels and
desirable behavioral outcomes from family and nonfamily employees alike is a balancing act
between implementing the appropriate levels and types of governance structures.
Limitations
My research is not without limitations. Both agency and stewardship theories consider
the principal-manager relationship, and as such, empirical tests require input from each side of
the relationship. Accordingly, there was a trade-off between remaining true to the theoretical
core and sample size. I chose theory and therefore was only able to capture and analyze data
from 77 matched triads. I found support for my hypotheses linking governance structures to
individual level agent and steward behavior and was able to demonstrate that kinship status alters
these relationships. I was also able to find support linking governance structures, individually
and in combination, to firm performance. However, I did not find support for the hypothesized
relationships between individual level behaviors and firm level performance. Statistical power
may be a limitation and a reason for the non-findings. Accordingly, I conducted a power analysis
using G*Power 3.1 software (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, and Lang, 2009) by inputting a sample
size of 77, seven predictor variables (i.e., four controls, two independent variables, and one
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moderator), an effect size of 0.30 and an alpha level of 0.05. This power analysis generated result
of 0.97, which is considered an acceptable level of power (Cohen, 1988). Although the small
sample size doesn’t appear to present a power issue, it may however limit the generalizability of
my findings.
Although generalizability may be considered a limitation of my study, I demonstrated the
applicability of my research findings in three analyses. These included an analysis of response
rates, an analysis of nonresponse bias, and an analysis of sample representativeness. As reported,
my overall response rate was 9.5%, but due to constraining my data analytics to matched
organizational triads, the response rate was reduced to 3.8%. However, these response rates are
similar to those in family firm research. For example, Schulze et al (2003) reported an
organizational response rate of 10.3% (i.e., 3860 responses from 37304 firms), but dropped 2396
firms for a final response rate of 3.92%; Chrisman et al (2007) reported an 18% organizational
response rate (i.e., 5779 responses from 32156 firms), but dropped 5571 firms for a final
response rate of less than 1%. As such, my response rate statistic has been deemed acceptable in
prior family firm studies. However, I took additional steps to determine if my respondents are
representative of the population. I compared early responders with late responders, finding no
significant differences in responses across the study’s variables. Research suggests that late
responders are similar to nonresponders; therefore, finding that my late responders were similar
to my early responders implies that my sample, as a whole, is similar to the nonresponding
population (Kanuk and Berenson, 1975). Furthermore, I compared characteristics of the family
firms in my sample with (1) primary data I collected from family firms not used in my analysis
(i.e., not part of an organizational triad), (2) secondary data from a national database (e.g.,
Winter et al., 2004), and (3) sample data from prominent family firm studies grounded in agency
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and/or stewardship theory (e.g., Davis et al., 2010; Sciascia et al., 2012; Schulze et al., 2003).
These comparisons found my sample to be similar to other family firm samples. Taken together,
these analyses demonstrate the representativeness of my sample, and thus the applicability of my
research findings to the general population of family firms.
Another limitation is that my study was cross-sectional in nature and, therefore, I cannot
infer causality from my findings. For the most part, my hypothesized relationships were
supported; yet, it may be possible that the causal relationship between structure and behavior is
reversed. Meaning, the actual behavior of the employees within the firm could trigger the
principal to implement matched governance structures, rather than the structure impacting the
behavior. Furthermore, structures and behaviors within family firms may not be static; a crosssectional study would not capture the possible dynamic quality of these relationships. A
longitudinal approach is thus warranted.
By obtaining data from multiple respondents per firm, I utilized a stronger design than
commonly found in the family firm literature. Although having multiple respondents per firm
makes an empirical contribution to the family firm literature, only capturing responses from one
family and one nonfamily employee may be a limitation in my study. The perceptions of
governance structures of the responding family employee and nonfamily employee may not be
representative of the perceptions of all the employees of the family firm. In order to link
structure, behavior, and performance together within family firms, a much larger sample of
respondents per firm would be ideal. Future research could improve on my study’s design and
capture responses from more employees of the same family firm. This would allow for more
generalizable comparisons between family and nonfamily employees, rather than making one to
one comparisons.
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Future Research
Aside from future research recommendations that would address my methodological
concerns (i.e., larger sample size, longitudinal approach, additional respondents per firm), there
are additional research possibilities. Specifically, future research could investigate the integration
of agency and stewardship theories on different outcome variables. For example, my study
utilized a subjective measure of family firm performance. If the firm leader responding to the
survey was satisfied with the firm’s overall performance level, he or she may have rated their
performance as high. However, the performance level may not be objectively high. Accordingly,
I encourage research that can determine if the relationships hold when using objective measures
of performance.
Furthermore, it may also be appropriate to consider social or psychological outcomes
rather than firm performance outcomes. I did not find significant main effects in the relationships
between behavior and firm performance. Future research could examine the effects of steward
behavior and agent behavior on outcomes other than firm performance. Given that agency theory
is rooted in economics and stewardship theory is rooted in sociology and psychology, future
research should consider more than just economic outcomes. For example, socioemotional
wealth generation is suggested to be important to family firms (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). It
may be of interest to determine how agency and stewardship structures and behaviors are linked
to this noneconomic outcome. Other potential outcomes could include process variables, such as
cohesion or conflict within the family firm. In turn, these noneconomic variables could then
perhaps be linked to the performance of the family firm. Accordingly, these noneconomic
outcomes, or perhaps mediating variables, provide future research possibilities.
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Future research could also investigate additional moderators in the relationship between
behavior and performance. My post hoc analyses considered individual level characteristics,
finding both human capital and position within the organization to be moderators, contingent on
kinship status. Alternatively, firm level moderators, such as having a clear and compelling
organizational vision, may be potential areas for investigation. A clear vision describes the future
direction of the firm and provides the reasoning behind the leader and employees’ journey. It
should reflect the firm’s ideals, foster commitment and meaning in work, and enhance
motivation and change in employees (Fry, 2003; Fry and Cohen, 2009). I suspect this is a
potential moderator in the relationship between behavior and firm performance because
employees would need to have an understanding of the organization’s direction in order to
behave in the intended way. For example, it is assumed that stewards act in the best interest of
the firm, but if the best interest of the firm is unknown or misinterpreted, behavior may not have
the intended consequences. To elaborate, if the firm’s vision is to perform at the highest level
possible but employees think the vision is to increase the family’s reputation, behavior would not
align with increased firm performance. Accordingly, investigating moderators in the relationship
between individual behavior and family firm performance could help provide explanations for
my nonfindings and reveal additional contingencies within this unique context.
My research demonstrates that kinship status considerations can impact relationships
within the family firm. Most family firm research neglects to consider the nonfamily employee.
In my sample, which is shown to be representative of samples in similar family firm empirical
studies, 94% of employees (59 of 63 employees, on average) are not family members. Extant
research makes inferences about the behavior and performance of family firms; however, these
inferences largely ignore the overwhelming majority of the family firm’s workforce. Therefore, I
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encourage researchers to investigate nonfamily employees, and specifically how they may differ
from family employees. Differences in perceptions, behaviors, and individual level performance
all provide fruitful avenues for investigation.
To my knowledge, this research is the first to investigate the integration of agency and
stewardship perspectives on the behavior within and performance of family firms. Organizations
were grouped into four categories based on their level of agency and stewardship structures. A
post hoc analysis found that organizations clustered within each category are similar on
characteristics other than just their governance structures, such as the presence of a succession
plan, business plan, and nonfamily top managers, just to name a few. An in depth qualitative case
study of organizations within each of these quadrants would help us uncover behavioral and
performance patterns among different variables not studied in my research. A configurations
approach to the examination of family firm performance would be a fascinating direction for
future research.
Future research could also consider incorporating additional theoretical lenses to help
explain the behavioral and performance outcomes of the integration of agency and stewardship
structures. For example, the relationship between structural integration and behavior can
incorporate a social exchange theory or balance theory lens. Social exchange theory describes a
series of dyadic exchanges with behavior being contingent on the actions of another (Blau, 1964;
Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005; Homans, 1961). This lens could be appropriate in examining
governance structure enactment and the resulting employee behavior from a dynamic, rather than
static, perspective. Derived from social psychology, balance theory describes triadic
relationships by its focus on an individual’s perception of his or her relationship with a second
individual and a third entity such as another individual or an organization; theory suggests that a
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balanced state exists when relationships among the entities are harmonious (Peterson, 2006).
Balance theory could prove useful in examinations of relationships between family and
nonfamily employees and their attitude towards the structure of the family firm.
The relationship between structural integration and firm performance could incorporate a
resource-related theoretical lens such as resource orchestration (e.g., Sirmon, Hitt, Ireland, and
Gilbert, 2011). Resource orchestration blends the resource based view (Barney, 1991) and
dynamic capabilities perspective (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Teece, Pisano, and Shuan, 1997)
by examining managerial actions and the bundling of resources to predict firm level performance
and competitive advantages (Sirmon et al., 2011). The principal enacting certain configurations
of stewardship and agency structures depicts managerial action and resource bundling, and
would therefore allow the resource orchestration framework to serve as an appropriate theoretical
lens to investigating firm performance implications.
In summary, my dissertation research investigates agency and stewardship theory within
family firms and provides a foundation for future research that can further explore their
integration. As described, potential areas include improving upon the methodology employed in
this study, such as taking a longitudinal or in-depth qualitative approach. Future research can
investigate different outcome variables including objective measures of firm performance,
process outcomes, or individual level organizational behavior outcomes. Additional
contingencies in the hypothesized relationships, such as organizational vision or leadership
variables, could provide more insight into family firm performance. Continuing to investigate
differences between family and nonfamily perceptions and behaviors also provides promise.
Structural integration can also be examined through a configurations approach or even with the
incorporation of additional theoretical lenses. These are just a few examples of the direction
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future research integrating agency and stewardship perspectives within a family firm context can
take.
Conclusion
My dissertation investigated the agency versus stewardship theory debate within a family
firm context. Through both an exhaustive review and synthesis of the family firm literature and
an empirical test using primary data gathered from family firm leaders, family employees, and
nonfamily employees, I can sufficiently answer the research questions guiding my dissertation.
My first research question asked, ‘Are the tenets, prescriptions, and related performance
outcomes of (a) agency theory and (b) stewardship theory applicable within family firms?’ My
review of the family firm literature grounded in agency and/or stewardship theories, coupled
with the results from my empirical study, allows me to answer ‘yes’ to both parts of this
question. Agency theory and stewardship theory governance structures serve their intended
purpose on the behavior within and performance of family firms: agency structures curb
opportunistic agent behavior and increase firm performance; stewardship structures enhance
steward behavior and increase firm performance.
My second research question asked, ‘Can the opposing prescriptions of agency theory
and stewardship theory be integrated within family firms to explain firm performance?’ My
research revealed that considerations for agency and stewardship perspectives have been
neglected in the family firm literature. To address this gap, my empirical study tested
assumptions regarding the integration of theory, finding support for enhanced performance
differentials between combinations of structures. Family firms adopting high levels of both
agency and stewardship structures have significantly higher performance results. Accordingly,
my research supports a ‘yes’ answer to this question, both practically and empirically.
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My third research question asked, ‘Does the family firm context (a) expand and/or (b)
impose boundary conditions on agency and stewardship theories? The family firm literature
shows that agency and stewardship theories have been expanded in this context. Research shows
that not only do agency problems exist in family firms, which is counter to the work of early
agency theorists, but there are agency problems unique to this context. Research also supports
stewardship theory’s expansion into the family firm context, with studies demonstrating that
family firms are an ideal context for stewardship to thrive. My empirical investigation offers
another step toward further expansion of these theories. My research shows that agency and
stewardship structures and behaviors can coexist in family firms. This is different from the
existing literature that depicts agency and stewardship theories at polar extremes. My research
demonstrates that these theories in opposition can expand into each other, thus narrowing the
distance between both sides of the debate. Additionally, my research suggests that the leader of
the family business can alter the behavior of the employees and performance levels of the firm
by making changes to the governance structures. Shifting the primary focus to the role of the
family firm leader, rather than the structure or behavior, could allow for additional theoretical
expansions. Accordingly, I can answer ‘yes’ to the question of whether the family firm context
expands agency theory and stewardship theories.
My research considers the role of kinship status as a factor that places a boundary
condition on predictions grounded in agency and stewardship theories. My empirical
investigation demonstrates that family and nonfamily employees of the family firm behave
differently as a result of agency and stewardship structures. Agency structures reduce agent and
steward behavior for both family and nonfamily employees. Stewardship structures increase
agent behavior for nonfamily employees, but have no effect on the agent behavior of family
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employees. Stewardship structures also increase steward behavior for family employees, but
have no effect on the steward behavior of nonfamily employees. Furthermore, my post hoc
examination demonstrated that human capital and position within the organization influence the
relationship between steward behavior and firm performance differently for family and
nonfamily employees. Employing highly educated nonfamily employees and high ranking family
employees is beneficial to the performance of the family firm. Kinship status, which is a unique
construct within family firms, is found to be a contingency in my hypothesized relationships.
Accordingly, I can answer ‘yes’ to the question of whether the family firm context imposes a
boundary condition on agency and stewardship theories.
In conclusion, my dissertation investigated the theoretical and empirical debate of agency
theory versus stewardship theory in the context of family firms, revealing that the distance
between these opposing theoretical perspectives can be narrowed. My research shows that both
theories, separately and in combination, are applicable within family firms. Separately, agency
and stewardships structures serve their within-theorized purpose on the behavior within and
performance of family firms; however, consideration must be made to the differing effects of
these structures on the behavior of family and nonfamily employees of the family firm. In
combination, family firms with both agency and stewardship structures in place have superior
performance. This research is a first step in integrating agency theory and stewardship theory to
more accurately capture the essence of family firm structure, behavior, and performance. I
encourage scholars to build from this foundation; this integration has the potential to provide
great contributions to theory and to the field.
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